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SATURA—THE GENESIS OF A LITERARY FORM

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It is a familiar observation of the commentators on Horace that the word *satura*, with which the second book of the *Sermones* opens—“sunt quibus in *satura*”—is there found for the first time in extant Roman literature as the designation of a literary form. That the non-occurrence of the word before this time is merely a matter of accident, a caprice of fortune in the preservation of literary monuments, has been, I presume, the general opinion of those whose studies have led them to take cognizance of the matter. Apart from the general assumption that Lucilius used the word either as a title or as a generic designation for his caustic poems, it has been the accepted opinion that it was similarly used by Ennius, not to mention the pre-literary dramatic *satura* of Livy's narrative. Since Kiessling's time we have become familiar with the suggestion that Ennius was the “inventor” of the name as a literary title. But this confidence in the early occurrence of the word rests upon an insecure foundation of assumption and inference, to which Marx has called attention in the *Prolegomena* to his edition of Lucilius. His brief observations give a most important hint for the history of the beginnings of Roman satire and they contain implications which neither Marx himself nor any who have since discussed the subject have followed out. Throughout the following discussion I would profess the fullest indebtedness to Marx, which will be recognized by those familiar with his learned and brilliant work.

As regards the occurrence of the word, we have then the two well-known passages in Horace (*Serm.* ii. 1 and 6) and the reference in *Livy* vii. 2 to the early dramatic performances which he designates as *saturae*. After this time the word is not found until the latter part of the first century A.D. But with this statement of the facts of occurrence the significant features of the matter are by no means exhausted. Marx himself has called attention to one noteworthy passage in which the word is not used where it might have been expected. It is Varro's allusion (*R. R.* iii. 2, 17) to "L. Abuccius homo ut scitis adprime doctus, cuius *Luciliano charactere* sunt *libelli*," and it may be added that the context of Varro indicates that the writings of Abuccius had to do with a censure of Roman luxury, a Lucilian theme. Similarly in Trebatius' account of a Lucilian invective in verses of his own composition contained in *Ad fam.* xii. 16. 3 (also cited by Marx), the absence of the word *satura* may well be significant. But these are no more than hints and indications: to have weight and meaning the number of such observations must be increased, and the character of each passage carefully weighed.

First then it is to be noted that Cicero nowhere alludes to Lucilius as a writer of any specific literary form or genus, in spite of a good many references to him. For Cicero apparently his work is as individual as the man himself, and in alluding to it he is content with general descriptive words, as in *De or.* ii. 25: "C. Lucilius homo doctus et *perurbanus* dicere solebat *ea quae scribebat* neque se ab *indocissimis*," etc., or again in *De fin.* i. 7: "et sunt *illius scripta leviora*, ut *urbanitas summa adpareat*," etc. As here, so generally elsewhere, the mention of Lucilius is attended by descriptive words or allusions which convey the idea of humorous or satirical writing, and it is at least noteworthy that nowhere the more precise and compact technical term should have been used for this purpose if it was available. It may be questioned whether any other literary name of equal prominence figures in the works of Cicero so vaguely. But whether this vagueness is in defect of a defined category and a name, or is a matter of chance, we may for the moment leave undetermined.

Far more significant than the absence of the word *satura*, or of

any other technical designation of Lucilius' work, from the pages of Cicero is its absence from contexts which seem fairly to clamor for it in Horace's first book of *Sermones*. The fourth satire is a document—but one of many we must believe—of the debate which was going on at Rome in Horace's time concerning the style and spirit of Lucilius' writings and the method of reproducing them for uses of the present. There were typical as well as individual differences in this effort; but probably Horace was at the opposite end of the scale from those who fancied themselves the most legitimate inheritors of the mantle of Lucilius, and who strove most faithfully to reproduce his manner. Horace begins, probably with reference to other contemporary discussions, with a definition of the *character Lucilianus* by pointing out his dependence upon the old Attic comedy. Both Crispinus¹ and Fannius, who follow, must be understood as imitators of the Lucilian style; the former, like Persius and Juvenal at a later time, a declaimer in hexameter verse against vice from the ethical standpoint of Stoicism, the latter, on the evidence at least of the pseudo-Acronian scholia, the author of satires. In contrast with the self-complacent assurance of Fannius, Horace vaunts his own reserve: "cum *mea* nemo *scripta* legat . . . quod sunt quos *genus* *hoc* minime iuvat." Then, after defining the classes against which the satirist directs his attacks, "omnes hi metuunt *versus*, odere poetas." The vagueness of *versus* has often been commented upon by editors and critics and variously justified, but a more simple explanation of the colorless general term, namely the lack of a specific word, has not, I think, been entertained. Again in 56 the style and manner which Horace is cultivating are characterized not by reference to a generic name, but by reference to Lucilius: "his ego quae nunc, olim quae scripsit Lucilius," and once more in 64, *genus* *hoc* takes the place of a fuller periphrasis. Throughout the whole of the satire it is plain that the poet is dealing with a literary genus which is for him the *character Lucilianus*, but for which he has at

¹ Concerning Crispinus the scholia contain certain items of information which cannot reasonably be looked upon as manufactured to fit the text of Horace: "Hic Crispinus *poeta* fuit, qui sectam Stoicam *versibus* scripsit" (ad *Serm. i.* 120). In the same place they report that the epithet *aretalogus* was applied to him, a name which implies not so much loquacity as a certain bizarre and fantastic treatment of satirical matter for which we should find better analogues in Lucilius and Juvenal than in Horace (v. Reitzenstein *Hell. Wundererzählungen*, pp. 8 ff.).

disposal apparently no single or comprehensive designation. As in Varro's allusion to Abuccius, so in this satire of Horace his own writings and those of others in the same style are *libelli characte Luciliano*.¹ Nor can it be urged that a technical designation is something which we might expect to find avoided. At all events Horace does not hesitate to refer to *comoedia* here (45) as he does to *mimos* in the tenth satire (6) in making comparisons with the style which he is defining.

Again in the discussion of the tenth satire, the word *satura*, comprehending briefly the literary type under consideration, might advantageously have found a place, though no single passages which point to its need so definitely as *genus hoc* and *versus* in the fourth can perhaps be indicated. But in such a transition as is made in vs. 7 from the characterization of Lucilius to the universal demands of satirical writing ("ergo non satis est . . . est brevitate opus"), a vagueness results which I cannot but suspect was due to Horace's inability to use a technical designation for the literary form which he proceeds to define in respect to its spirit and style. The lack of some such specific word of definition gives to the injunctions which follow a universality of application which is obviously not the poet's intention. I have spoken of Horace's inability to use a specific name, but it will of course be clear that its absence might equally well be due to the purist's aversion to a new word.

Concerning this composition in general the observation should be made that the warmth of Horace's criticism of Lucilius has to do only secondarily or even remotely with Lucilius himself. It has to do with a problem of the present, viz., the definition of the *character Lucilianus*, not as a matter of historical criticism, but as a norm or standard for present practice. The opponents of Horace had according to the letter a very good case in urging that the revived Lucilian style should follow the example of its inventor: should indulge itself in coarse wit, should admit of the prolixity of affected extemporization, should aim primarily at the biting and the caustic, should intermix Greek words with a colloquial freedom which rhetorical prose had long since forbidden. Against all this Horace raised his protest, and urged that, if the *character Lucilianus* was to take its

¹Cf. also vs. 71: "neque pila libellos," and vs. 101: "afore chartis."

place as a literary form in the present, its founder should not be looked upon as faultless: a genius, to be sure, and originator of a form and style untouched by Greek influence, but not a model for a more finished age; nor would Lucilius himself in their own age have written as he had done in the time which fate had allotted to him.

We see here very concretely and definitely the efforts of Horace, as against the theoretical demands and the practice of some of his contemporaries, to pass beyond the personality of Lucilius; to generalize a type of literature which, taking its origin from Lucilius, shall no longer be defined by traits which represented merely his faults and the limitations of his time; in short, to create out of the *character Lucilianus* a Roman satire. But as yet a recognized and current name for this revived Lucilianism was lacking. For all the efforts of his own circle of literary friends and associates toward the re-creation of older literary forms Horace finds some characterizing words suggestive of their distinctive labors—the *comes libelli* of Fundanius, the *facta regum pede ter percusso* of Pollio, the *forte epos* of Varius, the *Cameneae gaudentes rure* of Virgil—but for himself he says, with the same looseness of allusion which we noted in the fourth satire, “*hoc erat melius quod scribere possem*,” only suggesting as before a definition of his field by reference to Lucilius—“*inventore minor*.” In fine, the character of Horace’s references to his literary form throughout Book i bears the mark either of vagueness, or of definition merely by reference to the manner of his great predecessor. This phenomenon so often recurring does not seem merely a matter of chance or of taste in the choice of expressions.¹

¹ It is worth noting at this point that in two places Horace alludes to his satirical writing with *ludo* (“haec ego ludo”) and *inludo* (“ubi quid datur oti inludo chartis”). The only fragment of Lucilius which bears any trace of allusion to his work by title employs the words *ludus ac sermones* (1039, and Marx’s comment). The inferior MSS of Seneca give to the satire on the death of Claudius the title *ludus de morte Claudi*. For *Naevius in ludo* see below, p. 135, n. 2.

The natural Greek words to represent the idea of satire are *κωμῳδεῖν κωμῳδία*—“*voces ad quodvis fere ludibrii genus significandum usurpatae*” (Wachsmuth *Corp. poesis ludib. 25*). In the well-known and chaotic passage of Joh. Lydus *De mag. pop. rom. I, 41*, *κωμῳδεῖν* is used to describe the spirit of Lucilius’ writings, and *σατυρικὴ κωμῳδία* of the developed Roman satire. What the *σατυρικαὶ κωμῳδίαι* of Sulla (*Athen. 261 c*) were in fact it is quite impossible to say, but it would seem probable that the Greek designation represents an interpretation or conception of some poems of Sulla as Roman satires, from the standpoint of a later time. It is almost inevitable that the Greek grammarians who first gave a learned attention to Lucilius—Laelius

Now at the beginning of Book ii Horace, without circumlocution or apology, starts off at once with a technical designation of the Lucilian style—"sunt quibus in *satura*." Here at length we have a name, and together with the name we discern that some progress has been made toward defining it as a literary genus. Its laws have been abstracted and codified ("ultra *legem* tendere *opus*"), and Lucilius, though himself the "inventor," is thought of as having composed to a definite end:

cum est Lucilius ausus
primus in hunc operis componere carmina morem.

Here then, whether due to chance or to the developments of the intervening time, there is an absence of that vagueness of allusion which we noted in Book i. We have passed from the *character Lucilianus* to the recognition of a literary type. But though the occurrence of *satura* here and its repetition in the sixth poem (*saturis musaque pedestri*) would seem to point to the full habilitation of the word, yet as it is associated in the first passage with the technical language of a grammatical definition ("ultra *legem*"), so we may suspect that it was slow to obtain a place in the recognized literary vocabulary of the language. It is not to be wondered at that for his first book of satires Horace should not have employed as title a word which in the text of the book itself he has apparently not felt free to use. But for the second book it is not so clear, and it struck Porphyrio as peculiar that a work which avowed itself as satire should bear

Archelaus, Vectius Philocomus, and doubtless others—should have had occasion to assign his work to some general category of literature, and it is not easy to see where else it can have been placed than under the generic heading *κωμῳδία*. Such considerations would, perhaps, account for the early association of Lucilius with old comedy, and they may explain why Horace is at pains to state definitely that his own satirical writings are not meant for the stage—an assurance which would have been apparently superfluous with the title *satura*, but which would have some manifest motive if the Lucilian style were commonly classed as *κωμῳδία*—

haec ego ludo
quae neque in aede sonent certantia iudice Tarpa
nec redeant iterum atque iterum spectanda theatris.

In contrast with these are the true stage comedies of Fundanius,

arguta mercetrice potes Davoque Chremeta
eludente senem comis garrire libellos
unus vivorum.

But from these considerations I draw no positive conclusions that Horace's satires were called either *ludi* or *comœdiae*. Both observations serve rather to show that a fixed category of satire and a name were still lacking.

the title *Sermones*: "hos duos libros cum sermonum inscripserit tamen de his sic loquitur quasi *satura*" (ad ii. 1. 1). There is no evidence that the writings of Juvenal, for instance, were ever called either by their author or by the public anything else than *satura*: but Horace chose for both books the title *Sermones*, and why? Was it because, as we have supposed,¹ he chose to use a specific descriptive name within the larger genus, or was the term *satura* not yet sufficiently established to be available? Once again, in the epistle to Florus, Horace refers to his satires, and here also not by their technical, generic name, but descriptively as *Biomei sermones*, adding as if in explanation of their character as satires the words *et sale nigro*. It will not do to make too much of the passage, but the fact that the precise and technical designation of his odes and epodes has just preceded ("carmine tu gaudes hic delectatur *iambis*") may raise the suspicion that the word *satura* was still a stranger even after the experiment of its employment in Book ii. Even as late as 30 A.D. one may infer from the language of Velleius that the word was not yet thoroughly naturalized. For in his survey of the republican literature in ii. 9 he classifies the names which he reviews under general categories of literary effort: "oratores Scipio Laeliusque, etc., . . . Q. Mucius *iuris scientia* . . . clara ingenia in *togatis Afranii*, in *tragoediis Pacuvii atque Accii* . . . *historiarum auctor Sisenna, Rutilius*," etc. But in the midst of this series, following the tragedians, he inserts the Lucilian satire with only these words: "celebre et *Lucili nomen fuit*." For him, apparently, as for Cicero, *Lucilius* is an individual and not the representative of a literary genus.²

But it may be said, is not all this negative evidence, this argument

¹ See the writer's discussion, "Are the Letters of Horace Satires?" *Am. Jour. of Phil.* XVIII (1897), p. 313.

² A brief note in passing. Festus (ex Verrio) quotes from *Naevius in satyra* (257 M), "quia nam Saturnium populum pepulisti," a fragment which has generally been connected with the two well-known lines quoted by Cicero *De sen.* 20: "cedo qui vestram rem publicam," etc. The formula with which Cicero indicates the source of his quotation—"sic enim percontantur in *Naevii poetae ludo*"—has caused much debate, though in fact there is no good reason for questioning the integrity of the text. Now if the two fragments are from the same source, we have, for the purposes of our inquiry, the curious and noteworthy circumstance that Cicero cites the work with the words "in *Naevii ludo*," while Verrius, a generation later, cites the same work with *Naevius* "in *satyra*."

from silence, outweighed by the fact that Varro had already discussed the etymology of *satura* and inquired into its origins? It has been a very general assumption that the various speculations which Diomedes and the Horatian scholia give concerning the origin of the word *satura* and its application to a form of literature go back for the best part to Varro, and in this confidence a special feeling of security has been entertained concerning the foundations of our knowledge. But let us see. In the article of Diomedes the name of Varro occurs only once: "(*satura dicta*) a quodam genere farciminis, quod multis rebus refertum saturam dicit Varro vocitatum. Est autem hoc positum in secundo libro Plautinarum quaestionum 'satura est uva passa,' etc. (G.L. I, 485)." Diomedes (and his source) of course is discussing the origin of the name of the literary form, but it will be seen that this passage contains no evidence to show that Varro was doing so. Varro was explaining the word *satura* as it appeared in some connection in the language of Plautus, whether the Plautus which we now have, or a larger Plautus which he may have recognized. Now the word *saturam* is found in the *Amphitruo* (667), where it is applied to Alcumena in the natural and obvious meaning of pregnant, and it is to this passage that Marx refers Varro's gloss (*Proleg.*, p. xi). But I cannot entertain so much confidence in a matter so slightly reported to us, and indeed some obvious considerations would seem to me to make it unlikely that Marx is right. For if a grammarian offers a gloss or etymological explanation it is presumably to explain a difficulty or obscurity. This is not present in the case of *saturam* in the *Amphitruo*. Nor again would it be any explanation of the adjective use there found to point out another substantive use of the word. That the Plautine Questions would scarcely afford occasion to consider *satura* as the name of a form of literature need not be said. Of what word or phrase Varro's gloss is an explanation we can only conjecture, but not without plausibility. The archaic phrase *per saturam* is quoted from Laelius, from T. Annius Luscus (against Ti. Gracchus), and it is found in a fragment of Lucilius. In the time of Cicero and Varro it was already obsolete, and it continued so until it was resuscitated by the conscious archaist Sallust. Here was something of the older language which demanded explanation then as it does now.

The problem which it presented was to find a substantive (to be supplied) or a substantive meaning for the adjective form, to which the preposition could be logically prefixed. Varro, following the second alternative, finds it in the technical language of the culinary art, where as he says *satura* is a *genus farciminis*, and thus he affords a conceivable history of the origin of the phrase *per saturam*. Through Varro *satura* thus found a place among the words requiring glossographical treatment. Verrius, a successor in the same line of learned inquiry and collecting material for his general treatise, *De verborum significatu*, from Varro's monographical Plautine study, repeats his predecessor's explanation and adds another: "(satura) et lex multis alis legibus conferta." But in this addition, as Marx has pointed out, he has gone quite astray, misled by the occurrence of the phrase *per saturam* in connection with laws and the business of legislation, and so postulates a *lex saturam* which is not attested by the examples to which he appeals. But to *satura* as a form of literature, like Varro, he makes no allusion. The application of these glosses to the explanation of the name of the literary genus belongs to the scholarship of a later time, which cast about for still other possibilities, in the familiar manner of ancient etymology. Thus "satura a saturis" and "satura a lance variis multisque primitiis referta" were excogitated—an explanation which in later antiquity came to prevail ("plerique satyram a lance . . . nomen accepisse dicunt," *Ps. Acro* p.1 Keller). It would seem probable, and it is, I believe, generally assumed, that the passage of Diomedes is drawn from Suetonius without essential additions, but it must be entirely a matter of conjecture to what ultimate source it is to be referred—whether to Probus or to some other grammarian of the first century—nor does it much matter. Let it suffice to say that the most obvious etymological associations of the name—"a copia et saturitate rei"—apparently underlie Juvenal's description of the satirist's field:

quidquid agunt homines, votum timor ira voluptas
gaudia discursus, nostri farrago libelli est.

The purpose of this discussion is to show that to our earlier instances of the non-occurrence of the word *satura*, in connections

where it might have been looked for, we must add the important item that neither Varro nor Verrius explained the word as the name of a poetical form, nor alluded to it. For in view of the fact that Varro's consideration of the word in an entirely remote connection (*quaestiones Plautinae*) is cited, it would seem a tolerably certain conclusion that he had nowhere else discussed the matter. His silence, taken in conjunction with the other examples of its non-occurrence down to Horace's second book, point to the conclusion that the word was not yet in current usage to designate the Lucilian style. The situation in his time is indicated concretely it would seem by his own usage in reference to the satires of Abuccius, "eius *Luciliano charactere* sunt libelli."

If, then, it seems a probable conclusion that the substantive *satura* as the designation of a form of literature was either not in existence or not in current usage down to the decade 40-30 B.C., how shall we explain the origin and genesis of it at that particular time? The older explanations of the name *satura* in spite of many differences have yet all rested on the assumption that the word was early in Latin usage, and for the most part have appealed to the designation of the early dramatic form which Livy describes in vii. 2. But whether Livy's account has any basis of ultimate historical fact or not, no one will now believe that the name *satura* in it (which Horace's essentially parallel description does not contain) has any claim to be looked upon as primitive or original. The word *saturae* in Livy belongs to the descriptive vocabulary either of the historian himself, or of a contemporary source, employing the new designation which the literary criticism of the period had but recently acquired to indicate the humorous and satirical character of the performances which are described. An historical development therefore from the early dramatic to the later literary satire, on the evidence of a common name, can no longer be traced.

Now the positive teaching of antiquity on this matter makes satire begin with Ennius,¹ and it distinguishes between satire *par excellence* (namely Lucilian) and the earlier satire of Ennius. Kiessling it was, I think, who first (1886) threw out the hint that Ennius with the title *satura* was aiming at some suggestion of miscellany

¹ Diomedes-Suetonius *G.L.* I, 485.

such as is contained in Alexandrine titles like *ἄτακτα* or *σύμμικτα*, and he suggested that *poesis* was probably to be understood with it; Leo¹ with sounder feeling connected the name with the colloquial phrase *per saturam*, but both erred in assuming that Ennius did or could have used the substantive form *satura*. Marx makes the necessary correction and conjectures that the miscellaneous poems of Ennius bore the title *poemata per saturam* and that following this model Lucilius used *sermones per saturam*. This suggestion rests upon the analogy of such titles as *Divi Claudi apotheosis Annaei Senecae per saturam* and *Pescennius Festus in libris historiarum per saturam* cited by Lactantius (*Inst. i. 21. 13*). Still another example can be adduced from the mediaeval *vita Boetii* (Peiper, p. xxxi), which, referring to the composition of the *De consolatione*, says: "in quo (sc. carcere) repositus hos *libros per satyram* edidit, imitatus vide-licet Martianum Felicem Capellam." Whether in fact *per saturam* was attached to the title of Boethius' work the available record of inscriptions and subscriptions in the MSS does not reveal. The same may be said of the encyclopedia of Martianus Capella, with which the author of the life compares Boethius' work. However, the curious conceit of making *Satura* the narrator of the festivities with which the nuptials of Philology and Mercury were celebrated might be interpreted as a sort of jesting allusion to a form of title like *libri per saturam*.

These examples will suffice at least to show that the assumption of such a title for Lucilius is by no means incredible, and since *per saturam* is the only genuinely attested phrase from the early language from which the form *satura* can be derived, it is hard to see from what other source the origin of the name is to be sought. What *saturam* in the phrase *per saturam* is we do not know any better than the ancients did, nor are we likely to find out. The derivations of the ancient grammarians from *lanx* *satura*, *lex* *satura*, etc., are blind guesses, the futility of which is revealed by their variety; to the unsatisfying conjecture of one generation the next added still another. The method can be seen very clearly in the treatment of Verrius (Festus). To Varro's explanation *satura* = *genus farciminis* he adds a *lex* *satura*. But if one will follow the matter closely it

¹ "Varro und die Satire," *Hermes* XXIV (1889), p. 77.

will appear very clearly that this *lex* has its origin in a misapprehension of the meaning of the phrase *per saturam* in certain connections having to do with law and legislation.¹ With regard to *lax saturam*, the contribution of a still later time, we are no better off. It is only attested by the erudition of the grammarians in this connection, and it is not impossible that it also rests upon some similar misapprehension of *per saturam* in the context of sacrificial or ritualistic language.² As for Varro's *satura* as a *genus farciminis* I would not be boldly incredulous, but in the lack of evidence of usage one must accept it with some caution. All that remains of really attested usage from the early language itself is the phrase *per saturam*. Passing over Ennius one can discern an appropriateness in the title *libri per saturam* for the writings of Lucilius which may be variously illustrated, both from the character of the extant fragments and from ancient criticism. Lucilius was notoriously and even ostentatiously an extemporizer,

in hora saepe ducentos,
ut magnum, versus dictabat stans pede in uno,

and there is much probability that the term *schedium*,³ which is variously associated with his writings, goes back to his own usage. For such characteristics of style, combined with a discursive handling of subject-matter, a more fitting title than *libri per saturam* could not easily have been devised.

In the period intervening between Lucilius and Horace the writings of Lucilius were the object of some learned study, the barest record of which Suetonius has preserved for us. Some of it had to do with

¹ See Marx *Proleg.* XI, and *Com. ad vs.* 48. The matter was correctly apprehended also by Funck in his Program of the Gymnasium at Kiel, 1888, p. 14: "Für so ganz ausgemacht möchte ich es aber doch nicht halten, ob wirklich die *lex saturam* der Grammatiker der Ausgangspunkt der Redensart *per saturam* war; es wäre auch denkbar dass sie nur aus der juristischen Gebrauchssphäre sich rückwärts eine solche *lex* konstruiert hätten, und dass die Wurzeln der Formel schon im sermo vulgaris zu suchen wären." An early variant of the formula *per saturam*, but with no difference of meaning, is *in saturam*, found in the *lex repetund.*, *C.I.L.* I, pp. 62, 72. A consideration of this phrase by Verrius or his source would have made the interpretation of *per saturam*=*per legem saturam* quite impossible. For the variation of prepositional usage one may compare *in vicem* and *per vices*.

² Cf. Funck *op. cit.*, p. 16: "Es ist also wenig Grund vorhanden mit Sicherheit von der *lax saturam* oder *satura* allein in dieser Bedeutung zu sprechen," etc.

³ See the frag. ap. Fest. 294: "qui *schedium* fa<ciam>"=Marx 1297 and commentary.

the text of the poet, some with his life, nor is it unlikely that some steps were taken toward the definition of his *γένος*, such as for example the association of his satirical vein with the old Attic comedy. But it does not appear that his poetry was as yet recognized as constituting an independent literary type. As has been said above, for Cicero, Lucilius is merely an individual with individual traits¹ of a humorous or satirical tendency. Those who like Trebatius or Q. Abuccius write poems in his vein represent themselves or are represented as followers of Lucilius or imitators of his manner. That is to say, there was recognized and perhaps pretty well defined a *character Lucilianus*, but the generalization of this individual quality to a universal type had not yet been made, and as yet therefore the want of a generic name had not been felt.

Such then was the situation when Horace, after his return from the defeat at Philippi, was impelled, as he tells us, by the bitter experiences of life to try his hand at forms of verse which should afford an outlet to his spleen. The surviving results of this activity contained in the first book of the *sermones* afford clear evidence that we are in the very crisis where the experiments of a number of writers, their criticisms, disputes, and recriminations, were gradually evolving from the style and manner of Lucilius a literary form of a more universal and generic kind. All of Horace's utterances in the three or four critical essays which he contributes to the question reveal this process and become more intelligible in the light of this conception. His starting-point is from Lucilius; satire for him is still the *character Lucilianus*, but he shows signs of revolt. In i. 4 and i. 10 we have the documents which contain the evidence both of dependence and of revolt.² But Horace was not the only aspirant for honors in the revived Lucilianism of the time. Apart from Varro of Atax, whose work cannot have long antedated Horace's own first efforts, and the *quidam alii* of the same passage, there were others whose names Horace's criticism has preserved for us—Crispinus, Fannius, Fabius, poets who were preaching practical Stoic ethics in the vein

¹ Cf. *De orat.* iii. 171: "in quo lepide lusit *is*, qui elegantissime *id facere potuit*, Lucilius."

² See the writer's study of i. 4 ("A Protest and a Programme") in *Am. Jour. Phil.* XXI (1900), p. 121, and of i. 10 ("Horace and Lucilius") in *Studies in Honor of B. L. Gildersleeve*, p. 151.

of Lucilius, forerunners of Persius and Juvenal. Still others must have taken a hand in the critical and theoretical questions at issue—Hermogenes, Furius Bibaculus, Demetrius, and all the literary rabble hinted at in i. 10.¹ At the same time Valerius Cato was editing Lucilius, and his coterie of pupils and friends are among the critics whom Horace has provoked and against whom he defends himself.²

Thus in the decade 40 to 30 B.C. there was well under way an enthusiastic revival of Lucilius—in part of course only one manifestation of the same tendencies which were producing the archaic affectations of Sallust and Asinius—a revival which manifested itself in new texts of the poet, in emulation of the Lucilian style by contemporary writers, and in discussions of literary criticism and theory. But at the beginning of this time there was still no brief and comprehensive designation of the literary form which Lucilius had created. In consequence critical discussion and theory labored under the embarrassment of vague nomenclature (such as Horace's *hoc genus* or *versus*) or descriptive periphrasis (*his ego quae nunc olim quae scripsit Lucilius*). Thus from a Lucilian title such as *libri per saturam* a name was created by the demands of the time for a convenient designation, and the substantive form *satura* began to be employed. Whether it first came into vogue merely as a convenient abbreviation or as the result of some etymological fancy it is impossible to say. But for this second alternative it could be urged that etymology was one of the recognized means of restoring assumed ancient usage, and that the linguistic science of the time did not hesitate to put in practice the results to which it attained. At all events by the time Horace's second book appeared the usage had become sufficiently recognized in literary and gram-

¹The satire of Lenaeus (*Magni Pompei libertus*) directed against Sallust belongs to this time (Suet. *de gram.* 15). The *Indignatio* of Valerius Cato (*ibid.* 11) in the mouth of the editor of Lucilius, and with its suggestion of Juvenal's *facit indignatio*, has the look of a Lucilian satire.

²Let me say in passing that I feel convinced that the eight lines prefaced to i. 10 in a part of our text tradition are Horatian, and that the *fictus adversarius* of the poem is generalized from Cato and his school. Thus, for example, *simius iste* would represent some character like Furius Bibaculus (whom Horace makes ridiculous in vs. 36), the faithful satellite of Cato and *doctus cantare Catullum* (cf. Heidel in *Proceedings Am. Phil. Assn.* XXXII [1900], p. xliv).

matical circles, and *satura* now appears as the technical designation of the literary form derived from Lucilius, which before this time had only been indicated by some descriptive periphrasis. To the period, therefore, of Horace's early satires, it would seem, must be attributed not only the generalization of the Lucilian style from an individual to a more generic type, but also the gathering up of this conception into a single name. Roman satire begins with Lucilius, but the better part of a century had elapsed before it claimed a place as a recognized and independent form of literature.¹

NEW HAVEN, CONN.

¹ The remarkable paper of Dr. Alfred Klotz on the Catalogue of the writings of Varro in the latest number of *Hermes* (XLVI, 1 ff.) reached me too late to be taken account of here. The questions raised by the Varronian titles had not escaped me, but their consideration becomes the more pressing if in fact they are from Varro's own hand.

THE EARLY GOLD AND SILVER MANUSCRIPTS

BY JOHN M. BURNAM

There exists a small group of manuscripts chiefly of the fifth and sixth centuries written usually on purple parchment and in gold letters, or in silver, sometimes employing these two metal tinctures in combination. One is in the Gothic language, probably an Italian production, two are Greek, and five are Latin and with possibly one exception assignable to the Italian peninsula. They form a special class in the larger group of very handsomely decorated codices of the early Christian period. All of them are interesting as monuments of Christian art and literature, and as such have been the subject of numerous articles in magazines, besides treatment in monographs and comprehensive treatises. The discussion of them has been from the point of view of art, history, paleography, and biblical criticism. The writer of the present paper believes they deserve a place in the history of symbolism also.

Chrysography or writing with gold tinctures has been treated by Ch. Graux in the *Revue de Philologie* V (1881), 117-21, and in the *Saglio Dictionnaire*, art. "Chrysographie"; by W. Wattenbach in his well-known *Schriftwesen*, 3d ed. (1896), 251-61, who made some additions to the material gathered by his predecessors; and nominally by Mau in the Pauly-Wissowa *Realencyclopädie* under the title *χρυσογραφία*, where, however, the topic is merely mentioned. Other mentions are found in Birt's *Antikes Buchwesen* (1882) 108 and 502, and once more in the same author's *Buchrolle in der Kunst* (1907) 22 n. and 302 n. 2 with some corrections¹ to previous statements. Some welcome contributions to the whole subject were furnished in 1902 by L. Blau in his *Studien zum althebräischen Buchwesen*. His ideas were partly utilized and partly opposed by L. Traube in his epoch-making essay *Nomina Sacra* (1907) 21-24; this work contains, too, on pp. 178-85 a valuable list of the earliest

¹On p. 22 n. he cites a papyrus of the third or fourth century which shows that contrary to his earlier opinion, gold writing was possible on both parchment and papyrus, *ἐπὶ χάρτου ή διφθέρας*.

Latin manuscripts, biblical and patristic, and on pp. 56-87 a similar catalogue for the Greek language.

Blau's treatise deserves special mention at this point, for besides using whatever had been gathered by Graux and Wattenbach, he first saw the prime importance of the sections 176-79 of the famous Aristeas letter. This passage tells us how the high priest at Jerusalem sent to Ptolemy Philadelphus a series of handsome presents, among which was (176) *ταῖς διαφόροις διφθέραις ἐν ἣ νομοθεσίᾳ γεγραμμένη χρυσογραφίᾳ τοῖς Ἰουδαϊκοῖς γράμμασι θαυμασίως*. Again, p. 80 and n. 3, we learn that in the Song of Songs (1:3) the golden lines with silver points mean the Torah or Book of the Law (*ἡ νομοθεσίᾳ* in the aforesaid letter) written out in silver letters or words. On pp. 143-44 he adduces another interpretation traditional among the Hebrew doctors according to which silver lines should accompany golden letters.

This same scholar (pp. 157-62) brings up for discussion the entire topic of chrysography, and shows that whereas Loew (*Graphische Requisiten* I, 161 ff.) and Wattenbach (*op. cit.* 112) were able to cite no earlier authority for gold-lettered manuscripts than this same narrative regarding the high priest and Ptolemy but depended for proof on Josephus (*Antiqq. Judaeorum* XII, 2, 11 [III, 87, 19 Niesel]), this extract is merely a reproduction of the words of Aristeas. And on pp. 46 and 159 he emphasizes the combination of gold and silver in the same codex or roll and claims with justice, as it seems to the present writer, that there were some very early books entirely in these metal tinctures; that is to say, that the doubts on this point shared by Traube and others are groundless, and it was not merely initial letters or lines or the *τετραγράμματον*, *τὸ ὄνομα τὸ ἀνεκπροσφόνητον*, the *nomen Dei ineffable*, which was so honored. When men once learned how to make a writing-fluid containing a solution of either of the precious metals, why should it not be applied to the entire compass of a venerable text?

In all this valuable treatise, there is nothing more interesting than the discussion of the rule that if the *nomen ineffable* be written in gold, such writing must be hidden, that is, withdrawn from the public gaze. That name had a miraculous and magic power which rendered its use by the ignorant and uninitiated very dan-

gerous. This is a primitive conception, well known in the history of religion, current not merely among the Hebrews, but among early Christians too, for whom the name of the Savior had the same significance as the Tetragrammaton among the Jews. This fact accounts satisfactorily for the concealment of the *nomen ineffabile* and the loss of its true pronunciation even on the part of the priesthood. It became necessary to write out the skeleton of the word on the page of the Scriptures, it is true, but before the invention of the vowel points only a few persons were able to give the skeleton its clothing of flesh. Even the use of gold was a concealment—but we will presently return to this point. Readers of Traube's *Nomina Sacra* remember how he has traced the filiation between this Hebrew practice and the Christian system of abbreviation as opposed to the pagan or classical.

Finally, Blau suggests that in view of all the evidence we may refer the production of these costly gold and silver MSS of the Bible and Psalters to a Jewish or oriental origin; he seems to hold that the custom spread from the East to the Graeco-Roman world. But may we not assign at least a part of the glory of the invention to the Egyptians? If so, this is something to range alongside the production of illustrated books, an invention which we now know was due to the land of the Nile.

Whereas our authorities are able to quote a number of passages mentioning gold writing, silver seems to be mentioned in the Hebrew tradition regarding the Song of Songs, etc., and in the classical languages just one single time. This is the oft-quoted text from Jerome's preface to Job (cited from the edition of Vallarsius, Veronae 1734 and ss., Tom. X, 1099–1100): "Habeant qui volunt veteres libros vel in membranis purpureis auro argentoque descriptos,¹ vel uncialibus, ut vulgo aiunt, litteris, onera magis exarata quam codices: dum mihi meisque permittunt pauperes schedulas et non tam pulchros codices quam emendatos." This passage and another (Ep. XXII, Tom. I, 115B) show the natural anxiety of the earnest preacher and man of conviction lest his flock desert the essentials and

¹The combination of purple parchment with gold and silver letters, together with the contrast of *scheduleae* and *codices*, suggests that the spreading use of the codex form of books on membrana may be partly due to the greater ease of producing handsomely written and illustrated books in one way than in the other.

realities for the outward show and the frivolities of life; they also reflect the scholar and translator, the critic who was more concerned for the correctness of the biblical text than its external adornment. These texts testify as well to the presence of a number of people in the communion at an early age (Ep. XXII may be dated 384) who were interested in calligraphy and book decoration for artistic reasons. True, many of the Christians may have been members of the congregation of Rev. Dr. Yellowplush, but even these represent the unworthy side of a praiseworthy impulse.

In general, this and the similar citations refer often with disapproval merely to the decorative effect of the purple and the precious metals. And yet there are extracts from the writing of the Fathers from which the disciples of Rev. Dr. Yellowplush could draw a legitimate defense of their admiration for these unusually fine copies. There was current a system of interpretation in the works of their critics which they could employ when attacked, namely a resort to allegory, mysticism, and symbolism. Let us devote a few lines to the history of this movement.

The general problem of criticism and interpretation began at an early moment to confront those Greeks who read and studied the Homeric poems. The relevant questions became acute when religious opinions were involved, and as men found themselves drifting away from a simple and unquestioning belief in the gods of Olympus and the stories related about them in the two national epics, it was natural to explain these stories in a way to suit the later ideas. Many a statement in the text was evidently figurative; why not others as well? If we find allegory of service in philosophy, why not in poetry too? If Pythagoras arrives at a system of number-symbolism, and if Zeus was originally the sky, by skilful interpretation one may find numerical harmonies and moral signification in still other elements of ancient story.

The Stoics were the chief masters and champions of this mode of exegesis. They found it a convenient way of presenting their doctrines to the public and of defending the national religion. The various occurrences in the national mythology out of harmony with modern views became sometimes natural phenomena having no moral content at all, at other times, by way of the allegory, became

quite moral. It was soon found that this method of explanation made it easy to read into an ancient text a modern meaning which could then be read out again. Next it appeared that this process, besides its purely practical side in teaching philosophy and bolstering up a declining faith in the old religion, might become an intellectual exercise. Some of the explanations found in the later Christian champions of this method are startling examples of ingenuity, not infrequently farfetched and misplaced.

From Athens and the narrower Hellas the method passes over to Alexandria and the wider Hellas. In Alexandria the Hellenizing Jews made its acquaintance, and having to some degree lost their faith in the traditional meaning attached to the ideas and practices of the Mosaic Law, they readily adopted the new resource. How deeply it took root we know from the writings of Philo.

From the Jews and the Greeks the system reaches the Christians. One needs only to think of the parables of the Savior, references to the Lion of the tribe of Judah, to the Lamb that was slain, and to the entire books of John's Gospel and the Apocalypse to see how naturally the nascent church seized on this mode of interpretation.

From the canonical texts it passes over to devotional and exegetical works; for instance, the Pastor of Hermas is hardly anything but a long allegory. Origen resorts to forced explanations to drive home an argument, and henceforth in the writings, e.g., of Augustine and Jerome, allegory is a well-organized system. It applies everywhere and at all times. Every name, number, person, place, scene, or incident in the Old Testament must be prophetic of an occurrence or doctrine of the New. Hannah and her child were the prototypes of Mary and hers; Adam and Eve foreshadow the Savior and the Church.

Wherever in the Hebrew Scriptures you find the number 300, that means the crucifixion, because that number in the Greek system of notation is symbolized by the letter Τ, itself a form of the cross. The fact that the word and interpretation were in different languages did not, in the opinion of these investigators, invalidate the results. Thus *Adam*, a Hebrew word, means the world, because

the component letters are the initials of Ἀρκτοῦρος, Δύσις, Ἀνατολή, Μεσημβρία, or North, West, East, and South. These examples might be multiplied indefinitely by anyone who will take the trouble to turn the pages of Augustine and Jerome. The reader must admit that the contemporaries of those Doctors, and particularly the later generations accustomed to regard their words as inspired, were naturally inclined to find a hidden meaning in anything and everything connected with the Scriptures.

The doctrine of the time may be found in the following quotations:

St. Augustine (editio Benedictina, 11 vols., folio, Parisiis, 1679-1700) *In Johann. Evang.* 7, no. 9 Tractat. XXVIII (Tom. III, 2, 511C): "Omnia quae dicta sunt antiquo populo Israel in multiplice Scriptura Sanctae Legis, quae agerent, sive in sacrificiis, sive in sacerdotiis, sive in diebus festis, et omnino in quibuslibet rebus quibus Deum colebant quaecumque illis dicta et praecepta sunt, umbrae fuerunt futurorum. Quorum futurorum? quae implentur in Christo." *Enarratio in Psalmum CXXXI.* 2 (Tom. IV, 1472D): "Sed solemus in Psalmis non ad litteram adtendere, sicut in omni propheta, sed per litteram scrutari mysteria." *Sermo CXLIX de Verbis Act.* 10, etc. (Tom. V, 705B): "Omnia enim animalia quae Judaeis prohibita sunt manducare signa sunt rerum, et sicut dictum est, umbrae futurorum" (some examples which we omit). Same page, no. 5E: "Sic cetera quae ad hunc modum praecepta sunt Judaeis, umbraticeae sunt significaciones futurorum" (with examples). This mode of interpretation is called tropologia in Jerome's works; besides two passages cited below, we here note Ep. CXX *ad Hedibiam* (Tom. I, 842BCD) : "Triplex in corde nostro descriptio, et regula Scripturarum est. Prima, ut intellegamus eas juxta historiam. Secunda, juxta tropologiam. Tertia juxta intellegentiam spiritualium. In historia, eorum quae scripta sunt ordo servatur. In tropologia, de littera ad majora consurgimus, et quicquid in priori populo carnaliter factum est, juxta moralem interpretamus locum, et ad animae nostrae emolumenta convertimus. In spirituali θεωρίᾳ ad sublimiora transimus, terrena dimittimus, de futurorum beatitudine, et caelestibus disputamus: ut praesentis vitae meditatio, umbra futurae beatitudinis sit."

Recalling now what has already been said about the concealment of the Ineffable Name, let us consider what St. Augustine says (*Quaestiones in Exod. II: 120*, Tom. III, 458EF): he begins by quoting Exod. XXVIII:36: "Et facies laminam auream puram, et formabis in eadem formationem signi, sanctitatem Domini: et impones illud super hyacinthum duplice tortam: et erit super mitram; secundum adspectum mitrae erit: et erit super frontem Aaron. Et auferet Aaron peccata sanctorum eorum." These words are thus explained: "Quomodo formetur in lamina sanctitas Domini, non video, nisi aliquibus litteris, quas quidam quattuor esse dicunt Hebraeas, quod, ut Graeci appellant, *τετραγράμματον* nomen Dei ineffabile credunt fuisse vel esse adhuc usque. Sed quaelibet sint vel quomodolibet se habeant illae litterae, ut dixi, sanctitatem Domini vel sanctificationem, si hoc magis credendum est, quod Graecus habet *ἀγλασμα* non nisi litteris in auro formari potuisse crediderim."

Here, then, we find a mystic signification attributed to the gold on which, only, the hidden name of God was to be incised. This passage alone might have served as the starting-point for symbolism of the metal in those old Bibles and Gospels. But the lovers of handsome books with mystical tendencies were not limited to these words only, for there were four verses in the canonical Scriptures dealing with gold and silver which recur in the Fathers with allegorical or mystic comment. For instance, St. Augustine after saying (*Enarratio in Psalmum LXXII: 17*, Tom. 14, 751E): "intellegimus per aurum sapientiam, quae ita excellit inter omnes doctrinas, ut aurum inter metalla," cites as his proof Prov. VIII:10: "Accipite prudentiam sicut argentum, et sapientiam sicut aurum probatum." (Vulgate text ed. Fillion runs: "Accipite disciplinam meam et non pecuniam; doctrinam magis quam aurum eligit.")

The remaining verses in their Vulgate rendering are: Ps. XI:7: "Eloquia Domini, eloquia casta; argentum igne examinatum, probatum terrae, purgatum septuplum"; Ps. LXVII:14: "Si dormiatis inter medios clerros, pennae columbae deargentatae, et posteriora dorsi eius in pallore auri"; *ibid.*, vs. 31: "ut excludant eos qui probati sunt argento." Our patristic citations ring the changes on these extracts in a series of mystic interpretations. They are:

ORIGENES

(Cited from the edition of Delarue, *Parisiis*, 1723)

In Exod. Homelia XXIII (Tom. II, 175F), after citing Ps. XI:7, says: "Si ergo quae scripta sunt corde conceperis, erit sensus tuus probus, et argentum tuum, qui est sermo tuus, probatum." *In Lucam Hom. XXVII* (Tom. III, 965A): "Si dormieritis inter medios cleros, pennae columbae deargentatae et posteriora dorsi eius in virore auri."

HIERONYMVS

Epp. CXX (Tom. I, 816AB): "Quod si deponamus gravissimam sarcinam, et assumamus nobis pennas columbae, et volabimus, et dicetur nobis, Si dormiatis inter medios cleros etc. Dorsum nostrum quod prius informe erat, et gravi sarcina premebatur, habeat nitorem auri, quod interpretatur in sensu, et alas deargentatas, quae intelleguntur eloquia Scripturarum, et regnum Dei intrare poterimus." *In Ecclesiasten II: 8* (Tom. III, 400A): "Argentum et aurum semper Scriptura divina super sermone ponit et sensu. Unde et in sexagesimo septimo Psalmo, columba quae interpretatur in spiritu, manifestiores et visui expositas alas deargentatas habet, occultiorem vero intrinsecus sensum in auri pallore operit." *In Isaiam I: 2, 19 seqq.* (Tom. IV, 42DE): "Saepe diximus argentum et aurum pro sermone et sensu accipi, quae cum a Deo hominibus data sint, ut vel loquantur vel sentiant Deum, et laudent creatorem suum, illi abutuntur hoc munere in idolorum simulationem: juxta illud quod scriptum est (Hos. II:8) Dedi illis argentum et aurum; ipsi vero de argento et auro meo operati sunt Baal." *Ibid. XL: 20* (Tom. IV, 489C): "Juxta tropologiam possumus dicere, quod increpantur principes haereticorum, diversa idola de suo corde fingentes; vel eloquii venustate quod interpretatur argentum; vel splendore auri quod refertur ad sensum." *In Ezechielem II: 7, 20* (Tom. V, 75C): "Facilis autem sensus est juxta tropologiam, quod aurum et argentum, sensus et eloquia Scripturarum." *Ibid. VII: 22, 19* (Tom. V, 257AB): "Aurumque in sensu atque sapientia, et argentum in sermone atque eloquio suscepérunt, ut quod mente conceperint, verbis explicent. De argento legimus," etc. (citing Ps. XI:7 and LXVII:14). *In Joel II: 4-6* (Tom. VI, 209E): "Et argentum illius et aurum, eloquia videlicet Scripturarum, et νοήματα id est

sententias . . . suis erroribus manciparunt." *In Zachariam I: 4, 2* (Tom. VI, 809B): "Quod autem in sensu aurum accipiatur posteriora et humeri columbae in sexagesimo septimo Psalmo ostendunt: quae dicuntur auri virore sive fulgore radiare."

AVGVSTINVS

Quaestiones in Evang. I: 41 (Tom. III, 2, 247D): "Eloquium Domini argentum est." *Enarratio in Psalmum LXVII: 14* (Tom. IV, 673D): "Nullam quippe aliam melius hic intellegi puto columbam deargentatam, quam illam de qua dictum est, Una est columba mea (Cant. VI:8). Dargentata est autem, quia divinis eloquias est erudita: eloquia namque Domini alio loco dicuntur argentum igne examinatum terrae purgatum septuplum."

EVCHERIVS

(Cited from the *Maxima Bibliotheca Veterum Patrum ed. De la Bigne*, *Lugduni 1677*)

Formularum Spiritalium cap. 7. 9 (Tom. VI, 836E): "Aurum interior Scripturarum intellectus. In Psalmo: Et posteriora dorsi eius in specie auri." *Ibid. E:* "Argentum, eloquia divina, sive intellectus litterae vel historiae. In Psalmo" (XI:7).

ANASTASIVS SINAITA

(*Works in the same Bibliotheca*)

Anagogicarum contemplationum in Hexaemeron VIII (Tom. IX, 897H): "Aurum . . . hoc est divinitas, quae in terra Ecclesiae resplendet, et adoratur. . . . In multis autem locis divinae Scripturae, ipse quoque perscrutatus invenies aurum sumi pro figura divinitatis Verbi."

GREGORIVS MAGNVS

(*Benedictine edition, Parisiis, 1705*)

Lib. IV in *Reges* 4, 27 (Tom. III, 206D): "Sed quia argenti nomine divina eloquia designantur, argentum in manu pueri est sermo divinus in virtute sciendi." *Super Cantica Canticorum Expositionis*, cap. III, 10 (Tom. III, 426B): "Praedicatores . . . nitore eloquii quasi splendore argenti decoravit." Cf. I:30: "Per aurum quippe sapientia." *Moralia in Job* IV: 3, 61 (Tom. I, 131B): "Quid

vero aurum nisi sapientiam appellat? de qua per Salomonem dicitur (Prov. XXI: 20): Thesaurus desiderabilis requiescit in ore sapientis . . . (C) Quid etiam per argenti, nisi eloquia divina figurantur?" XVI: 23, 23 (p. 509C): "Argenti autem nomine sacra eloquia designari testatur Psalmista (XI:7)." XVIII:27, 24 (p. 566C): "Argentum intellegi eloquii claritas solet, sicut alias dicitur: Eloquia Domini," etc. XVIII:28, 39 (p. 573A): "In argento eloquium, in auro vitae vel sapientiae claritas designari solet." XVIII:28, 73 (p. 591C): "Quia enim argento saepe eloquia divina designantur, possunt argenti vocabulo etiam eiusdem eloquii scriptores intellegi." XVIII:38, 17 (p. 901C): "In argento enim quid aliud quam claritas divini sermonis accipitur?"

In this series of citations there is an ever-recurring pair of equations: gold means perception, knowledge, wisdom, the power to comprehend the works and words of God; whereas silver uniformly means speech, the ability to give expression to the words of the Supreme Being. Now, as God is himself Supreme Wisdom and Knowledge, and as it was for various reasons customary to use gold and gold only to reproduce his name when appearing in writing, and yet concealed from the eyes of the ignorant, what was easier than to make the gold letters in and of themselves symbolize God? And does not the thought at once suggest itself that as silver is God's word, the canonical texts as being God's word should be reproduced in silver letters?

Now let us examine the state of the handsomest of the early MSS. Here we find a series of Bibles, Gospels, sometimes Psalters and Evangelaries, whose writing is uniformly uncial; the parchment is frequently stained in some one of the purple hues, the book provided with paintings or drawings, or at any rate with some kind of decoration. On other occasions we find the precious tinctures so often referred to. One need not expect to find a surviving MS showing all these features at the same time; such a book, especially if inclosed in a worthy jeweled case like the "cumdachs" of the finest Irish Bibles, would be a "livre de grand luxe" indeed.

The gold and silver MSS have been best discussed by Traube in his *Nomina Sacra*; by St. Beissel (*Geschichte der Evangelienbücher in der ersten Hälfte des Mittelalters*, Freiburg im Breisgau, 1906);

by H. Omont in *Notices et Extraits XXXVI*, 2 (1899), 599-675: "Notice sur un très ancien manuscrit grec de Saint Mathieu en onciales d'or sur parchemin pourpré et orné de miniatures, conservé à la Bibliothèque Nationale." The reader is referred to these papers for additional facts and bibliography.

GOTHIC: A famous codex argenteus now at Upsala, ultimately of Italian origin; holy names apparently in silver along with the rest of the text.

GREEK: The codex purpureus Petropolitanus saec. VI contracts the genuine *nomina sacra*, i.e. God and the members of the Holy Trinity, and writes them in gold, whereas man, heaven, Israel, David, and Jerusalem are done in silver, as is the remainder of the text. The Psalterium Turicense, probably saec. VI, has a silver text, but the captions to the Psalms and their initials are golden; and a contract form of ΘΕΟΣ or ΚΤΡΙΟΣ occurring at the beginning of a psalm is golden.

LATIN: Here there are no less than five surviving MSS that concern us.

1. Codex Brixianus, of the gospels: purple, silver text; as for the adornment of the holy names Traube speaks doubtfully.

2. The so-called Sarrezzano MS of John's Gospel, now in the archives of Monte-Cassino: silver purple, holy names in gold.

3. Psalterium Sancti Germani, partly in Paris (no. 11947 du fonds latin), partly in the Imperial Library of St. Petersburg: silver purple, holy names in gold.

4. Verona VI (³⁰₆): a gospel MS on purple, and like so many others just described, with silver text and holy names in gold.

5. Vindobonensis 1235, gospels: silver purple, holy names in gold.

The predominance of this combination of parchment stained in some purple hue with text in silver letters and the holy names in the royal metal, is remarkable in the region where the influence of Augustine and Jerome was always the greatest. It is, too, the region where Jerome's angry comment on the devotion to superabundance of ornament to the exclusion of true piety was most noticeable. The occurrence of a few surviving MSS of the character under consideration in the East might mean a widening of the influence of the Western Doctors in the other half of the Empire. It

seems that from those oft-quoted biblical verses and the doctrinal comment on them a mystical conclusion was drawn, in accordance with which the name of divine wisdom was done in contract, and thereby concealed form, and the divine word in silver.

It is well known that at a later period the tradition of gold writing revived or perhaps survived: but the writer has no evidence to show a continuance of the mystical tradition. S. Berger in his *Histoire de la Vulgate* has a whole chapter devoted to an *école chrysographique* and shows that there still exist no less than nineteen specimens of such workmanship, all produced within the confines of the Carolingian empire, between the years 780 and 880. Gold MSS continue sporadically for over two hundred years longer and actually reappear during the humanistic epoch. All that time silver was not absolutely forgotten. As for the gold or silver, we will content ourselves with citing from M. Prou (*Manuel de la paléographie latine et française*, 3me éd., 1910, p. 38): "Dans un certain nombre de manuscrits carolingiens écrits à l'encre noire, les titres, les initiales, les noms du Christ, de Dieu, du Saint-Esprit, sont seuls tracés en lettres d'or ou d'argent."

In conclusion, it may be observed that this use of handsome adornment, especially with the help of gold, is frequent in the finest early Christian mosaics. For information and details the reader is referred to the first volume of the *Histoire de l'art* now in process of publication under the editorship of André Michel.

UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI

TWO LINGUISTIC TESTS OF THE RELATIVE ANTIQUITY OF THE *ILIAD* AND THE *ODYSSEY*

BY JOHN A. SCOTT

When Wolf sent a copy of his *Prolegomena* to Wilhelm von Humboldt, the latter replied to him; "Der cardo rerum liegt meines Erachtens bloss darin, dass in der *Ilias* wirkliche Verschiedenheiten des Styls, der Sprache, u.s.w. sein sollen. Bei diesen, glaube ich, hätten Sie anfangen müssen" (quoted by Geppert in his *Ueber den Ursprung der Homerischen Gesänge*, p. iii). This wise suggestion of von Humboldt's could not well be ignored, and so it has come about that one of the most vaunted proofs of diversity not only of authorship but of antiquity of the books of Homer has been the assumption of different and easily defined stages of linguistic development.

No single phase of language is better adapted for furnishing this test than the demonstrative article δ , η , $\tau\delta$, both because it is used so frequently and also because it shows in Homer all the different stages through which it passed from a pure demonstrative to a simple defining article. The demonstrative is the older, the article the later development, so, if the demonstrative use is predominant in certain books, the articular in others, the belief is justified that the books were written at different periods, and thus also by different poets.

The use of the definite article has furnished one of the chief arguments for the comparative lateness of the *Odyssey*; cf. Monro in his *Odyssey, Books XII-XXIV*, p. 332: "The defining article is much more frequent in the *Odyssey*." The use and extension of the definite article in Homer has been the subject of repeated publications; three of which cover practically the same ground and reach essentially the same results.

Any one of these three investigations should have shown how vain the attempt to separate the books of Homer on the basis of the defining article.

Hugo Koch in a pamphlet of forty pages, *De Articulo Homericō* (Leipzig, 1872), published a complete list of references to all the

examples of δ , η , $\tau\delta$, in Homer, noting the use as demonstrative pronoun, relative pronoun, or as defining article. No attempt was made to distinguish between the usage of the different books or poems, but the writer limited himself to giving a simple list of the different cases, genders, and numbers.

In addition to all these categories he noted as doubtful the examples where he could not decide whether the word was used as a demonstrative or a simple defining article. No statistics were given, but by adding up his various lists I find that he assigns 422 examples of the definite article to the *Iliad*, 214 to the *Odyssey*. I have omitted from these figures all forms which he regarded as doubtful.

The results reached by Koch are practically the same as those reached independently by Miss F. Melian Stawell and published in her *Homer and the Iliad*, pp. 278 ff. Miss Stawell gives 218 examples of the definite article in the *Odyssey*.

As she divided the *Iliad* into Original *Iliad* and Additions, and did not give full statistics for the Additions, her figures are not complete, but, even so, she gives about 400 examples of the definite article in the *Iliad*. The fact that Miss Stawell makes one *Odyssey* and two *Iliads*, the bounds of which are constantly shifting, seems to me to detract greatly from the force and value of her statistics, especially since for the assumed Additions she did not feel it necessary to give all the examples, but only the "bulk." Since publishing this book Miss Stawell has enlarged the scope of the Original *Iliad* with a corresponding contraction of the Additions. Cf. *Zeitschrift für das Gymnasialwesen* (1910) 387.

Nevertheless the publication of her results should silence the argument based on the supposed increasing use of the definite article in the *Odyssey*.

A pamphlet *Ueber den Artikel bei Homer* (Adam Stummer, Schweinfurt, 1886) contains by far the fullest and ablest treatment of this subject which I have seen. Stummer wrote it under the direction of Professor von Christ, and was completely dominated by the latter's theories of the older and later portions of the *Iliad*. Stummer believed in a more restricted use of the definite article than Koch and assigned to a place among demonstrative pronouns many

of the examples of the definite article of the latter. His figures are as follows: The definite article is found in the *Iliad* 218 times, against Koch's 422; definite article in the *Odyssey* 171 times, against 214. However, they agree in this, that each assigns the greater number to the *Iliad*. Stummer never refers to Koch and seems to have been unacquainted with his work.

Stummer tried to fit his statistics to von Christ's theory of the *Urilias*. Cf. p. 56: Number of verses in the original *Iliad* 8,981, examples of definite article in original *Iliad* 125, that is one definite article in each 72 verses; verses in additions to the *Iliad* 6,712, examples of definite article in additions to the *Iliad*, 93, or one definite article in each 72 verses. That is, *the Urilias and the additions show exactly the same ratio in the use of the definite article*. No wonder Stummer felt his pamphlet did not prove anything. The reviewer, Vogrinz, in *Bursians Jahresbericht* 46, 189, says, "Aus den Zahlenverhältnissen, die uns geboten werden, ergiebt sich kein so überwältigendes Resultat als man gern hätte und als Hentze anzunehmen geneigt scheint."

To continue with the figures given by Stummer: entire *Iliad*, verses 15,693, definite article 218, one to each 72 verses; entire *Odyssey*, verses 12,110, definite article 171, one to each 71 verses.

In the entire *Iliad* δ , η , $\tau\delta$, as demonstrative pronoun, 3,000 times; as definite article 218 times, or in a ratio of 14:1. In the *Odyssey*, as demonstrative pronoun, 2,178, as definite article 171, or in a ratio of 13:1.

The three poems assigned to Hesiod have 2,330 verses, the definite article occurs in them 62 times, or one in 36 verses; δ , η , $\tau\delta$ as a demonstrative pronoun 404 times, as a true definite article 62 times, or in a ratio of 7:1. In the five greater Homeric Hymns there are 1,914 verses with 57 examples of the definite article, or one in each 33 verses, δ , η , $\tau\delta$ as demonstrative pronoun 217 times, as a true definite article 57 times, or in a ratio of 4:1.

To restate these important facts in a brief summary: *Iliad*, one definite article to each 72 verses; *Odyssey*, one definite article to each 71 verses; Hesiod one definite article to each 38 verses; Homeric Hymns one definite article to each 33 verses. Ratio of the use of δ , η , $\tau\delta$ as a demonstrative pronoun to the use as a pure definite

article: *Iliad* 14:1; *Odyssey* 13:1; Hesiod 7:1; Homeric Hymns 4:1.

There could be no more cogent reason than these statistics for assigning the *Iliad* and *Odyssey*, the *Urilias*, and the additions to a single period, a period widely separated from the time of the origin of the poems of Hesiod and the Homeric Hymns. Such was the spell or pall cast by disintegrating criticism that Stummer, von Christ, and the reviewer passed coldly by these important results and saw nothing in them but a failure to reach anything of value.

Higher criticism simply blindfolded Homeric investigators. From the above figures it is clear that the distance from Homer to Hesiod is many times greater than the distance from Hesiod to the Homeric Hymns, while the advance from the *Iliad* to the *Odyssey* is just that which might easily be made within the life of one man. Not only is it impossible to separate the *Iliad* from the *Odyssey* on the basis of the definite article, but however plausible the test when applied to individual books, as for example to K, the Doloneia, it breaks down at last, since *Odyssey* α and ω , two of the most despised books in Homer and presumably the latest, show the most restricted use of the definite article.

If the books of Homer could be dated by the use of the demonstrative pronoun as a definite article, then the oldest books would be *Odyssey* α , ζ , ω , the latest would be *Iliad* A, K, Λ , X, Ψ .

Whether the free use of the definite article as assumed by Koch and Miss Stawell or the restricted use of Stummer be accepted, there can be little doubt that the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* belong to the same stage in the development of δ , η , $\tau\delta$ from a demonstrative pronoun to a definite article.

Another excellent test for the relative antiquity of the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey*, as well as for individual books, should be furnished by perfects in $-\kappa a$, since these perfects are not of Indo-European but of Greek origin, and they show in existing Greek literature clear traces of their development from a sparing use in the singular indicative to a wide use in other moods and numbers. From the vast literature on this subject I select two works as sufficient for my purpose: Hirt *Handbuch der griechischen Laut- und Formenlehre* 471, "Das κ -Perfektum ist zweifellos eine griechische Neuschöpfung, deren

Entstehung und Ausbreitung wir noch einigermassen verfolgen können. Das *κ* tritt zuerst im Singular auf bei den ursprünglich auf Vokal ausgehenden Formen"; Lobell, *Quaestiones de Perfecti Homerici Forma et Usu* (Lipsiae, 1876), traces the development of the perfects in *κ* thus, pp. 23 f.: "κ in perfectum paulatim irrepsisse videtur hac via: (1) *a*, singul. pf. ind. conjunct. et plusq., *b*, verba contracta, exc. partic.; (2) participia verborum contractorum; (3) *tertia persona pluralis ind.*; (4) *optativus*; (5) *participia verborum quae non sunt contracta*."

Homer shows no further stages in the development of these perfects, since there are no examples of the infinitive, imperative, of the first or second persons in the plural of the perfect, and no plurals of any person in the pluperfect, and further Homer never has any perfects from consonant stems of the type found in *ἔφθαρκα*. Such a simple method for detecting late books in Homer could hardly have been neglected, and accordingly we find Monro and Leaf, each, in his Introduction to *K*, drawing an argument for the lateness of that book from the presence of certain verbs in *-κα*. I find that there are in the *Iliad* the following different verbs with a perfect in *-κα* (I quote in the form first appearing in the *Iliad*): *ἀδηκότες* Κ 98, *βέβηκας* Α 37, *βεβίηκεν* Κ 145, *βεβλήκει* Δ 108, *βεβρωκάς* Χ 94, *δέδυκεν* Ε 811, *ἔστηκε* Γ 231, *κέκμηκας* Ζ 262, *μέμβλωκε* Δ 11, *μέμυκεν* Ω 420, *πεφύκει* Δ 109, *τεθαρσήκασιν* Ι 420, *τεθνήκασι* Ο 664, *τέτληκας* Α 228, *τετυχηκάς* Ρ 748, *ὑπεμνήμυκε* Χ 491, *παροίχωκεν* Κ 252—17.

The following verbs in the *Odyssey* occur with perfects in *κα*: *ἀδηκότες* μ 281, *βεβίηκει* α 360, *βεβλήκει* χ 258, *βεβρωκάς* χ 403, *μέμβλωκε* ρ 190, *δεδαηκότες* β 61, *δεδειπνήκειν* ρ 359, *δέδυκεν* μ 93, *ἔστηκει* θ 505, *πεφύκει* ε 63, *τεθνήκειν* α 196, *τέτληκε* τ 347, *τετύχηκε* κ 88—13.

The thirteen of the *Odyssey* bear about the same relation to the seventeen of the *Iliad* as the number of verses in the *Odyssey* to the number of verses in the *Iliad*, so that the *Odyssey* has one different verb with perfect in *κα* to each 931 verses, the *Iliad* one to each 923. I find the total number of all examples of perfects of this class in the *Iliad* is 85, in the *Odyssey* 55. The relatively larger number in the *Iliad* is due to the free use of *βεβλήκει*, *ἔστηκει* in descriptions of

fighting, as these two forms are found in the *Iliad* 25 times, in the *Odyssey* but 8.

If we omit these two forms we find that one example of these perfects is found in the *Iliad* in each 261 verses, in the *Odyssey* one in each 258 verses.

Practically all of these examples belong to the singular of the indicative or the subjunctive, so it will be sufficient for the purposes of this paper to quote the forms which show a later development. According to Lobell, quoted above, the second stage in the development of the perfects in *-κ* is found in the participle of contract verbs. There are three different participles of this class: ἀδηκότες *K* 98, 312, 399, 471, *μ* 281, τετυχηκώς *P* 748, δεδαηκότες *β* 61. Thus the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* have each two examples of these participles. The third stage is found in the use of the third plural of the perfect indicative; of this there are four examples: ἔστηκασιν *Δ* 434, τεθαρσήκασι *I* 420, 687, τεθνήκασιν *O* 664, πεφύκασι *η* 114. πεφύκει is the reading of the last word in many of the best manuscripts. The fourth stage is found in the use of the optative; of this there is but a single example, βεβλήκοι *Θ* 270. Here there are variant readings. The fifth stage is found in the use of the participle in other than contract verbs; of this there is one example, βεβρωκώς *X* 94, used also in the *Odyssey* *χ* 403. This marks the latest phase of the development of perfects in *κ* found in Homer, as the infinitive and first and second persons plural of the perfect and first, second, and third plural of the pluperfect do not occur. It will be noted that no examples of the third, fourth, or fifth stages of development are found in *K*, *Ψ*, or *Ω*, and but three, one of which is doubtful, are from the *Odyssey*. Here as in the case of the definite article we see how dangerous it is to base arguments on single books, since if perfects in *κ* be the basis for dividing the books of Homer, then the oldest books would be *Iliad B*, *H*, and *Odyssey π*. Since no one of these has a perfect of this formation, the latest books would be *Iliad Δ*, *K*, *Π*, and *X*, and, as in the case of the article, *Odyssey α* and *ω* would be near the oldest stratum. Taken as a whole the *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* belong to the same period in a perfectly well-defined stage in the development of the perfect in *κα*. It seems to me incredible that two poems of such bulk could show such similar treatment of the

definite article and of the perfects in *κα* and themselves be separated by any appreciable interval of time.¹

The *Iliad* and the *Odyssey* belong to the same era of linguistic development, and whether they are the work of one poet or not they are surely the product of the same age.

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¹ I have not added to the list of perfects in *κα*, *Ιλήκρατι* φ 365, since it is generally regarded as a present from a verb *Ιλήκω*. I have omitted *δέδοικα*, found in both poems, since the shift in the vowels of the diphthong clearly mark it as a different formation. I have also not admitted *μέμυκεν* μ 395, since the *κ* is part of the root of the verb and is not an addition of the perfect stem.


THE *DE COMPOSITIONE* OF DIONYSIUS OF HALICARNASSUS
CONSIDERED WITH REFERENCE
TO THE *RHETORIC* OF ARISTOTLE

BY H. P. BREITENBACH

The *De Compositione* of Dionysius of Halicarnassus is a work that deserves more attention from students of language and literature than it has received.¹ Now that so excellent an edition and translation has been published, that of W. Rhys Roberts, there is every incentive for the study of the treatise.² A comparison of it with the *Rhetoric* of Aristotle promises to throw some new light upon the methods and results of both authors.

In this paper I purpose to indicate the attitude of each writer to his problem by disclosing and comparing the fundamental presuppositions that underlie the two treatises. I shall endeavor also, from the standpoint of aesthetics, to explain their divergent positions. Finally I shall refer to certain similar standpoints in modern rhetorical theory.

Of the two treatises the scope of the *De Compositione* is much the more limited. In c. i Dionysius suggests the following rhetorical classification:



The *De Compositione* confines itself pretty strictly to the topic of arrangement; the other topics receive only occasional mention.

The scope of the *Rhetoric* is less easily defined. The search for it reveals a significant progression in Aristotle's point of view.

His avowed purpose is to establish rhetoric on a scientific basis by relating it to dialectics. Thus he hopes to avoid, on the one hand, the fragmentary treatment found in the ordinary rhetorical hand-

¹ Cf. Clayton Hamilton *Materials and Methods of Fiction*, p. 206.

² It is, however, only fair to state that this essay (together with some other studies of similar nature) was prepared several months before Professor Roberts' edition was announced as forthcoming.

books, and, on the other hand, the sophistical method, which involves numerous devices or tricks, such as introducing matters foreign to the issue but designed to work on the feelings of the audience.¹ In opposition to these methods he declares: "It is clear then that the only proper subjects of artistic treatment are proofs" (i. 1). Accordingly he defines rhetoric as "a faculty of discerning all the possible means of persuasion in any subject" (i. 2). That no reference to the domain of form or expression is implied at this point is indicated by the threefold analysis of the subject which he immediately makes: "The proofs provided through the instrumentality of the speech are of three kinds, consisting either in the moral character of the speaker, or in the production of a certain disposition in the audience or in the speech itself by real or apparent demonstration" (i. 2). Again he says: ". . . a speech is naturally composed of three elements, viz., the speaker, the subject of the speech, and the persons addressed" (i. 3). To these topics, then, which he calls the only proper subjects of treatment in rhetoric, he devotes the first two books, comprising about three-fourths of the entire treatise. But at the outset of the third book he makes a new analysis in which all that he has before discussed constitutes only a third part. "There being three proper subjects of systematic treatment in rhetoric, viz., the possible sources of proof, style, and the right ordering of the parts of the speech, the first of these has already been discussed. . . . We have next to discuss the question of style" (iii. 1).

Why, then, did Aristotle at the outset of his discussion analyze discourse so as to leave out of consideration the topic of expression? And why did he afterward change his point of view so as to admit it?

To take up each question in turn: Several reasons may briefly be set down which will throw light on the first point. The element of style or expression, which term may serve for the moment to include both the remaining topics of Aristotle, is not easily susceptible of intellectual comprehension—not, at least, in comparison with the subject to which Aristotle gives his main attention, the sources of proof. Also, the principles of style cannot well be worked out deductively. Likewise, they cannot easily be related to rhetoric's

¹Cf. *Rhet. ad Alex.*, c. 15.

"counterpart," dialectics. These perhaps are the main reasons why Aristotle did not include style in his first analysis of his subject.

Then, too, the topic style, like the appeal to the emotions of the audience, was a feature of the sophistical treatments of rhetoric, which Aristotle was opposing. We know that Gorgias, for example, devoted considerable attention to it. Moreover, while the *Rhetoric* was designed to be philosophical or scientific in its basis, it was practical in its aim. The matter of style is not of immediate importance from either of these points of view.

Finally, it may be that Aristotle's own appreciation of style was weak. In his extant works he assuredly exposes himself to this charge, although certain ancient critics, among them Dionysius himself, especially commend his style. Whether their judgment is without adequate grounds, or whether they are referring to works of Aristotle now lost, we can scarcely say. But so far as the evidence afforded by his own extant works is concerned, we should be justified in ascribing to him a lack of artistic ability. As for his appreciation of style in others, the fact that he disregards the works of his great contemporary Demosthenes has perhaps some bearing on the matter; and below, in the discussion of his treatment of style, his lack of interest in the details of expression will be shown.

The other question now remains for consideration: why Aristotle, after outlining his subject in such a way as to exclude the topic of style, changed his point of view and did discuss it. While perhaps no decisive answer can be given to such a question, some attempt at explanation may be offered. It is altogether likely, then, that Aristotle intended his treatment of rhetoric, as we have it in the first two books, to embrace the subject completely; which it does, so far as the logical aspect of the subject is concerned. Then, probably, his further studies drew his attention to the importance of the elements he had before neglected, and he added the third book as a sort of appendix. If it is true, as many scholars have concluded, that the *Poetics* was composed after the second book of the *Rhetoric* and before the third, the theory would receive considerable support.¹ For

¹ On the question of the genuineness of the third book and its relation to the rest of the *Rhetoric* and to the *Poetics*, see Christ *Griechische Litteraturgeschichte*, 3rd Aufl., p. 483 and note, together with the references there given.

Aristotle's study of poetry would naturally bring him to a consideration of the stylistic element in oratory. Some confirmation of this is afforded by the frequent references in the third book to the *Poetics*, and especially by Aristotle's efforts to distinguish the appropriate styles of prose and poetry (for a discussion of which, see below).

At any rate, Aristotle assigns to the whole topic of style or expression only the brief third book of the *Rhetoric*; while Dionysius, having subdivided expression into selection and arrangement, devotes his entire treatise to the latter topic alone. It now remains to consider what are the fundamental rhetorical presuppositions of the two writers and to see how these underlie their respective treatments of the subject of style. In this investigation I shall view the treatises from the three standpoints which Aristotle distinguished—that of the hearer, that of the speaker, and that of the discourse itself.

Regarded from the point of view of the hearer, the fundamental principle of Aristotle's theory of rhetoric is what may be termed intellectual hedonism. "The acquisition of knowledge is pleasant" (i. 11. 2). "To receive information easily is naturally pleasing to all" (iii. 10. 2). "Accordingly, in style and enthymemes all those are pointed and lively that convey to us instruction rapidly" (iii. 10. 4). "Such a style is agreeable because the hearer is constantly thinking he has got hold of something" (iii. 9. 3). Other passages of the *Rhetoric* (e.g., iii. 11. 6, iii. 8. 2, i. 11. 21) convey the same idea. It is found elsewhere in his works also. At the opening of the *Metaphysics*, for example, he says: "All men have a natural longing for knowledge"; in the *Problems*: "The pleasure we receive from rhythm derives from the natural love of a recognizable ($\gammaνώριμον$) regularity"; in the *Poetics*: ". . . learning is most delightful not only to philosophers but in like manner to other persons" (iv. 4).

Indeed, Aristotle's very theory of art, as expressed in the *Rhetoric*, seems based upon this principle. "From the pleasure of learning and wonder it results that there is a pleasure in such things as the imitative arts, e.g., painting, sculpture and poetry, or in any successful imitative work, even if the actual object of imitation is not pleasant; as it is not the pleasantness of the object which produces the

pleasure but an inference from the copy to the original and in consequence of it a kind of learning" (i. 11).

In short, this principle of Aristotle's assumes that the hearer is actuated by the pleasure that accompanies the act of learning. Just as the satisfying of bodily hunger gives a feeling of well-being, so likewise, Aristotle would say, the mind is naturally hungry for information, and the satisfaction of this desire produces a feeling of pleasure. To this principle I have given the name intellectual hedonism to indicate that, while a pleasurable emotion is involved, its source is intellectual. According to this principle, one who heard bad tidings would nevertheless be pleased because he had learned something.

In contrast to the fundamental principle of Aristotle's *Rhetoric*, that of the *De Compositione*, likewise from the standpoint of the hearer, may be termed aesthetic appreciation, by which I mean pleasurable emotion derived from what is artistic. Dionysius' attitude on this point is very manifest in numerous passages. In c. xi, for example, in a passage too long to quote here, he compares the pleasure derived from oratory to that derived from music. "In oratory also the words have melody, rhythm, variety and appropriateness; so that the ear takes pleasure in the melody, is captivated by the rhythm, delights in the variety, and in all requires appropriateness. The difference between the two is merely one of more or less." The same underlying principle of aesthetic appreciation is clearly shown in cc. ii, iii, iv, vi, ix, xii, xvi, etc. In fact, he maintains this point of view consistently throughout the treatise.

According to this view, the hearer is pleased, not because he learns something, as is Aristotle's idea, nor is it primarily because he receives pleasing information—but because he enjoys the oration as a thing of beauty, for its rhythm, its euphoniousness, etc.

We have now to consider the second point of view, that of the speaker. More specifically, our question is, What is the purpose of the speaker? What is the effect on the hearer that he aims to produce by means of the speech? Answering the question for the *Rhetoric*, we may say that, obviously, the aim and purpose is to produce persuasion. Indeed this is the essence of Aristotle's definition of rhetoric, "a faculty of discerning all the possible means of per-

suation in any subject."¹ Now to be consistent with himself, Aristotle should make the means of persuasion include only proofs appealing to the intellect. In point of fact, he does this, as we have seen, at the outset of his treatise. There he declares, "It is the proofs alone which form the proper subject of artistic treatment, and everything except the proofs is a mere accessory"; and he condemns those sophistical writers who "omit all mention of enthymemes which are the soul of proof, and occupy themselves almost exclusively with such things as lie outside the actual issue. For," he adds, "prejudice, compassion, anger and such emotions of the soul have no bearing upon the point at issue; they merely affect the minds of the jury." Again he makes a similar protest: "It is improper to warp the judgment of a juror by exciting him to anger or jealousy or compassion, as this is like making the rule that one is going to use, crooked." He would have all cases "determined absolutely by the laws, and as little as possible left to the discretion of the judges." For, besides other considerations, "feelings of affection or ill-will and private interests are necessarily often involved, so that they lose the power of adequately studying the truth, and their judgment is clouded by a consideration of their personal pleasure or pain." And a little further on he declares for the second time, "It is clear then that the only proper subjects of artistic treatment are proofs" (i. 1).

Evidently, then, Aristotle starts out with an intellectual point of view. The means of persuasion are to be confined to proofs appealing to the intellect. But in a very short time he shifts his position, and we find him admitting into consideration appeals to the emotions. Finally, he devotes considerable attention to them in the first part of the second book. A similar inconsistency we have already observed, in the case of his treatment of style, which likewise he at first excluded from consideration. His remarks on style and delivery, at the beginning of the third book, are in fact strikingly similar to those opinions just quoted relative to appeals to the emotions. "Strict justice, indeed, if applicable to rhetoric, would con-

¹ In the previous chapter he has declared: ". . . Its function is not to persuade but to discover the available means of persuasion in any subject." From what follows, however, his meaning is clearly that it should succeed so far as is possible, although, like the art of medicine, it must sometimes fail.

fine itself to seeking a delivery such as would cause neither pain nor pleasure. For the right condition is that the battle should be fought out on the facts of the case alone: and therefore everything outside the direct proof is really superfluous, although extraneous matters are highly effective, as has been said, owing to the depraved character of the audience." And he argues that when one is teaching geometry "tricks of style" are not needed to gratify the audience.

The inconsistency, then, in regard to appeals to the emotions is of the same sort as the inconsistency with regard to style; and probably the same reasons lie at the bottom of it. These are: Aristotle's strong intellectual bias; his opposition to the sophistical treatments of the subject; possibly a lack of artistic appreciation. Here also another factor now comes to view—his low opinion of the popular audience as referred to above in the words, "the depraved character ($\muοχθηπλαν$) of the audience." This opinion is expressed with various degrees of candor in several other passages of the *Rhetoric*, e.g., ii. 21, iii. 16, iii. 14.

In short, the aim of the speaker is persuasion, and not by intellectual means alone. Aristotle goes even farther than to admit emotional appeals among the means of persuasion: he admits also "apparent demonstration" as well as "real"; by this he means fallacious or specious reasons, etc. Examples of this "sophistical" element are to be found in iii. 14, 15, 16, etc.

So far as the aim of the speaker is considered in the *De Compositio-*ne, it is referred to pleasing the auditor by the charm and beauty of the speech, by its effect, that is to say, as a work of art; the purpose is to produce not an intellectual, but an aesthetic, impression. Although in his other works Dionysius duly recognizes them, yet in the *De Compositio-*ne he seldom makes direct reference to the production of clearness, lucidity, or any other intellectual effects as being a necessary aim of arrangement. On the contrary, he commends passages where the thought has been somewhat sacrificed to the artistic demands of expression, being left incomplete or made redundant. "Truly some clauses receive changes in their form, taking on additions not necessary to their sense, or undergoing curtailments whereby the thought is left incomplete. These changes are made by both poets and prose-writers, and for no other reason than that

the 'harmony' may become more charming and beautiful" (c. ix). In other passages also the same idea is expressed.

Since in the *De Compositione* the attitude of the hearer and that of the speaker exactly correspond, further discussion or citation of examples seems unnecessary. Instead, another indication of the aesthetic point of view in the treatise may be presented here—the character of the analogies employed.

Practically all the important analogies are drawn from the realm of fine art. I have already referred to one passage comparing oratory to music. In c. x, referring to charm and beauty as the characteristic aims of arrangement, Dionysius says: "For the ear requires both of these in much the same manner as does the eye. The eye looks upon images and pictures and sculpture and all the other handiwork of man, and finding therein charm and beauty, it is satisfied and desires nothing more." In c. xxi he compares composition to painting. In c. xxiii he says the smooth style resembles finely woven cloth or pictures in which light and shadow blend. In c. xxv, he says that the men of Demosthenes' time fashioned their discourses "not like to writings but to carvings and intaglios." Again, arguing in the same strain he speaks of the pupils of painters and sculptors, who would exhaust the ingenuity of their art on such details as veins and down. In the same chapter, to suggest how conscious art by dint of practice becomes second nature, he refers to the training of skilled performers on the lyre, harp, and flute. There are also some minor allusions of similar nature in the *De Compositione*.

It is to be noted that the *Rhetoric* contains no such comparisons.

The third significant relation, that of the speaker to the discourse, yet awaits consideration. The problem is represented by the question, in the case of each author: What is the nature of the discourse as a combination of words?

Taking up its consideration we come upon another divergence in the concepts of the two authors. Aristotle's idea as to the nature of a discourse may be only inferred from the *Rhetoric*; but in the *Poetics* (c. xxiii) what is probably his conception of it is expressed in the comparison of an epic poem to "a living organism." "It should have for its subject a single action, whole and complete, with a beginning, a middle, and an end." He discusses tragedy in a

similar way, making the same comparison, and similarly explaining the organic interrelation of beginning, middle, and end. It seems altogether likely then that this view extends with Aristotle to a speech or any other discourse in the realm of rhetoric. This probability is strengthened by certain indications in the third book of the *Rhetoric* in his treatment of the exordium. For he compares it to the poem of epic or dithyrambic poetry, or the prologue of a drama: "As to the exordia of forensic speeches, it must be understood that they are equivalent to the prologues of dramatic or the proems of epic poetry; for the proems of dithyrambs resemble epideictic exordia. . . . In rhetoric as in epic poetry the exordium is a sample of the subject, being intended," etc.

Moreover, Aristotle explains that exordia which do not set forth the end or object of a speech are not true exordia, but "merely means of remedying defects in the audience, serving to get their attention, remove prejudice, and the like. They are used in this way because the audience is corrupt. If this is not the character of the audience, there is no need of an exordium, except for the mere purpose of stating the facts summarily, that it may not be, as it were, *a body without a head*" (iii. 14). Besides the exordium a speech contains necessarily two parts, exposition and proof; the peroration is sometimes found as a third part, but it is not necessary to a speech. Probably, then, in Aristotle's opinion, the exordium is the "beginning," the exposition the "middle," and the proof the "end."

In short, the Platonic conception of discourse as an organism, which is a dominating idea in the *Poetics*, probably underlay, though less consciously, Aristotle's whole theory of discourse. Certainly it is an idea altogether likely to have accorded with his scientific type of mind and early-awakened interest in biology.

The underlying concept of Dionysius, from the point of view of the discourse as a combination of words, is not at all biological in its nature, but rather what may be called architectonic, or perhaps, in a restricted sense of the word, architectural. He has first analyzed words into their component syllables and these into their component letters: "We designate them letters because they are written with certain lines, and we term them elements because all speech takes its origin from them and into them resolves itself in its final analysis"

(xiv). Then, having given a long and detailed account of the quality and force of the several letters, he undertakes the task of synthesis: "Out of these letters, then, having such number and such qualities, the so-called syllables are formed" (xv); and he examines the nature of syllables. Finally he remarks: "How, then, do I sum up this matter? I say that the diverse qualities of syllables originate in the combination of letters; that the nature of words varies according to the arrangement of syllables; and that discourse varies according to the degree of harmonious arrangement in the words" (xvi). His treatment of rhythm is altogether similar (see cc. xvii–xviii).

A composition in Dionysius' view is a structure formed like a building of a certain kind. It is as if a pyramid were constructed in several sections, each in turn composed of several subsections, and these again composed of the individual stones.¹ The stones represent the words which are fitted together to form the sub-sections, i.e., the clauses. The clauses in turn are adjusted one to another until they form suitable sentences. These, finally, Dionysius would say, form the structure of the whole composition. But while in all this process of construction the builder is supposed to be thinking of charm and beauty as aims, the structure has no fundamental organization. The units are built up independently of one another until the time comes for combining them; only then are they adjusted one to another.

In both analysis and synthesis Dionysius is governed by such an architectural analogy. At the outset of his treatise, to show that arrangement has more potency than selection (an idea that itself is significant of his attitude) he refers to "the other constructive arts, such as house-building and cabinet-making and the like, which take various kinds of material and out of them produce a composite result" (c. ii). Again, in c. vi, when explaining the function of arrangement, he uses as illustrations "house-building and shipbuilding and the like," to show how the materials are adjusted so as to form a harmonious structure. The latter passage well indicates the remarkable influence of the architectural concept on Dionysius' treatment of the subject. Unfortunately it is too long to be quoted here.

¹Of course, to make the analogy complete, one would need to imagine that the nature of the several stones depends upon their constituent elements, just as that of words is supposed by Dionysius to depend upon the nature of the component syllables and letters.

In the last-mentioned passage Dionysius gives his principles of arrangement with reference to words. He also explains the similar principles that govern the disposition of clauses (cc. vii-ix). He has promised (c. v) to discuss likewise those that pertain to the arrangement of periods, but he dismisses the subject in two or three brief sentences (c. ix, *ad fin.*). This is significant, pointing to his greater interest in the details of style, and also indicating the inductive nature of his method. Conversely, Aristotle, his interest being of a philosophic nature, devotes the greater share of his attention to the larger elements of style and fails to carry his analysis into and through the details.

The fundamental presuppositions of the two authors have now been set forth with reference to the three aspects of discourse. According to Aristotle, the attitude of the hearer is that of intellectual hedonism; the aim of the speaker is to produce persuasion, even by appeals to the emotions or by sophistical proofs; the discourse is organic in structure. According to Dionysius, the attitude of the hearer is that of artistic appreciation; that of the speaker corresponds, his aim being to produce artistic enjoyment; the discourse is architectural in structure. Aristotle sets out with an intellectual pre-disposition, at first excluding all non-rational elements. Dionysius is interested rather in the artistic or aesthetic phase of the subject.

Several minor topics are treated in some detail by both Dionysius and Aristotle, affording an opportunity for further comparison. These include diction or choice of words, rhythm, the period, and the relation of prose and poetry. Careful study has revealed that the fundamental principles set forth above determine the respective treatments of these matters of detail also. On account of the limitations of space, however, only one of them, the relation of prose and poetry, can be discussed here.

At several points in the third book of the *Rhetoric* Aristotle distinguishes between the appropriate metrical structure of prose and poetry. Near the beginning of the book (c. i) he sketches the history of style to show how prose has become differentiated from poetry. "It was because the poets were thought, despite the simplicity of their sentiments, to have acquired their reputation by their style, that prose style assumed at first a poetical form, as, e.g., the

style of Gorgias. Nay, even at the present time it is the opinion of most uneducated persons that a poetical style is the finest. This, however, is an erroneous idea, the styles of prose and poetry being distinct, as is shown by the fact that the writers of tragedies themselves have ceased to use the poetical style as once they did. . . . It is absurd then to imitate them who no longer employ their old style." In the following chapter (ii) he says: "Style should be neither mean nor exaggerated, but appropriate; for a poetical style, though not mean, is still not appropriate to prose." Throughout the chapter he refers repeatedly to the necessity for maintaining separate styles for prose and poetry. In c. iii he enters an objection against the misuse of epithets: "For if in poetry it is proper to speak, e.g., of 'white milk,' such epithets in prose are in any case inappropriate, and if there are many of them, they expose the art of the style and show it to be simple poetry." Another expression (*ἀντίμιμον* in *ἀντίμιμον τὴν τῆς ψυχῆς ἐπιθυμίαν*) he calls "a word which is at the same time a compound and an epithet, so that the prose is converted into poetry. . . . The consequence is," he resumes, "that this poetical diction by its impropriety is a source of absurdity and tastelessness as well as of obscurity." In c. vi, among the means of producing dignity of style, he recommends the employment of metaphors, "being on your guard at the same time against a poetical style." At the close of c. vii, he suggests that the use of compound words, epithets, and strange words, which previously he has objected to, is permissible "when the speaker has mastered his audience and has aroused them to enthusiasm. . . . For this is the language of enthusiasm and is . . . suitable to poetry for the same reasons, as poetry is inspired." Aristotle's final reference to the relation of prose and poetry is in c. viii, in his treatment of rhythm in prose. He sums it up in his famous dictum: "A prose composition should have rhythm but not meter, or it will be a poem. But the rhythm should not be too elaborately finished, or in other words it should not be carried too far." He recommends the use of the paeon in prose on the ground that it alone cannot form a regular meter, and therefore it is the most likely to escape detection. Evidently, then, Aristotle's aim is, from a logical standpoint, to differentiate prose and poetry with regard to both diction and rhythm.

Dionysius appears to adopt Aristotle's distinction between prose and poetry, but actually his recommendations are quite diverse from those of Aristotle. For he devotes the final two chapters of his treatise to the consideration of "how discourse not in meter may become like a beautiful poem or lyric, and how a poem or lyric may become very similar to beautiful prose." To these subjects Dionysius seems to ascribe much importance, for not only does he accord them a prominent place in his treatise, but he prefaces his disclosures about them with a peculiar proclamation as to their esoteric nature: "They are very like to mysteries, and it is not proper that they be disclosed to everybody. Wherefore it would not be impertinent if I were to summon only those that possess the right to come into the inner precincts of style, but should enjoin the profane to close the gates of their ears." Then follows a statement of the controlling principle: "Prose cannot become like metrical and lyrical writing unless it contains concealed meters and rhythms. However, it is not fitting that it should appear to be meter or rhythm. For then it would be a poem or lyric and would depart from its proper character. It should simply appear rhythmical and metrical, for thus it may be poetical but not poetry, and lyrical but not a lyric." This statement closely resembles that of Aristotle on the same subject, but there is an important difference in application. Aristotle made his statement for the sake of calling attention to the distinction to be observed between the proper styles of prose and poetry; Dionysius, on the contrary, calls attention to their points of similarity. Now he proceeds to develop the idea that prose should contain concealed rhythms and meters. He cites the third book of the *Rhetoric* as authority for this idea, and adds: "We not only have Aristotle's testimony, but we find confirmation in experience itself to the effect that rhythms must be employed in prose if it is desired that it bloom with the beauty of poetry." But, as shown above, Aristotle is *not* desirous that prose "bloom with the beauty of poetry"; he has a quite different purpose in his consideration of their relationship. Dionysius, however, goes on to exhibit "the concealed rhythms" in a number of passages from Demosthenes, to show that they were introduced "not accidentally, but with full design."

Dionysius' final task is to disclose how poems and lyrics become

like beautiful prose (c. xxvi). The factors he mentions include variety in the arrangement of the individual words, and also in the length and the form of the clauses, so as not to make them coincident with the lines of verse. The feature of the analysis consists in the element of freedom which Dionysius detects in the most successful poetry, and which he ascribes to the endeavor to make it resemble prose. Judging from the passages he cites as examples and from his comments on them, the chief characteristic of this element of freedom is the employment of sentences and phrases of various lengths, so that the sense does not always come to an end with the line of verse; in a word, the use of *enjambement*, or run-on lines. In short, Dionysius is making a plea for artistic freedom in poetry, freedom from mechanical adherence to traditional or conventional rules.¹

In summary, then, of these two topics with which Dionysius closes the treatise, it may be said that in both cases his aim is to further the cause of the artistic, the aesthetic element in discourse. On the one hand, he objects to awkward, wooden prose; on the other, to mechanical poetry. To remedy the one evil he refers as an exemplar to prose which resembles poetry in that it has rhythm; in the other case, he holds up as a model poetry resembling prose in that it has freedom of structure.²

¹ The position of Leigh Hunt in the English Romantic movement affords an interesting parallel.

² Theodore Watts-Dunton, in the *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (9th ed. s.v. "Poetry"), says: "Perhaps the first critic who tacitly revolted against the dictum that substance, and not form, is the indispensable basis of poetry was Dionysius of Halicarnassus, whose treatise upon the arrangement of words is really a very fine piece of literary criticism. In his acute remarks upon the arrangement of the words in the sixteenth book of the *Odyssey*, as compared with that in the story of Gyges by Herodotus, was perhaps first enunciated clearly the doctrine that poetry is fundamentally a matter of style. The Aristotelian theory as to invention, however, dominated all criticism after as well as before Dionysius."

This statement calls for some comment. In the first place, in the passage from Dionysius referred to (c. iii), Dionysius is *not* comparing the two arrangements; far from trying to show any contrast between the prose and the poetical passages, he has quoted both for the same purpose—to show the potency of arrangement of words as compared with selection. Furthermore, while certain passages in the *Poetics* have afforded a foundation for the so-called Aristotelian theory as to invention (see Butcher *Aristotle's Theory of Poetry and Fine Art*, pp. 134 ff.), yet the *Rhetoric*, as shown above, contains considerable evidence, to all appearances strangely neglected by Butcher, which tends to show that Aristotle clearly distinguished between the appropriate styles of prose and poetry. Dionysius, on the other hand, as is likewise shown above, occupied himself with pointing out their similarities rather than their differences.

A retrospect of the work of our two authors from the point of view of aesthetics exhibits a paradox. Both of them investigated the same phenomenon, Greek oratory, and in part they examined the same phase of it, the topic style; but their fundamental principles, as has been shown, are altogether diverse. Aristotle supposed on the hearer's part an intellectual attitude; in the speaker, the aim to persuade; in the discourse, an organic character. Dionysius requires in the hearer an aesthetic attitude; in the speaker, the aim to produce artistic effects; in the discourse, an architectural character. How are these striking differences to be explained? In part they are to be accounted for by the divergent aims and methods of the two writers. But a more ultimate explanation is to be found in the relation of these two men to the art of oratory which they were studying.

For Aristotle oratory was a practical art. In his generation it had achieved its utmost successes and had reached a pinnacle of greatness from which only recession was possible. Living accordingly in a very world of oratory, Aristotle, especially in view of his scientific proclivities, could not but envisage it with reference to its ulterior purpose and end, and could find it successful only as it achieved these. Necessarily his view was teleological in character.

Viewed in such an objective, teleological manner, the oration naturally assumes the character ascribed to it by Aristotle. Its substance or content is then of overshadowing importance. The hearer is concerned with the oration in an intellectual way, i.e., because he is to learn from it something that will direct his beliefs or conduct. But the speaker's business is to make the oration fulfil his purpose; success is the primary thing, to gain which it may be necessary to resort to emotional appeals or even to specious and sophistical arguments. Out of the speaker's vital purpose grows the nature of the discourse. Consequently it assumes an organic character, functioning, like an animal, for an ulterior, practical end.

Dionysius' point of view was quite different. When as a teacher of rhetoric at Rome he referred to the masterpieces of his native tongue as examples, he discerned in them an element lacking in Roman oratory; accordingly he analyzed them to try to account for it. In so doing he did not refer to the external purpose which the orations

were designed to fulfil, for Dionysius was lacking in the historic sense.¹ Consequently, given an oration which his native taste told him was superior, he would examine it for the sake of determining the sources of the effect upon himself, and perhaps on others too, his pupils for example. His point of view, then, was not objective in the sense in which Aristotle's was, but rather subjective; it was not teleological but aesthetic. For Dionysius, in short, oratory was a fine art.

Accordingly, he did not concern himself with the practical end subserved by the oration, and hence his main interest is not in its substance or content. Instead he analyzed out the sources of its aesthetic effects, and endeavored, from the elements thus detected, to reconstruct the oration synthetically. He assumed consequently that the hearer likewise takes an aesthetic attitude, and that the aim of the speaker, correspondingly, is to produce artistic appreciation. Moreover, the discourse is not now a vital thing, animated by its function in the practical world; it was viewed rather as a structure created by artistically combining certain materials selected beforehand, and selected not so much for their import as for the aesthetic effects they tend to produce. For Dionysius, then, the biological concept was not suitable, since he was emphasizing not content, but form. What he required was an artistic concept, and he found what answered his purposes in the architectural analogy.

In concluding, it may be briefly noted that modern rhetorical theory has made use of both the architectural and the organic concept of structure. The architectural concept has been held by many of the older rhetoricians in a more or less explicit fashion. With some it is scarcely distinguishable from a mechanical concept, in which discourse is thought of as resembling a machine in its structure. Among others the concept varies from that of a simple assemblage of materials to that of a highly elaborate structure of thought all of which, it is supposed, is preconceived in the mind of the writer. But with the more recent generation of scholars, under the stimulus of evolutionary thought, these theories of style have largely given way to the organic concept. This Platonic theory of discourse has now been developed and extended beyond the Aristotelian treatment

¹ Cf. W. Rhys Roberts *Dionysius of Halicarnassus: The Three Literary Letters*, pp. 3-4.

so as not only to include the main outlines of the thought, but also to reach into the uttermost details of form or expression. Moreover, by directing attention to the essential part played in the rhetorical process by the free personality of the writer, the organic concept has suggested the clue for reconciling the seemingly diverse claims of thought and expression. Thus it has opened the way to a truly comprehensive aesthetic theory of discourse—one which includes and, so far as possible, harmonizes the essential features of both the Aristotelian and the Dionysian treatment.

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ROMAN PRAYER AND ITS RELATION TO ETHICS

BY GORDON J. LAING

It is a commonplace of writers on comparative religion that primitive prayers contain no ethical element.¹ It is said that in the early days of religion men implored their gods for increase of blessings or decrease of sufferings. They prayed for victory over their enemies, for the rich booty of successful warfare, for fruitfulness in their flocks, herds, and fields, and, at a later stage of their development, for success in ventures of trade. They prayed also for relief in time of pestilence, famine, or other calamity. Furthermore, far from confining their petitions to their own prosperity, they frankly and openly prayed that disaster and death might be the portion of their enemies. But they did not pray to the gods to make them better men, to give them clean hearts, to guide them in the straight and narrow way of purity and rectitude, to strengthen them so that they could resist temptation. In a word, for many primitive cultures a complete divorce of religion and morality is assumed. Morality of a kind these cultures had, but it was independent of their religion. With them religion was the means of getting in touch with the powers of the unseen world, whose assistance could be secured by due forms of ritual; while the morality they knew was founded on social conditions. Offense against the moral code made one liable to punishment by such forms of reprisal as the community recognized but did not necessarily imply any offense against a god. The union of morality and religion came comparatively late.

Such is the description frequently given of the relation of religion and morality among primitive peoples, and the lack of the ethical element in their prayers is continually emphasized.

In this paper it is my purpose to examine Roman prayers with a view to determining to what extent they conform to or diverge from the type described above; and where they diverge, to ascertain the sources of the new elements contained in them. I will begin with some of the prayers given by Appel in his *Romanarum prectionum*

¹ See Tylor *Primitive Culture* 364.

reliquiae (pp. 8 ff. of his *De Romanorum precationibus*¹). For example, in the well-known prayer in Cat. *Origin.* i. fr. 12 (p. 55, Peter) the tone resembles that of a man who makes a proposal rather than that of one who offers a petition. The god is treated pretty much as if he were merely another person with a range of desires similar to those of his petitioner, and the advantage that will accrue to him if he grant the request is pointed out: "Iuppiter, si tibi magis cordi est nos ea tibi dare potius quam Mezentio, uti nos victoris facias." So also in the prayer of the Roman commander to Jupiter in Liv. i. 12. 4 the relation of suppliant and god is closely analogous to that of man and man: "deme terrorem Romanis fugamque foedam siste. Hic ego tibi templum Statori Iovi voveo." The vow of Appius in Liv. x. 19. 17 is couched in the simplest terms of *quid pro quo*: "Bellona, si hodie nobis victoriam duis, ast ego tibi templum voveo." A striking example of this primitive type of Roman prayer is furnished by the vow of the *ver sacrum* by Cornelius Lentulus in 217 B.C. (Liv. xxii. 10. 2 ff.): "Si res publica populi Romani Quiritium ad quinquennium proximum, *sicut velim eam salvam*, servata erit hisce duellis, *quod duellum populo Romano cum Carthaginensi est quaeque duella cum Gallis sunt*, *qui cis Alpis sunt*, tum donum duit populus Romanus Quiritium: *quod ver attulerit ex suillo ovillo caprino bovillo grege quaeque profana erunt*, Iovi fieri, ex qua die senatus populusque iusserit." Here we have a vow hedged about with such conditions and stipulations as one might find in a formal contract. The speaker manifestly wishes to make it clear exactly what he expects and exactly what the god is to expect. The formal phraseology is designed to exclude any misunderstanding by the party of the first or of the second part. The state is not merely to be saved but to be saved *sicut velim eam salvam*. Any mistake as to what wars are referred to is prevented by the clause *quod duellum*, etc. What Gauls are meant is made clear by the clause *qui cis*, etc. That animals already vowed to other divinities are excluded is definitely stated in the words *quaeque profana erunt*. The half-dozen *sic*-clauses that follow the passage quoted and complete the vow are inserted for the same purpose. There are many other examples of this meticulous precision in the prayers in Appel's *conspectus*: e.g.,

¹ *Religionsgeschichtliche Versuche und Vorarbeiten*, VII. Band, 2. Heft.

the words *sicut dixi* in the prayer of the *vilicus* in Cato *De agricultura* 141. 2: "lustrique faciendi ergo, *sicut dixi*, macte hisce suovetauribus lactentibus esto"; and in the dedicatory prayer of Domitius Valens in *CIL.* III, 1933: "hisce legibus hisce regionibus *sic, uti dixi*, hanc tibi aram, Iuppiter optime maxime, do dico dedicoque." Less baldly stated but in effect the same are the prayers offered on the occasion of the *ludi saeculares* of 17 B.C. (*CIL.* VI, 32323). In Romulus' dedication of the *spolia opima* (Liv. i. 10. 6) the circumstances under which the present offering is made and the conditions which shall govern future dedications of the same kind are specifically set forth: "Iuppiter Feretri, haec tibi *victor* Romulus *rex regia* arma fero templumque dedico sedem opimis spoliis, quae *regibus ducibusque hostium caesis* me auctorem sequentes posteri ferent." In this as in other prayers the business-like attitude of the speaker is emphasized by the plain form of address, Iuppiter Feretri, without magnifying epithet or clause. Other illustrations of this style of address are furnished by the prayer of the *fetialis* in Liv. i. 32. 10: "audi Iuppiter et tu Iane Quirine," and by that of the *fetialis*, *idem* i. 24. 7: "audi Iuppiter, audi pater patrare populi Albani, auditio populus Albanus." The element of adoration is conspicuously lacking, the nearest approach to it being a matter-of-fact acknowledgment of superior power, such as is found in a later part of the last prayer quoted: "tantoque magis ferito quanto magis potes pollesque."

But in many cases no condition or stipulation or consideration is expressed or implied. The suppliant merely appeals to the higher powers for assistance as in Liv. xxix. 27. 1. That a note of adoration is heard in this and in other prayers where nothing is said of the advantage to the god, and that we have such phrases as "divi divae, qui maria terrasque colitis, vos precor quaeisque," admits of simple psychological explanation. More or less unconsciously, perhaps, on that analogy of the relation of man and god to the relations of man and man, or, to put it another way, on the basis of the essentially social nature of prayer,¹ he who has nothing to offer tends to flatter his god with fair words. Another example of this occurs in the prayer in Velleius Paterculus ii. 131. 1 where Mars is addressed

¹ See Strong *The Psychology of Prayer*, chap. i.

as "auctor ac stator Romani nominis Gradive Mars." That magnifying phrases are confined to this type of prayer is not claimed, but that they bulk larger here seems certain.

Other strictly mundane elements are found. A common one is that of the claim, as in the prayer of Romulus in *Liv. i. 12. 4*: "Iuppiter, *tuis iussus avibus* hic in Palatio prima urbi fundamenta ieci," and in that of Camillus (*Liv. v. 21. 2*): "*tuo ductu, Pythice Apollo, tuoque numine instinctus*." The trend of the prayer in each of these cases is that the god, being in a sense responsible for the initial steps, should help his people through stress and crisis to the goal of success. The same suggestion of a claim upon the services of the god is discernible in *Tac. Hist. iv. 58*: "Te Iuppiter . . . quem per octingentos viginti annos tot triumphis coluimus." To this type belongs also the prayer in *Cic. De dom.* with all its elaborate rhetoric: "vos [i.e. dii] obtestor, quorum ego a templis atque delubris pestiferam illam et nefariam flamمام depuli, teque Vesta mater, cuius castissimas sacerdotes ab hominum amentium furore et scelere defendi," and a few lines below: "si in illo paene fato reipublicae obieci meum caput pro vestris caerimoniis atque templis perditissimorum civium furori atque ferro." In other prayers the suppliant does not so much suggest claims as advance reasons why the god should grant his request. In the prayer of Spurius Postumius (*Liv. ix. 8. 8*) the humiliation of the Romans in being sent under the yoke by the Samnites is urged as a reason for the gods' assisting them in the further prosecution of the war with that people: "dii immortales . . . vos satis habeatis vidisse nos sub iugum missos . . . novos consules legiones Romanas ita cum Samnite gerere bellum velitis ut omnia ante nos consules bella gesta sunt." The plea here is that they had suffered enough. This same idea that there was a limit beyond which it was hardly reasonable that the displeasure of gods should go is found in the prayer of Volumnius in *Tac. Hist. iv. 58*: "Iuppiter . . . Quirine si vobis non fuit cordi me duce haec castra incorrupta et intemerata servari, at certe pollui foedarique a Tute et Classico ne sinatis." In the long prayer in *Verr. ii. 5. 184 ff.* Cicero urges the crimes of Verres against the sanctuaries of the gods as a reason for their punishing him.

Another aspect of man's communion with his gods is seen in the

curse-tablets. In the case of many of these it is clear that the author of the curse believes that he can compel the gods or demons addressed to do his will. Many examples are given by Audollent.¹ The content of these *defixiones* also is of great significance in determining the attitude of the ancients toward their gods, for it will be remembered that the authors of the tablets call down disasters of all kinds upon their enemies in no uncertain terms.²

So far the prayers examined have conformed more or less to the type of primitive prayer described at the beginning of this paper. It is clear that the Romans bargained with their gods, flattered them, reasoned with them, made claims upon them, and on occasion even attempted to force them. Of adoration, of contemplative prayer, of ethical concepts there are in the cases before us but few traces. Even in such a prayer as that in Valerius Maximus viii. 1. 5, where Tuccia, addressing Vesta, says, "si sacris tuis castas semper admovi manus," the significance of *castas* is probably ceremonial rather than ethical. Must we then assume that Roman prayer in general was of this primitive type, that it was confined for the most part to petitions for material blessings, and that it was without ethical content? Two questions must be answered before we can arrive at any satisfactory conclusions on this point: I, What is included under the term "ethical"? and II, Are these prayers that have been discussed, so many of which are formal vows, representative of the attitude of the Romans in their personal supplications to the gods? In regard to the first question I would refer to Jevons' remarks in his chapter on prayer,³ where he points out that even the appeal of an army of savages to their war-god for victory implies a species of group morality. Such an appeal is not merely a petition for personal or individual advantage, but springs from feelings of loyalty and patriotism. Whether patriotism is always a virtue is, I suppose, a debatable question, but it approaches closely enough to the moral to serve as an illustration of the too rigid exclusion of morality from primitive prayers. There is a distinct ethical element in such a prayer as that offered by one of the Osages to Wohkonda, the Master of Life:

¹ *Defixionum tabellae quotquot innoverunt* (p. 345).

² Cf. Audollent *op. cit.* (p. 249).

³ *Introduction to the Study of Comparative Religion*, pp. 144 ff.

"Wohkonda, pity me, I am very poor; give me what I need; give me success against mine enemies, that I may avenge the death of my friends. May I be able to take scalps, to take horses."¹ In the sense in which ethical content is predicated of prayers like this, even those Roman prayers that I have quoted are ethical. Whether the term "ethical" in the broader sense of "pertaining to right and wrong, to virtue and vice" may also be applied to Roman prayers can best be determined by answering the question propounded above under II, for that will involve a more thorough examination of the prayers and accounts of prayer given by Roman writers. Among others we must review the satirists and philosophers, for although it is to be remembered that the satirists exaggerate and the philosophers tend to the ideal, yet it cannot be doubted that we have in them indications of the character of contemporary prayer. They are for the purposes of this inquiry sources which must be treated warily but which can on no account be disregarded. I shall begin, however, neither with satirist nor philosopher but with some of the poets of the late Republican and early Imperial periods, only reminding the reader by way of preface that it is not always easy to distinguish between poetry and piety, between rhetoric and religion.

It is a curious fact that the first prayer breathing a spirit of adoration in Latin occurs in Lucretius, the exponent of Epicurean rationalism. I mean the famous invocation to Venus at the beginning of the first book. Many critics² have commented on what they have been pleased to call Lucretius' inconsistency in prefacing his iconoclastic poem with lines permeated by a spirit of fervid devotion. But as Hadzsits in *Classical Philology* II, 187 ff., has shown, there is no real inconsistency. We have abundant testimony that Epicurus and his followers believed in prayer. They did not think that the gods could be induced by prayers and sacrifices to grant men's desires, and Lucretius in v. 1198 ff. speaks disdainfully of those who prostrate themselves before stone altars; but prayers of contemplation and adoration were a part of their system, and only he, they claimed, who was free from all fear of the gods was in a position

¹ Tylor *Primitive Culture* II, 365, and Jevons *op. cit.* 143.

² The various explanations offered are given by Merrill in his edition of Lucretius, p. 260.

to open his mind to the images that flowed from that divine perfection.¹ We find an approach to adoration also in Catullus' ode to Diana (34); her descent from Jove, her sovereignty over hills, woods, and rivers form the prelude to the prayer that she aid the Romans. Similar but much briefer is the appeal to Hymen at the beginning of 61. In this poem we find that device of repetition ("O Hymen Hymenaeo io, O Hymen Hymenaeo") so common in litanies of all ages, the earliest example of which in Latin is in the "Carmen Arvale." The same solemnity of style that characterizes Catullus' invocation of the gods in these odes is seen in vs. 91 of 63: "Dea magna, dea Cybelle, dea domina Dindymi." In 64. 193 ff. Ariadne strengthens her appeal to the Eumenides by referring to her helplessness ("inops . . . amenti caeca furore") and to her sincerity ("quae quoniam verae nascuntur pectore ab imo"). The latter clause introduces an ethical element into the supplication which is found also in that most pathetic of all Catullus' poems, 76, where after throwing himself on the compassion of the gods ("O Di, si vestrum est misereri . . . me miserum adspicite"), he bases his petition for divine aid on the purity of his past life ("si vitam puriter egi"). What he means by *puriter* is made clear by vss. 3-4 ("nec sanctam violasse fidem nec foedere in ullo divum ad fallendos numine abusum homines"), and the ethical content of such a prayer as this can without doubt be assumed for all supplications addressed to Jupiter in his capacity of god of truth, to Fides, to Dius Fidius, and to all deified abstractions of moral ideas.

The communion of the shepherds with their gods in Virgil's *Eclogues* is on the basis of definite consideration. So Corydon in vii. 31 promises Diana that if his success in hunting continue, he will set up a marble statue of her; and in the next line Thrysis, mocking his rival's words, assures Priapus that he shall have a statue of gold if the flocks show increase. The tone of the invocation at the beginning of the *Georgics* (i. 5 ff.) is one of devout reverence: "Vos o clarissima mundi lumina, labentem caelo quae ducitis annum." Sun and moon, Bacchus and Ceres, Fauns, Dryads, and other spirits of the woodlands are invoked in sonorous phrases setting forth their powers and attributes. Here and there we are reminded of the

¹ See Masson *Lucretius, Epicurean and Poet*, pp. 284 ff.

Lucretian invocation, but the shift from god to god excludes that concentration of fervor which, passing beyond the bounds of reverence into contemplative adoration, is the most salient characteristic of Lucretius' lines. The form and content of the Virgilian prayer sprang from that combination of rare artistic sense and religious reflection which shows itself in so much of Virgil's poetry. Pious he was, but not pious only, he knew to the full the aesthetic effect of accumulations of names and epithets charged with religious associations. He employs the same device in the prayer in 498 ff. of this book: "Di patrii, Indigetes, et Romule Vestaque mater," etc. Cf. also the invocation to Bacchus in *Georg.* ii. 1 ff. The prayer of Aeneas to Venus in *Aeneid* i. 327 ff. is a flurry of adoration, a plea for pity and a promise of sacrifice ("O dea certe . . . ignari erramus . . . multa tibi . . . cadet hostia"). In i. 731 there is an example of that custom of hinting to the god that he ought to grant the request: "Iuppiter, hospitibus nam te dare iura loquuntur, hunc laetum Tyriisque diem Troiaque profectis esse velis." This attitude toward the god recurs in ii. 689 ff., where Anchises asks for a sign. In Aeneas' prayer to Apollo in iii. 84 ff. the urgency of the case is emphasized by a rapid fire of imperatives and brief questions. The pitifulness of their plight is also part of their plea ("reliquias Danaum atque immitis Achilli"). In the last words of this prayer the god is asked to glide into their hearts ("animis inlabere nostris"), the worshiper being confused with the seer. Iarbas' prayer in iv. 206 not only reveals his feeling that his service to Jupiter in making him the tutelary divinity of his realm ("Iuppiter omnipotens, cui nunc Maurusia pictis gens epulata toris Lenaeum libat honorem") entitles him to expect divine assistance, but in the following lines ("an te, genitor, cum fulmina torques, neququam horremus?") contains almost a challenge that the god show his power. Iarbas' action in touching the altar as he prayed ("talibus orantem dictis arasque tenentem") is not intended merely to add solemnity, as Conington suggests in his note, but belongs like such an action as embracing the knees of a statue of a god to that quasi-coercion of the divine powers traces of which have already been noticed. That familiarity of tone which we have found in so many of the prayers examined is especially noticeable in Aeneas' prayer to Jupiter (v. 687)

on the occasion of the fire among the ships. It comes out in the *si*-clauses in 697 and 698 but is still more prominent in 690 ff., the burden of which is "Either save us or destroy us completely." The hero's prayer to Apollo in vi. 56 ff. contains a reminder of the god's former protection of their fortunes, a reference to the guidance he had recently vouchsafed, and a plea that the wanderings had lasted long enough. This thought that the Trojans had suffered enough is seen also in the appeal in 631. In viii. 572 ff. when Evander prays, he makes it perfectly clear that he asks for life only on the understanding that he shall see his son Pallas in safety. In ix. 404 ff. Nisus claims the assistance of Diana on the strength of former offerings to her. Ascanius bases his prayer to Jupiter in ix. 625 partly on the fact that his undertaking is a bold one ("audacibus adnue coepitis"); then he speaks of the offering he will make if Jupiter favor him. The prayer of Pallas in x. 421 ff. is of the simple vow form. In a word, Virgil's prayers conform for the most part to the primitive type, though doubtless this is to some extent due to his desire to reproduce faithfully the simplicity of the pastoral and heroic types of character which he is portraying.

Some examples of contemporary prayer and some passages showing his views on the subject are found in Horace's poems. In *Epist.* i. 4. 8 ff. intelligence, eloquence, influence, reputation, health, and a decent competence are mentioned as typical of the kinds of things nurses prayed for in behalf of the children in their charge. The old man in *Sat.* ii. 3. 283 prays for life: "me surpite morti: dis etenim facile est." In the same satire (288 ff.) a mother bargains with Jupiter for the cure of her child. The first part of *Od.* i. 31 contains a list of the things which Horace disdains to pray for—things which are obviously the objects of other men's prayers: fertile fields, goodly herds, gold and ivory of India. Sometimes it is a foolish prayer that the poet glances at contemptuously as in *Sat.* ii. 6. 8. ff.: "si veneror stultus nihil horum, O si angulus ille proximus accedat, qui nunc denormat agellum! O si urnam argenti fors quae mihi monstret." Many of Horace's own prayers conform to the common types of the day, but we cannot find on these any theories of the poet's personal views. When in Ode i. 3 he prays for the safety of a friend he is conforming to a literary rather than a theological theory. The

same is true of his prayer to Faunus in iii. 18 and to Diana in iii. 22. Nor can we regard as anything more than a thoughtless echo of primitive religious ideas those lines (*Od.* i. 21. 13 ff.) in which he says that Apollo moved by prayer will not only save the Romans but will send war, pestilence, and famine among their enemies the Britons and Persians. We get much closer to Horace's own ideas in such prayers as that given at the end of Ode i. 31 ff.: "frui paratis et valido mihi, Latoe, dones et, precor, integra cum mente nec turpem senectam degere nec cithara carentem." Similar in tone is that in *Ep.* i. 18. 107: "sit mihi quod nunc est, etiam minus, et mihi vivam quod superest aevi, siquid superesse volunt di: sit bona librorum et provisae frugis in annum copia, neu fluitem dubiae spe pendulus horae." But the next two lines give a new turn to the thought: "sed satis est orare Iovem, qui ponit et aufert, det vitam, det opes: aequum mi animum ipse parabo." According to the last words one can himself, without aid of gods, attain the moral quality ("aequum animum"); while in the first lines we have the old idea that it is external goods that one should seek from Heaven. How deeply grounded the latter thought was we see from the passage in Cicero *Nat. deor.* iii. 36: "num quis quod bonus vir esset gratias dis egit umquam? At quod dives, quod honoratus, quod incolumis. Iovemque optimum et maximum ob eas res appellant, non quod nos iustos, temperatos, sapientes efficiat, sed quod salvos, incolumis, opulentos, copiosos."

The purest note in all Horace's words on communion with the gods is sounded in *Od.* iii. 23. 17: "immunis aram si tetigit manus," for the emphasis here is on the moral stainlessness of the worshiper, *immunis* meaning *immunis scelerum*. The recurrence of this idea in the passages from Persius and Seneca which I shall cite below affords a substantial support to this interpretation in spite of the many arguments that have been advanced against it.¹

In the *Carmen Saeculare* the prayers beginning with vs. 37 and ending in vs. 52, consistent with the formal character of the whole ode, revert to the type shown by so many of the vows quoted in the first part of this paper.

¹ See Postgate *Classical Quarterly* IV (1910), 106 ff.; Granger *Classical Review* XXIV (1910), 46 f.

It is characteristic of the conservative piety of Tibullus that in i. 10. 25 he assures his Lares that the sacrifice of the victim which shall be theirs if they save him will be accompanied by due forms of ritual: "hanc pura cum veste sequar," etc. The tone of the prayers in the third book of the collection (with the exception of iii. 6. 1) is different. The author of iii. 8. (iv. 2) 1 ff., where Mars is warned against Sulpicia, is flippant. The same is true of iii. 10 (iv. 4), where the lover does not only make vows, but if his mistress have a relapse, he abuses the gods: "interdum vovet; interdum quod langueat illa, dicit in aeternos aspera verba deos." At the end of the same elegy we are told that Phoebus will be so delighted with the offerings that both lover and mistress will bring him on the latter's recovery that the other gods will wish that they also had powers which could win them such gratitude. In iii. 11. (iv. 5) 9 ff. the Genius is asked to favor the lover only so long as he is faithful.¹ The prayer in Propertius ii. 16. (iii. 8) 30, that Venus bring about the discomfiture of a rival, is typical of a large group of supplications addressed to that goddess.

In *Am.* ii. 13. 7 in a prayer to Isis Ovid strengthens his appeal by a rhetorical amplification of the extent of her power in a style similar to that already pointed out in the case of Virgil (p. 187): "Isi, Paraetonium genialiaque arva Canopi quae colis et Memphim palmiferamque Pharon," etc. There is moral significance in the prayer in ii. 14. 43 where the gods are implored to forgive the sin of abortion on the ground that it has been committed only once. It is noticeable also that it is the gods in general whose wrath at this sin is assumed. In iii. 10 with characteristic irreverence Ovid reasons with Ceres on the inconsistency of her festival being a period of continence. In *Met.* i. 377 ff. the burden of the prayer offered by Deucalion and Pyrrha to Themis is that now if ever is the time for a manifestation of divine compassion. Special stress is laid upon the justice of the prayer: "si precibus . . . numina iustis victa remollescunt." The *si*-clause does not express doubt but points out the appropriateness of the occasion for a demonstration of the quality referred to. The *si*-clause in the prayer of Daphne (*ibid.* 545) and in many other passages has a similar force. The prayer of Myrrha

¹Cf. Hendrickson in *Class. Jour.* V, 255.

at the time of her temptation (x. 321 f.), when she beseeches the gods to save her from the sin of incest, is of especial interest for our inquiry: "Di precor et pietas sacrataque iura parentum hoc prohibete nefas scelerique resistite nostro." In the supplication she makes after she has sinned (x. 483 ff.) we have an early reference to the possibilities of confession as a means of gaining divine forgiveness: "O siqua patetis numina confessis, merui nec triste recuso supplicium." Ovid recurs to this thought in 488: "numen confessis aliquod patet." Along the same lines is the reference to a realization of error as a reason for the god's relenting in Medea's prayer in xi. 131 ff.: "da veniam, Lenaee pater, peccavimus." In the *Fasti* i. 65 ff. the favor of Janus is solicited for those whose efforts have brought about peace on land and sea. When the poet in iii. 714 asks that Bacchus be propitious to him, he emphasizes the fact that it is his festival he is celebrating: "Bacche fave vati, dum tua festa cano." In iv. 1 ff. Ovid chats with Venus just as in the first book he interviews Janus. The emphasis on personal chastity is noteworthy in the prayer of Claudia Quinta on the occasion when the ship carrying the image of Cybele stuck in the mud in the Tiber (iv. 319 ff.): "supplicis, alma, tuae, genetrix fecunda deorum, accipe sub certa condicione preces. Casta negor. Si tu damnas, meruisse fatebor; morte luam poenas iudice victa dea. Sed si crimen abest, tu nostrae pignora vitae redabis et castas casta sequere manus." Octavian's prayer to Mars (v. 573 ff.) contains the words "stetque favor causa pro meliore tuus." The next line, however, reverts to the usual form of the vow: "templa feres et, me victore, vocaberis Ultor." A suggestive commentary on the character of some kinds of supplication offered by Romans is furnished by the prayer which Ovid puts into the mouth of the trader in v. 681 ff.: "abue praeteriti periuria temporis . . . pateant veniente die periuria nobis, nec carent superi siqua locutus ero. Da modo lucra mihi, da facto gaudia luero, et fac ut emptori verba dedisse iuvet." The next two lines give the poet's comment: "talia Mercurius poscentem ridet ab alto, se memor Ortygias surripuisse boves." In the words spoken by Metellus before entering the temple of Vesta when fire had broken out (v. 450 ff.), it is ceremonial sin that is referred to: "si scelus est, in me commissi poena redundet."

One of the most significant accounts of prayer is that contained in the second satire of Persius. Grounded on fact doubtless are the prayers he censures: e.g., those for the death of an uncle or a ward (vss. 10, 12), those for treasure trove (vs. 11), for a great marriage for the heir of the family (vs. 37), for fertility of flocks (vs. 46), for physical strength (vs. 41)—some of them prayers of criminal intent and only to be muttered under the breath, others harmless enough in themselves but devoid of real piety: "Haec sancte ut poscas," sneers Persius, "Tiberino in gurgite mergis mane caput bis terque et noctem flumine purgas." The satirist scouts the idea that a god would listen to evil prayer or that the sacrifices made could influence him: the offerings acceptable to the gods are duty to god and man, purity of heart, and nobility of character (vss. 73-74). If the worshiper have these, a handful of meal will win acceptance (vs. 75). We have in this satire two elements: first an indication of the kind of prayers Romans sometimes offered, and secondly Persius' ideas of the only really acceptable types of offering. It is an example of primitive pagan prayer subjected to analysis by a Stoic philosopher. That such prayers were offered is attested by abundant evidence. I have already drawn attention to the character of the contents of the *defixionum tabellae*, and the prevalence of the criminal element in the prayers men muttered has been demonstrated by Sudhaus,¹ Schmidt,² and Conington.³

Seneca's remark in *Ep. 10. 5* is in substantial agreement with Persius: "nunc enim quanta dementia est hominum! turpissima vota dis insurarrant . . . quod scire hominem nolunt, deo narrant." Other passages in Seneca throw light on prayers, calling attention either to their foolishness or to the presence of still more reprehensible qualities: *De ben. vi. 27. 7*: "votum tuum aut supervacuum est aut iniuriosum." In the fragment preserved by Lactantius (Haase 123) he speaks of the inefficacy of costly sacrifices and emphasizes the importance of the pure mind and honest purpose. So too in *De ben. i. 6. 1 ff.* he points out that not in victims, even though they be decked out with ornaments of gold, lies the honor of gods, but in

¹ *Archiv f. Religionsw.* IX (1906), 185 ff.

² *Veteres philosophi quomodo iudicaverint de precibus*, pp. 26 f., 61 f.

³ *The Satires of A. Persius Flaccus*.

the piety and rectitude of the worshipers. A little meal and vessels of earthenware suffice the good for the service of the gods, nor do the wicked escape the taint of impiety by staining altars with streams of blood. In *Ep.* 95. 40 Seneca tells us that to be good is the best way to propitiate the gods and to imitate them is their most pleasing service. In *Nat. Quaest.* iii. praef. 14 he warns men not to harbor evil thoughts, but to raise pure hands to heaven and ask for nothing that would mean deprivation for another. The "bona mens," however, that he bids men pray for in *Ep.* 10. 4, is mental, not moral, health.¹ The phrase has the same meaning in Petronius 88, a passage which has other points of similarity with those quoted from Seneca and Persius: "ac ne bonam quidem mentem aut bonam valetudinem petunt, sed statim ante quam limen Capitolii tangant, aliis donum promittit si propinquum extulerit, aliis si thesaurum effoderit, aliis si ad trecentiens sestertium salvus pervenerit."

In saying what men ought not to pray for Juvenal in his tenth satire shows us what men did pray for. One man's supplication is for great power (56 ff.), another's for a wife, another's for children (352), another's for long life (188 ff.); mothers pray for beauty for their children (289 ff.), and in all the temples are offered prayers for wealth. Juvenal's censure of these types of prayer is an odd medley of material and moral considerations. He bids men not to pray for great power because it has proved the ruin of many. He cites the tragedy of Sejanus' end as a case in point, and describes the horrors of his fall with all the resources of rhetorical declamation. As a warning to those who pray that their life may be long he details the unsightliness and physical disabilities of extreme old age. He tries to frighten those who pray for riches by dwelling on the dangers to which great wealth would expose them. On the other hand there is a moral element in his censure of parents' prayers for beauty in their children, for he contends that beauty and chastity rarely go together (297): "rara est adeo concordia formae atque pudicitiae"; and when at the end of the satire he discusses suitable subjects for prayer

¹ It would be apart from the purpose of this paper to attempt to reconcile with the passages quoted those other passages in Seneca's works in which he seems to disapprove not only of wicked or foolish prayers, but of prayers of all kinds. This question has been admirably discussed by Schmidt in the treatise already cited.

(354 ff.), he urges men to ask for a stout heart that shall not know fear of death, that shall be able to bear any hardships, that shall never stoop to anger or desire, and that shall prefer honest toil to all the lures of indulgence, luxury, and ease. Some commentators see high moral intent in vss. 346 ff., where Juvenal advises men not to pray for such things as have been mentioned above but to let the gods decide what is good and useful for them; they will give what is suitable even if it be not pleasant. Mayor compares the passage in Xenophon's *Memorabilia* i. 3. 2, where we are told that Socrates prayed to the gods for good things, leaving them to decide what things were good. But judging from the language used by Juvenal here ("conveniat . . . utile . . . aptissima"), from the trend of the arguments throughout the greater part of the satire, and from the illustrations given (350-53), worldly rather than spiritual considerations predominate. The illustrations are especially instructive in determining Juvenal's meaning: Why pray for a wife when she might turn out to be a harridan or worse? Why pray for children when they might disgrace you?

Some of the thoughts in Juvenal's discussion of prayer are traced by Mayor¹ and Schmidt² back to Valerius Maximus. The resemblances are certainly striking. Cf. Val. Max. vii. 2 ext. 1: "at haec [i.e. marriages] ut aliquando illustrant, ita nonnumquam funditus domos evertunt . . . divitias adpetis, quae multis exitio fuerunt, honores concupiscis, qui complures pessum dederunt, regna tecum ipsa volvis, quorum exitus saepenumero miserabiles cernuntur."

The authors examined give, I think, a fair representation of prayer as it was practiced and preached among the Romans. I shall add only one more writer, namely Apuleius of Madaura, not because any distinctly new elements are found in the prayers in his works but because some of the qualities discussed appear there in a far higher degree of intensity. Appeals to the compassion of gods we have seen in many prayers, but few of them rival in pathos Psyche's plea to Ceres (vi. 2): "miserandae Psyches animae supplicis tuae subsiste," etc. The most striking feature of Apuleius' prayers, however, is their

¹ *Thirteen Satires of Juvenal*.

² *Op. cit.*, pp. 28-29.

fervor of adoration. An example is furnished by the passage cited above where Psyche, bowing her head in the dust at Ceres' feet, adores and magnifies her: "per ego te frugiferam tuam dexteram istam deprecor, per laetificas messium caerimonias, per tacita secreta cistarum." Of similar character is Psyche's prayer to Juno (*ibid.* 4), and that to the gods in xi. 1. The prayer of Lucius to Isis after his initiation into her mysteries (xi. 25) is of the same type but breathes a purer spirit of adoration. He extols her manifold powers in golden phrases that carry the reader up to the very threshold of divine compassion and love: "sancta et humani generis sospitatrix perpetua, semper fovendis mortalibus munifica, dulcem matris affectionem miserorum casibus tribuis . . . et depulsis vitae procellis salutarem porrugas dexteram." Not a thousand tongues, he cries, not an eternity of unflagging speech could begin to express the adoration of his heart. Nor can any paraphrase reproduce the startling effectiveness of Apuleius' rhetoric. Adoration we have found before in Roman writers, but only here do we find that exaltation which transcends the things of this world and passes into the mystic.

To sum up, while Roman prayer throughout its whole history retained for the most part a primitive form, yet it did at an early date in certain cults involve moral ideas—not moral merely in the sense in which Jevons uses the term but moral in the ordinary acceptation of the word. These moral ideas were at least as early as the worship of Jupiter as the god of truth and good faith, a cult which belongs to the first days of Roman history. It should, however, be noticed that originally there was no connection between moral ideas and the cults of the gods in general, and that in some cults such a connection was never developed. On the other hand prayers quoted in this paper make it clear that there was a tendency in the direction of a closer drawing together of moral and religious ideas. This tendency is not as strong as one would expect it to be. The prayers exemplifying it are, in comparison with those of more primitive type, relatively few in number. But sporadic as they are they do exist, as the quotations show. It is not necessary to assume that all these moral ideas came to the Romans through the medium of Greek philosophy. The philosophical schools, however, constituted one of the chief sources, and the views of Horace, Persius, and Seneca were influenced

by them. That some Romans practiced the precepts which we find in the works of these writers it is reasonable to assume. As regards those types of prayer which the satirists attack most bitterly—the wicked and foolish prayers—there is no doubt that they existed and were even frequent; but that they were the most common kinds of prayer cannot be believed. The satirist has ever loved the extreme. The most common type of prayer was neither immoral nor moral. It was ceremonial.

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

STUDIES IN GREEK NOUN-FORMATION

Based in part upon material collected by the late A. W. STRATTON, and prepared under the supervision of CARL D. BUCK¹

LABIAL TERMINATIONS

Words in *-φη* or *-φā* (also *-φă*)—in *-φης* or *-φās*, gen. *-φou*—and in *-φos* and *-φov*, gen. *-φov*.

BY E. H. STURTEVANT

The existence of an Indo-European suffix *-bho* has long been recognized, and in recent years it has received rather frequent treatment. There is an excellent summary of our present knowledge of the subject in the new edition of the second volume of Brugmann's *Grundriss* (Part I, pp. 386 ff.; see his references to the more important literature). Upon this we must base our introductory remarks on the use of the suffix in Indo-European in general (pp. 197 to 199), although we shall depart from Brugmann's treatment at several points, and our third paragraph is entirely new.

Only a few words containing the suffix can with any certainty be ascribed to the parent speech. In the first rank stand *ἐριφός* (from **eribhos*), Ir. *earb* "goat," Swed. *järf* "gulo borealis" (from **erbhos*) : Lat. *aries*, Lith. *eras* "lamb"; *ἀλφός* "white," as substantive "white leprosy," Lat. *albus*, OHG. *elbiȝ*, OB. *lebedȝ*, Serv. *l̄abud* "swan" : OHG. *elo* "yellow"; OP. *naiba-* "beautiful, good," Ir. *noib*, *noeb* "holy" : Lat. *niteo*, Ir. *niam* "splendor," Skt. *nilas* "dark blue"(?). We should probably add to the list *ἐλαφός* (from **eln̄-bhos*) : Goth., Eng. *lamb* (from **lon-bhom*) : *ἐλλαός* (from **éλνός*) "young deer," Cymr. *elain* "hind," OB. *jelen* "deer" (see Osthoff *Etymologische Parerga* 305); *σφός*, OPr. *subs* "selbst, eigen" (from **s'bho-*), Goth. *sibja*, NHG. *Sippe*, OB. *seb-ru* "free peasant," Lat. *Sab-īnī* : **se*-reflexive; and Slavic *svobó-da*, *svobo-dá* "freedom," *Svēbī*, OHG. *Swābā*, NHG. *Schwaben* : **sue-* reflexive.²

¹ See Introductory Note, *CP*. V. 323 ff.

² Cf. Lidén *Studien z. altind. u. vergl. Sprachgeschichte* 54 and Solmsen *Untersuchungen z. griech. Laut- u. Verslehre* 197 f. Solmsen derives Skt. *sabha* "assembly" also from the reflexive stem, but it seems preferable to connect it with the demonstrative **se-* (see p. 199). Brugmann, *Grundr.* 2. 1². 388 (cf. also *Demonstrativpronomina* [CLASSICAL PHILOLOGY VI, April, 1911] 197

It is impossible to draw a sharp distinction between words with an Indo-European suffix and those with a "root-determinative." For example, *κνάφος*, *γνάφος* "a carding comb," *κνάπτω* "card wool," Lith. *knibti* "pluck," *knēbti* "pinch" (Sütterlin *IF*. 25. 66), clearly belong with *κνῆν* "scrape, scratch"; accordingly *κνάφος* may originally have been an abstract derivative in *-bho*, while *ἄγναφος*, *N. T.*, may possibly represent an Indo-European adjective. Similarly we have (*σ*)*κέραφος*, *σχέραφος* "mockery, abuse," Hesych., Lett. *schk'erbs* "rude," *skarbs* "sharp, etc." : *κείρω*, Lat. *careo*, etc. (Brugmann *IF*. 15. 97). *τρυφή* "luxury," properly "destruction," *τρύφος τό* "fragment" (perhaps originally masculine, cf. *ἔδαφος*), *θρύπτω*, Lett. *drubascha* "fragment," *drubasas* "splinter" stand beside *θρανώ* "break," *θρανστός* "frangible," Lett. *drupi* "fragments," *drípu* "fall to pieces" (cf. p. 209), etc.

Scholars have been more successful in tracing certain uses of the suffix back to pro-ethnic times. Thus, all branches of the Indo-European stock employ it in animal names. Adjectives, though rather less numerous except in Baltic-Slavic, are quite as widespread. It is hardly possible to classify their meanings except for the several languages separately.¹ Abstracts occur with some frequency in Baltic-Slavic and Greek, and occasionally elsewhere.

The abstracts and adjectives seem to be very closely related. The suffix-form *-ibhā-* common in abstracts in Baltic-Slavic, stands beside *-ibho* in Lithuanian and Greek adjectives.² Such pairs as Lith. *dalybas* "sharing" : *dalybos* (plural) "division," especially of an inheritance, and Goth. *halbs* "half" : *halba* fem. "Seite, Teil" are significant. The animal names probably represent, in part at least, a specialization of the adjectives. For example, several animal names

31), on the other hand, connects only Slavic *srobo-da* with the reflexive stem. Apparently he loses sight of the fact that these etymologies are quite independent of Solmsen's theory that I-E. *su-* became *s-* under certain unknown conditions, since the semantic equivalence of **sue-* and **se-* is indubitable.

¹ Brugmann, *loc. cit.*, lays stress upon the color words; but, of the half-dozen he names, Lat. *galbus* is very likely a Celtic loan word with suffix *-uo* (Walde), while *ձափօ* and *ձրյոփօ* may be specifically Greek.

² The constant length of the *-i-* in Baltic is not original, as is shown by Slavic *-i-*. Lithuanian *-yba*, *-ybė* in abstracts may have been influenced by the equivalent suffix *-ysta*, *-ystė*. The adjectives in *-ybas* clearly stand in some secondary relation to those in *-yvas*, Slavic *-ivā* (see Leskien *Bildung d. Nomina im Lit.* 353). But Greek *σέριφος* (see p. 209) indicates that the parent language had the suffix *-ibho* as well as *-ibho*.

in *-bho* were originally color words. With these we must include words like Goth. *-dūbō*, OHG. *tūba*, Eng. *dove* : Ir. *dub* "black" (? Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 306), which did not contain the suffix.

The parent speech also employed the suffix in *-bho* or *-bhā* to form derivatives from pronominal stems. The derivatives from the reflexive pronouns have been given above (p. 197). Lidén, *Studien z. altind. u. vergl. Sprachgeschichte* 52 ff., finds demonstrative stems in Lombard *-aib*, OHG. *-eiba* "district" (from I-E. **oi-bhā* or **ai-bhā* : **e-*, **o-* demonstrative), Skt. *sabhā* "assembly" (from I-E. **se-bhā* : **se-* demonstrative), and Skt. *ibhas* "elephant," properly "possession, property," *ibhyas* "rich" (: **i-* demonstrative). Some of these pronominal derivatives belong with the adjectives (*σφός*, OPr. *subs*); Germanic *-aib* and *-eiba* and Skt. *sabhā* have a collective force, and so go more nearly with the abstracts.

All the inherited types are represented in Greek, and a large majority of the Greek derivatives fall under them.

1. *Animal names*.—As in Indo-European in general, animal names most frequently show the suffix under discussion. *έριφος* and probably *έλαφος* were inherited (see above). *κόττυφος* "black-bird" is perhaps onomatopoetic in its first member. Prellwitz suggests a derivation from **kukjubhos* (with dissimilation of the first vowel ?), and compares Skt. *kukkubhas* "phasianus gallus." Brugmann, *Grundr.* 2. 1². 390, sees onomatopoeia in the bird names *κέπφος*, *κουκούφας*, and *ἀπαφός*. Thompson, *Glossary of Greek Birds*, thinks that *κέπφος* is probably foreign. *κουκούφας* (also *κουκούφος*) seems to be an Egyptian word for *ἕποψ* (Thompson *op. cit.*; cf. Horapollo 1. 55). *ἀπαφός*· *ἕποψ*, *τὸ ὄρνεον*, Hesych., is very likely a variant of its synonym, under the influence of the animal names in *-φος*.

The Hesychian *κόραφος*· *ποιὸς ὄρνις* is derived from the stem seen in *κορώνη*, *κόραξ*, Lat. *cornix*. *σιγαλφοί*· *οἱ ἄγριοι τέττιγες*, Hesych., is to be connected with *σιγηλός* "mute," used of animals in Arist. *H.A.* 1. 1. 29, and with *σιγᾶλέος* "silent." Probably it applies to the species of which the scholiast on Ar. *Av.* 1095 Dind. says: *ἔτερον δὲ γένος σύμιον καλεῖται παρὰ τὴν σιωπήν*.¹

¹ Schmidt writes Hesychius' lemma *σιγαλ[φ]οί*, while L. Dindorf (*Thesaurus* 7. 216) prefers *σιγαλέοι*. Doubtless one or the other is right as far as the first definition (*οἱ διφωνοί*) is concerned; but I suspect that two articles have been amalgamated.

κεμφάς. ἔλαφος, Hesych., belongs with *κεμάς* -άδος, Hom., +. The suffix is -φᾶ-, although it is possible that the influence of the primitive carried the word over to the -άς -άδος declension. *χρύσαφος*, Marcell. Sid., and *χρύσοφος*, CGL., a fish, Lat. "aurata," show the influence of the suffix, but they are probably modifications of *χρύσοφρυς*, the name which is usually applied to the fish in question, rather than new derivatives from *χρυσός*. *κίραφος* ἀλώπηξ is a derivative of the word which precedes it in Hesychius, *κίρα* ἀλώπηξ, Λάκωνες; unless we should rather suspect a corruption of the text. An article in Antonius Monachus' lexicon runs: *βοῦφος* ὄρνεον. *βοῦφος* ἐπιφοιτᾶ, ἐπὶ τῶν ἀσυνέτων καὶ παχυφρόνων εἱρηται. Whether the bird in question was merely a creature of the imagination or a real bird of sluggish habits, its name is derived from *βοῦς*.

The late *κουτάλαφας* "cicada," Port., seems to be connected with *κουτάλα*, Doric for *σκυτάλη* "club, staff," also "sucker" on a tree (Geop. 9. 11. 4). Perhaps we may think of *κουτάλαφας* as the "insect on the twigs."

ὅρφος,¹ a kind of fish, is Attic ὄρφας, assimilated to the words with our suffix.

γρύψ, γρυπός (also γρυφός) "griffin," Hes., +, and its variants. γρυβός, Hesych., and γρυφός, Pomponius Mela, are certainly to be connected in some manner with Hebrew *k'rūb*, a creature combining the forms of man, ox, lion, and eagle (Ezek., chap. 1) or of man, lion, and eagle (Ezek., chap. 10). As there seems to be no satisfactory Semitic etymology of the word (Thayer *Lexicon of the New Testament*, s.v. *χερουβιλμ*), it is probable that Greek and Hebrew borrowed from some common source. The final consonant of the Hebrew word makes it probable that γρυβός was the original Greek form, in spite of its late appearance in our records.² The stem with π is due to a fancied connection with γρυπός "hook-nosed." γρυφός and γρύψ, γρυφός (Verg. *Ec.*, +) show the influence of the animal names in -φος.

σιλφη "book worm" may be derived from *ψιλός* "bare," in view of Aristotle's (*H. A.* 8. 17) remark: τὸν αὐτὸν δὲ τρόπον (i.e., as the

¹ Herodian, 1. 166. 19 L., cites the word as a barytone. Modern ὄρφος is from ὄρφως.

² Cf. Fick *KZ*. 42. 288. This view now seems to me more probable than the one which I expressed in *CP*. V. 331.

serpents) *καὶ τῶν ἐντόμων ἐκδύνει τὸ γῆρας ὅσα ἐκδύνει, οἷον σίλφη*. . . . The change from *ψ*- to *σ*- would have to be explained as an instance of dissimilation (from *πσιλπη). Both meaning and etymology of *τίφη*, Ar. *Ach.* 920, 925, are uncertain. It is indeed said by Phrynicus, 359 Ruth., and the scholiast on the passage to be equal to *σίλφη*; and probably we should read *τίφη* instead of *σίφη* in Herodian 1. 108. 14 L.: ἐγένετο δὲ ἔλλειψις, ὡς παρὰ τοῖς Ἀττικοῖς ἡ <τ>ίφη ἐκ τοῦ σίλφη παρ' ἡμῖν λεγομένη. . . . But the two words can hardly have been equivalent in Aristophanes' day. In the *Acharnians*, Nicharchus propounds a scheme to burn the ships by putting a wick ἐς *τίφην*, and sending it to the dockyard through a sewer. Dicaeopolis replies: *σέλαγοιντ' ἀν ὑπὸ τίφης τὲ καὶ θρυαλλίδος*; Clearly a book worm is out of the question; a glow worm would fit the context admirably.¹ We may at least, therefore, be sure that *σίλφη* and *τίφη* have no etymological connection, and that in the classical period they differed in meaning. The semantic confusion which we have noticed in Herodian and elsewhere was responsible for Lucian's *τίλφη*, a contamination of the two.

Beside (*σ*)*κιδάφη* and *κιδάφος*² "fox," we find *κινδάφη*, *κινδάφιον*, Hesych., and *σκίνδαφος*, Oudendorp's conjecture for *σκινδακός* in Aelian. The forms with a nasal represent a contamination with the synonymous *κίναδος*, but the etymology of *κιδάφος* itself is unknown. Other obscure words are (*άσ*)*κάλαφος*, an unknown bird (see p. 215), *ράφοι*· *ὅρνεις τινές*, Hesych., *βαιώμφαι*· *αι αἴγες ἐν ἱερατικοῖς*, Hesych., *σύρφος*· *θηρίδιον μικρόν, ὄποιον ἐμπίσ*, Hesych., *κυφή*, a kind of shrimp, Epich., +, *καθουφήν*.³ *ἀλώπεκα*, Hesych.

Είραφιώτης, Lesb. *Ἐρραφεώτης*, an epithet of Dionysus, h. Hom., +, suggests **είραφος*, **ἐρραφος* "goat" (Froehde *BB.* 21. 199), or "fox" (Ehrlich *KZ.* 39. 567), or the like.

*ἀκαλήφη*⁴ and (*ά*)*σκαλάφη* "sea-nettle," as well as "nettle," and *γόμφος*· *ἰχθύς*, Hesych. : *γόμφος* "nail" are animal names only in

¹ Herwerden, *Lex. Gr. Suppl.*², identifies Aristophanes' *τίφη* with the homonymous plant name.

² Hesychius' first definition, "δόλιος," doubtless represents a figurative use of the animal name.

³ Schmidt conjectures *κάθουριν* = *κόθουριν*.

⁴ *ἀκαλήφη*, in Pollux and Simeon Seth, seems to be an itacistic blunder for this. See also *Thesaurus s.v.*

a derived sense, and are quite independent of the suffix. *σέρφος*, the name of an insect, is a variant of the adjective *σέριφος* (see below). There are also several compound animal names in the following word-lists, as *τραγέλαφος*, *σχινότροφος*, *κιχλοκόσσυφος*.

2. *Adjectives*.—Several of the Greek adjectives with suffix *-φος* have a derogatory force. But there is hardly sufficient evidence that this is anything more than accidental and that such a force had become consciously associated with the suffix. *λίσφος* “ἀπυγος,” Moer., Tzetz., as substantive, *λίσφα τὰ ἴσχια . . .*, *E.M.*, is cited as Attic for *λίσπος*. A derogatory connotation attaches to the latter form in *Ar. Ran.* 826, *λίσπη γλῶσσα* (of Euripides), to the compounds, *λισπόπυγος* and *λισπόπυξ*, and to *ὑπόλισπος* in *Ar. Eq.* 1368, *πολλοῖς γ' ὑπόλισποις πυριδίοισιν ἔχαρισω*. Elsewhere *λίσπος* has no disagreeable connotation, and *ὑπόλισφος* in *Philostr. De Gymn.* 35, *τὰ δ' ὑπὸ τῷ ἴσχιῷ μήθ' ὑπόλισφα ἔστω μήτ' αὐτὸν περιττά*, is innocent enough. *λίσφος* is a derivative of *λισσός* “smooth” (cf. *ὅλισθος* from *ὅλισθάνω*, *ὅλισθος*; *CP. V.* 337). *λίσπος* has fallen under the influence of *λιπαρός*, etc.

σκελιφρός “dry, parched, lean,” Hipp., implies a base **σκελιφος*, from *σκέλλω* “make dry, parch.” The form *σκελεφρός*, Erot., shows assimilation of *ι* to the preceding *ε*, and so does the primitive adjective in its two recorded substantival uses: *κελεφός*, Hegemonius, +, is one of the numerous late Greek words for “leper”; *σκέλεφορ* (Schmidt; MS *σκέλεφερ*). *βόλου ὄνομα*, Hesych., was perhaps a throw in which some or all of the *tali* rested upon the narrow side, hence the “narrow throw.”

According to Antonius Monachus and Suidas, the phrase *γραῦς σέριφος* or *γραῦς σερίφη* was properly the Sicilian name of the locust usually called *μάντις*, and was used figuratively for “old maid”; but they have evidently reversed the process: *γραῦς* means “old woman” literally, not figuratively. The adjective appears elsewhere in the proper name *Σέριφος*, a small island (cf. Fick *Vorgriech. Ortsnamen* 57), in *σέριφον*,¹ a kind of wormwood, and in the Hesychian gloss: *Σέριφος· Ἀριστοφάνης τὴν Λακεδαιμονικὴν Σέριφον. ἔστι δὲ καὶ πόλις*

¹ L. and S. cite *σέριφος* ἡ from *Diosc.* 3. 27 (= 3. 24 Spengel). That passage, however, contains the accusative singular without the article. The gender is shown to be neuter by the article in *Galen* 13. 126 K.

σέριφος λεγομέμη. Instead of this Photius writes: *Σέριφον· τὴν Λακεδαιμονίαν, διὰ τὸ σκληρῶς ξῆν.* Apparently *σέριφος* meant "dry," in combination with *πόδα* "hay," and in the phrase *γραῦς σέριφος* "a dried-up old woman"; while *σέριφον* "wormwood" and *Σέριφος*, the island name, as well as *Σέριφος* = *Λακεδαιμονίαν*, show a derived sense, "unpleasant, harsh" (cf. *ξηρός* opposed to *ἡδύς* in Eur. *Andr.* 784). *σέρφος*, an insect, differs only in the form of the suffix. For the root, Prellwitz suggests a comparison with *ξερός* "dry."

στέριφος "barren," of women, animals, and plants, Ar., +, is a derivative of the synonymous *στεῖρος*; likewise *στέριφος* "firm" from *στερεός*. *ἄγροφον· ὄρεινόν*, Galen *Lex. Hipp.*, is derived from *ἄγρος*. *στυφός* "astringent" comes from *στύω* "make stiff." *λίηφος· δεινός*, Hesych., is possibly connected with *λίην* "very much, overmuch." In *λαφός· ὁ ἀριστερᾶς χειρὶ χρώμενος*, Hesych., *φ* probably represents *f*.

There remain four color words, of which one, *ἀλφός*, is certainly inherited. *ἀλωφός* "white," Hesych., is made on the same root as *ἀλφός*, Lith. *alvás*, etc., and is probably an inherited form (see Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 388). *ἄργυρφος*,¹ a Homeric epithet of sheep, contains the stem of *ἄργυρος* and Skt. *árvunas* "white." *κίνιφος· ὁ ποίκιλος*, Anton. Mon., Suid., seems to go with *κινέω*, *κίννυμαι* "go" and *κινύσσομαι* "waver, sway."

3. *Abstract substantives.*—Most of the Greek abstracts in our suffix differ from those in Baltic-Slavic in having the *o*-stem and masculine gender. All the masculines have recessive accent. The inherited forms (*σ*)*κέραφος*, *σχέραφος*, *κνάφος*, *γνάφος*, *τρύφος*, and *τρυφή* may contain the suffix (see p. 198). It is certainly present in the following (Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 390): *κόλαφος* "buffet" : *κόλος*, *κολάζω*, etc.; *φλήναφος* "ineptiae" : *φληνέω*, *φληνάω*, *φληνώ* ; *κρόταφος* "side of the forehead," plural "the temples," originally "a striking, a pulse" : *κρότος*, *κροτέω*, *κρόταλον*. *τὸ ἔδαφος*, originally a masculine abstract, owes its change of stem and gender to the influence of the synonymous and cognate *ἔδος*. Homeric *εἶλυφόων* "whirling" implies an abstract substantive **φέλινφος* :

¹ *ἄργυρφος* is an extension of this on the model of *ἄργυρος*, *μαρμάρεος*, etc. (Brugmann *Grundr.* 2. 1². 387). Lycophron's *συφός* "pig sty," beside Homeric *συφέος*, *συφείος*, shows the reverse process.

**φέλνυμι* (*εἰλύω*).¹ *τῦφος* "smoke, folly" : *θύω* must antedate the dissimilation of aspirates.

For the noun *σκίραφος* and its derivatives we have a bewildering array of meanings. *σκίραφος* itself means "trickery, cheating" in Hippoanax, "gambler" and "licentious" according to Herodian 1. 225. 13 f., 2. 581. 22 ff. L., and "dice box" according to the *E.M.* *σκιραφέῖον* is the name of an Athenian gambling den (*Isochr.*, +). *σκ[ε]ιραφεῖν* means "play at dice" (*Hesych.*); *σκιραφεντής*, "dice player" (*Amphis*); and *σκιραφώδης*, "tricky, swindling" (*Phryni-chus* in *A.B.* 101). Herodian, *loc. cit.*, is surely right in deriving the group from *Σκίρον*, the name of the red light district in Athens, where the *σκιραφεῖον* was situated. The various recorded meanings can most easily be arranged if we start with *σκίραφος* in an abstract sense "rascality, gambling." This developed into the concrete "dice box" and "rascal, gambler." The connecting link between *Σκίρον* and *σκίρ-α-φος* was probably **σκίρ-ων* "frequenter of the *Σκίρον*."

Several Greek abstracts show the feminine which appears constantly in Baltic-Slavic. *τρυφή* has already been mentioned. *κνήφη* "the itch," LXX, Suid., is a specifically Greek derivative from *κνῆν* "scratch, tickle," and has no direct connection with the inherited *κνάφος*.

Beside the familiar *κορυφή*, we find a masculine *κόρυφος*² in an inscription in the Megarian dialect (*IG.* 4. 929. 17 ff.) referring to certain landmarks between Epidaurus and Corinth. *Κόρυφον*, the name of a mountain near Epidaurus, *Paus.* 2. 28. 2, suggests that the word is Epidaurian rather than Megarian. A wholly different meaning of the *o*-stem appears in the Hesychian gloss, *κόρυφος*. *κόρυμβος γυναικέος*. The force of *κορυφή*, as of *κόρυφος*, is usually concrete, "summit, top"; but a trace of the abstract meaning "height" is preserved in Pindar's *κορυφὰ λόγων, λόγων κορυφαὶ* "the climax," *κορυφαὶ πόλεων* "the best of cities," etc.; although here too the concrete idea was present to consciousness, as is shown by Plato's use of the noun with the verb "to go" (*Crat.* 415 A)—

¹ Solmsen *Untersuchungen z. griech. Laut- u. Verslehre* 325. His alternative suggestion of an original adjective is less probable, since it would not correspond in meaning with the Greek adjectives in *-φος*.

² The accent is determined by Herodian 1. 225. 18 L.

ἔρχομαι γὰρ ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν ὡν εὑρηκα, ἐπὶ τὴν κορυφὴν δεῖ τῶν εἰρημένων ἐλθεῖν.

4. *Concrete substantives*.—Like other abstract substantives, those in *-φος* and *-φη* sometimes came to have a concrete sense, as *ἔδαφος* “bottom,” e.g., of a ship, *Od.* 5. 249, *σκίραφος* “gambler,” *φλήναφος* “babbler,” *κορυφή* “summit.” Other concrete substantives, as we have seen above (pp. 202 ff.), sprang from the substantival use of adjectives in *-φος*, as *κελεφός* “leper” and *σκέλεφορ* “a throw at dice” from **σκέλιφος* “dry, thin”; *Σέριφος*, an island, and *σέριφον* “wormwood” from *σέριφος* “dry, unpleasant”; *λίσφον* “(small) buttock” from *λίσφος* “smooth, flat”; *ἀλφός* “a dull-white leprosy” from *ἀλφός* “white.”

After the model of these and similar words, the suffix *-φος*, *-φη* was used to form concrete substantives. *γάλεφος*, Interpol. Diosc., is a variant of the plant names *γάλιον*, *γαλεόβδολον*, and *γαλεόψις*. Walde, *s.v. galea*, derives these three words from *γαλέη* “weasel,” in the secondary sense of “helmet” which is seen in the borrowed Latin *galea*. *γάλεφος* is derived from the same base with the suffix *-φος*. *ἐγκιλλαφον· οὐρά*, Hesych., is a derivative of *ἐγκιλλον· οὐράν*, Hesych. *ἀγρίφη*¹ “harrow, rake,” with its derivative *ἀγρίφνα*, *Anth.* P. 6. 297, and *ἀγρίφος* “grapple,” Const. Porph., may be from *ἀγρεύω*, *ἀγρέω*. *ἀγρίφος* “wild olive,” Hesych., whence comes *Αγρίφα*. *Αθηνᾶ*, Hesych., seems to be connected with *ἀγριος* “wild.” *οὐλαφον· νεκρός*, Hesych., suggests *οὐλυμη*, *οὐλόμηνη*, etc. *ταρήφη· τάρπη*, Hesych., goes with *τάρπη*, and *ταρσός*, *ταρρός* “crate, basket.”

“*Αλθηφον* or “*Αλθηφος*, the name of a district in Troezenia, belongs with *ἀλθετο*, *ἀπαλθήσεσθον* “heal,” Hom., *ἀλθήσκω*, Hipp., *ἀλθαίνω*, Hipp. and Alexandrian epic poets, *ἀλθεξις* “a healing,” Hipp., Galen, *ἀλθαία* “wild mallow,” Theophr. (as proper name, Hom.), *ἀλθήεις*, *ἀλθεστήρια*, Nic., *ἀλθεύς*, *ἀλθος*, Hesych., and several proper names in *Αλθαι-*, *Αλθη-*, *-ἀλθης* in inscriptions of Ephesus, Eretria, Cos, and Thasos (Fick-Bechtel, pp. 52 f.). The group evidently belongs primarily to the Ionic dialect, and hence our word is a trace of the original Ionic speech of the Argolic Acte² (cf. Buck

¹ Herodian, 1. 345. 32 L., cites it among *τὰ εἰς φη ταραληγόμενα φύσει μακρῷ*.

² In this connection we may add that Strabo, 10. 4. 18, says that the son of Cirrus, one of the founders of Argos, was named *Αλθαιμένης*.

Greek Dialects 2). Very likely the Troezenian variety of vine, called ἀλθηφιάς (Arist. *ap. Ath.* 31 C), got its name from the district Ἀλθηφον, either directly or from Ἀλθήφιος, the man for whom Aristotle says that it was named.

If *μαστροφός*, Hesychius' variant for *μαστροπός* "leno," is a derivative of *μαστήρ* "seeker," the *π* of the common form may be due to popular association with *-τροπός* as it appears, for example, in *δύστροπος*, the first word in Hesychius' definition of *μαστροπός*.

5. *Proper names*.—Many appellatives also appear as personal names, among which we may note such as *Κόττυφος*, *Κοσσύφα*, *Ἐριφος*, *Ἀσκάλαφος*, which belong to the large class of simple names, originally nicknames, based upon names of animals. Cf. Fick-Bechtel 314 ff. and Bechtel "Griech. Personennamen aus Spitznamen," *Abh. Gött. Ges. Wiss.* 1898, No. 5, p. 17, and *passim*. *Ἐλαφος* is the name of a small stream in Arcadia (Paus. 8. 36. 7), but on its supposed occurrence as a personal name see Bechtel *op. cit.* 45.

Some names in *-φος* may be regarded as the short forms of full names the second member of which begins with *φ*, e.g., *Ἀντίφος* beside *Ἀντιφάνης*, *Ἀντίφιλος*, *Ἀντιφῶν*, etc., or *Στάρτοφος* beside *Στρατοφάνης* (so Fick-Bechtel 255). But there are several for which no such full names are quotable, and there is no reason why we should not recognize the adjective suffix *-φος* as one of those which, like *-λος*, etc. (cf. Fick-Bechtel 24 ff.), may be employed in short names derived from full names or in those of the class treated of by Bechtel *op. cit.*

Thus *Τέκταφος*, which Fick-Bechtel say implies a full name *Τέκτα-φῶν* or the like, is more probably formed directly from the stem of *τέκτων*; similarly *Ἀσταφος* from *Ἀστων*, while *Ἀστοφος* is a short form of *Ἀστά-φιλος* or the like; *Κέρκαφος*, a mythical ancestor of the Rhodians, from *κερκιός* *ιέραξ*, Hesych. (Fick *BB.* 21. 280); *Τύλιφος*, a mythical shepherd, from *τύλη*, *τύλος*. Is *Θελέροφος*, name of a poet, formed from a **θέλερος* "wishing, wilful"? There are some examples of similar extensions in *-φας*. *Ματρίφας* (gen. *Ματρίφα*, *IG.* 12. 2. 646. 19) is, like *Ματρίχη*, from *Μάτρις*. From *Κλέων* is formed *Κλιώνφας*, *IG.* 12. 3. 1181 (or *Κλιώνφας*? Cf. names in *-ωνδας* and *-ονδας*), and the name of another Melian, *Ἐπόνφας*, or *Ἐπόνφης* in the adopted Attic form, *IG.* 12. 3. 1187,

must be of the same type (from an **Επων?*). Ὁνόφας, Herodian 1. 57. 15, 2. 655. 4, may be a nickname derived from ὄνος.

6. *Regressive formations from diminutives in -αφιον.*—Such a form as ἐλάφ-ιον, Ar., +, diminutive of ἐλαφος, gave rise to θηρ-άφιον from θήρ, and to a whole series of diminutives having no relation to animal names, e.g., ξυράφιον, χρυσάφιον, χωράφιον, μυημάφιον, etc. In a similar fashion arose the diminutives in -ιφιον and -υφιον. Cf. now especially Walter Petersen *Greek Diminutives in -ION*, pp. 276 ff. In late times these were felt as diminutives in -ιον, and by regressive derivation there arose many new forms in -φος, -φη, -φα. So modern Greek χωράφα, ξυράφα, from χωράφιον, ξυράφιον, like σταφύλα (not from ancient σταφυλή, but) from σταφύλιον, and countless others. Cf. Hatzidakis Μεσαιωνικὰ καὶ νέα Ἑλληνικά 2. 139 ff. θήραφος, a late medical term for a small insect, arose in the same way, and θέαφος, θελάφος (also τεάφη) “sulphur” is very likely a regressive formation from θέαφιον, rather than an original formation in -φος and the source of θεάφιον, as assumed by Petersen *loc. cit.*

The form of the words that we have been discussing calls for some treatment. It will be enough, however, to summarize briefly from that point of view some of the facts already stated in detail. In particular we must notice the two dissyllabic forms of the suffix, -ιφος and -αφος.

The suffix -ιbho- appears in Baltic-Slavic abstracts and Lithuanian adjectives as well as in Greek adjectives (see p. 198). Probably it arose from the incorrect analysis of derivatives of *i*-stems (cf. ἔρι-φος : Lat. *aries*). We have discussed σέρι-ιφος (beside the substantive σέρφος), στέρι-φος, κίνι-φος, and *σκελ-ιφος. Τύλ-ιφος (: τύλη, τύλος “callous”) was probably in the first place an adjective meaning “callous.” In ἄγρι-φος the *i* belongs to the base.

The suffix -φος was frequently appended to the weak form of nasal stems as in ἐλα-φος : ἐλλός from *ἐλνός (above, p. 197), κόρα-φος : κορών-η, Κέρκα-φος : κερκνός, Τέκτα-φος : τέκτων, Ἀστα-φος : Ἀστων. In several other cases we may suspect that the base of a derivative in -αφος is a lost substantive in -ων; σκίρα-φος “rascality” seems to be from *σκίρων “frequenter of the Σκίρον” (see p. 204), φλήνα-φος “ineptiae” may be from *φλήνων, and possibly

κρότα-φος, from **κρότων*. From these and similar words arose a suffix *-αφος* which appears in *χρύσ-αφος* : *χρύσ-οφρυς*, *έδ-αφος* : *έδος*, *έγκιλλ-αφον* : *έγκιλλον*. Compare with these words the diminutives in *-άφιον*.

Nearly all words containing our suffix have recessive accent. The exceptions are: the inherited *ἀλφός* (with its congener *ἀλωφός*), the feminines *κυνφή*, *καθυνφή*, *τρυφή*, and *κορυφή*, of which only the last certainly contains the suffix, the Hesychian glosses *σιγαλφός* and *κεμφάς*, which may have been influenced by the primitives *σιγηλός* and *κεμάς*, the late word *κελεφός* and the obscure word *μαστροφός*, and finally, *στυφός*.

VARIATION BETWEEN THE THREE LABIAL MUTES

So many of the words in *-φη*, *-φης*, and *-φος* show variants with *β* or *π*, that we are compelled to inquire into the causes of the variation. For completeness' sake we shall include in the discussion a number of words which do not properly fall under the topic to which these studies are devoted; and we shall find it convenient to treat here the few cases of variation between *π* and *β*.

1. *π* : *β*.—The Indo-European variation between tenuis and media, particularly frequent in root-finals (Brugmann *Grundr.* 1². 629 ff.), is not often reflected in the Greek labial stems. It occurs, for example, in *σκαπάνη* "mattock," (*σ*)*κάπετος* "trench," etc., Goth. *skaban* "shear" : Lat. *scabo*, Lith. *skabūs* "cutting" (Brugmann *Grundr.* 1². 629); and in Lat. *stīpo*, Lith. *stimpū* "stiffen," Eng. *stiff*, etc. : *στίβος* "path," *στίβη* "hoar frost," *στείβω*, Lith. *staibus* "strong," etc. (Walde).

The *β* of *βλάβη*, beside Cretan *ἀβλοπές*, *ἀβλοπία*, *καταβλαπέσθαι*, with original *π* as is shown by Lat. *mulco*, is due to assimilation to the initial consonant of the root (cf. vulgar Eng. *Babdist* for *Baptist*).

Νιόπη, on an Attic vase, gets its *π* from the rather numerous mythological names in *-όπη* (Meisterh.³ 77. 3). *γρύψ*, *γρυπός*, beside *γρυβός* with original *β*, shows the influence of *γρυπός* "crooked" (see above, p. 200). *ἀστραπή* for *ἀστράβη* "saddle," Anon. in Rhett. Gr. 8. 668, involves a rather grotesque popular etymology. *κῆβος* = *κῆπος*, *στύβη* = *στύπη*, and *κόλλαθος* = *κόλλοψ*, *κόλλοπος* show the influence of the suffix *-βος*, *-βη* (see *CP.* V. 332, 333, 341).

2. π : ϕ .—A larger number of Greek words show a variation between π and ϕ , and in some cases this may go back to proethnic times. There was in the parent speech an occasional interchange of tenuis and tenuis aspirata (Brugmann *Grundr.* 1². 632 f.), as in $\pi\lambda\alpha\tau\acute{\nu}s$: Skt. *prthūś*, Lat. *rota* : Skt. *rāthas*, Av. *raþō* "wagon." We have an additional example of this kind in Lat. *pampinus*, *papilla*, Skt. *pippalas* "berry," etc. : $\pi\omega\mu\phi\acute{\nu}s$ "blister," $\pi\omega\mu\phi\delta\lambda\upsilon\xi$, $\pi\epsilon\mu\phi\acute{\nu}\xi$ "bubble" (see Walde *s.v.* *pampinus*).

The interchange of Indo-European *bh* and *ph* appears in $\tau\omega\mu\phi\acute{\nu}s$ *τό* "fragment," Hom., +, *τρυφή*, *θρύπτω*, etc., Lett. *drubascha* "fragment," *drubasas* "splinter" beside *drupi* "fragments" and *drúpu* "fall to pieces."¹

Walde, *Etym. Wörterb. s.v.*, finds Indo-European variation between *bh* and *p* in *σκάριφος* "stile," *σκαριφισμός* "a scratching," Ar., *σκαριφάραι* "scratch, sketch," Schol. Ar., Lat. *scribo*, OHG. *scriban*, OS. *scrīban*, OFris. *skriva* "write" : Lett. *skrīpāt* "to scratch," *skrīpsts* "curved knife," OIsl. (*h*)*rīfa* "to scratch." If, however, we assume I-E. **sqriph-* (Prellwitz), we can trace all the forms to one original, for the Germanic words with *b* are probably Latin loan words, as is indicated by their meaning and by the *f* of OIsl. (*h*)*rīfa*. The meaning of OFris. *skriva*, OE. *scrifan* "to enjoin punishment upon," OIsl. *skript* "confession, punishment" may easily be derived from the meaning "write"; cf. *γράφεσθαι* "to indict" and *γραφή* "indictment."

$\tau\epsilon\theta\eta\pi\alpha$ "be astonished," Hom., beside $\epsilon\tau\alpha\phi\omega\eta$, Hom., $\tau\acute{\alpha}\phi\omega\eta$ "astonishment," Hom., owes its π as well as its τ to the dissimilation of aspirates.

More frequently the Greek variation between ϕ and π is due to analogy. As Osthoff, *Perfect* 301, long ago showed, the ϕ of $\acute{\alpha}\lambda\epsilon\acute{\iota}\phi\omega$, beside $\lambda\acute{\iota}\pi\alpha$, $\lambda\acute{\iota}\pi\omega\acute{s}$, $\lambda\acute{\iota}\pi\alpha\acute{r}\omega\acute{s}$, etc., arose from the analogy of $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\acute{e}\acute{\phi}\omega$, $\acute{\eta}\rho\acute{e}\acute{\phi}\omega$: $\acute{\epsilon}\rho\acute{e}\acute{\phi}\omega$, and the like. Similarly the presents in - $\pi\tau\omega$ form the connecting link between forms with original π and later forms

¹ It is possible that *drup-* represents I-E. **dhrup-*, but an Indo-European variation between *bh* and *p* is problematic. The relationship of Eng. *drop*, etc. (I-E. **dhrub-*), is not certain. It was suggested above (p. 198) that the forms with *bh* contain the suffix *-bho*, *-bhā*. If so, this group differs from many others that exhibit "root determinatives" only in that we can identify one of the "determinatives" with a formative element that continued to be productive. In any case, the words certainly belong under this head.

with ϕ . Thus we have *κάπη* "crib, manger," Hom., but *ἔγκαφος* "mouthful," Eupolis (*ἔγκάπτω* "gulp down," perfect *ἔγκέκαφα*); *σκαπάνη* "mattock," (*σ*)*κάπτεος* "trench," Lat. *scapula* "shoulder blade," OB. *kopati* "dig," but *σκαφή*, *σκάφος* "a digging," *σκαφεύς*, *ἔσκαφην*, etc. (*σκάπτω*; Solmsen *Beitr. z. griech. Wortforschung* 196 ff.); *ῥάπις* "needle," Epich. 138 Kaib., Lith. *verpū* "spin," but *ῥάφις* "needle," *ῥάφή* "a stitching, seam," *ῥάφεύς*, etc. (*ῥάπτω*; cf. Prellwitz); *ῥύπη*, Hom., +, but *ῥύφη* "a throw," Lyc., *ἀναπόριφος* "ἀμεμπτος," papyri, *ἐρρίφην*, Eur., +, *ῥύφησομαι*, LXX, + (*ῥύπτω*); (*σ*)*κυνπός* "niggardly," Lucilius in *Anth. P.* 11. 172, (*σ*)*κυνπότης*, Ps.-Hipp., +, but *σκυνφός*, Phryg., +, *Γυνίφων*, *Μισόγυνφος*, Luc. (*σκυνίπτω* "pinch, nip"). The ϕ of *σκυνφός*,¹ beside (*σ*)*κυνπός* "dim-sighted," *κεκυνπωμένοι* *ἡ κυνπὸν τὸν ὀφθαλμούς*, Hesych., is due to the pair *σκυνφός* : (*σ*)*κυνπός* "niggardly." That *κυνέφας* "darkness" cannot be responsible for the change is shown by the initial *σ*.

Laconian *ἄγριππος* "wild olive," in a proverb cited by Antonius Monachus and others, beside *ἄγριφος* "wild olive," Hesych., and its derivative *Ἄγριφα· Ἀθηνᾶ*, Hesych., suggests a popular connection with the phrase *ἄγριος ἵππος*. Perhaps Cyprian *ἔλφος· βούτυρον*, Hesych., beside *ἔλπος· ἔλαιον, στέαρ, εὐθηνία*, Hesych., owes its ϕ to the influence of *ἀλείφω* and the related forms. Doric *ῥάφα* "a large radish" and *ῥαφανίς* : *ῥάπνη* "turnip," Lat. *rāpum*, etc., were perhaps connected in the popular mind with *ῥάφις* "needle," an implement that was not unlike a radish in shape.

From their first appearance until the present day the two words *γρῖπτος* "fishing net," Artemid., Diog. L., +, and *γρῖφος* "riddle," Ar., +, have been kept distinct, with the exception of two occurrences of *γρῖφος* "net" in Plut. 2. 471 D and Opp. H. 3. 80.² The π of *γρῖπτος* is further attested by *γρῖπεύς* "fisher," Theocr., +, *Γρίπων*, the name of a fisherman, Leonidas in *Anth. P.* 7. 504, *γρῖπτης*, Antipater in *Anth. P.*, *γρῖπεύνα*, *γρῖπτισμα*, Anton. Mon., *γρῖπιζω*, Hesych. It seems more likely, then, that the copyists have blundered than that Plutarch and Oppian really knew a by-form *γρῖφος* = *γρῖπτος*.

¹On the provenience of the word, see Herwerden.

² *γρῖφος* in Pap. Tebt. 2. 486 is very dubious, and the perfect participle *γεγρῖφως* in Hesych. is in line with *πέπομφα*, etc.

The Latin *cupa* "cask, vat" (*κοῦπα*, *IG*. 14. 1342, *ἡμι-κοίπη*, inscr. in *Comptes Rendus de l'Acad. des Inscr.* 1866, 384) appears as *κοῦφον* in ostraka and papyri (95 A.D., +) and in the *Apophthegmata Patrum*.¹ The word has evidently been brought into semantic relationship with *κοῦφος* "light," i.e., "movable." *κόλφος*, *IG*. 14. 189, +, Modern Greek *κόρφος*, *κόλφος* is *κόλπος*, which changed its *p* to *ph* in Latin (cf. Ital. *golf*, Fr. *golfe*),² and was taken back into Greek in the new form.

ἀμφίδαφος = *ἀμφιτάπης*, Pap. Ox. 2. 298. 9, 10 (first century A.D.), is for **ἀμφίδαπος*. Cf. *ἀμφίταπος*, LXX, +, and *δάπις* = *τάπης*. The second *φ* is due to assimilation. Cf., with assimilation in the opposite direction, *'Ανθίλοχος* = *'Αιντίλοχος*.

We have noticed the effect of the suffix *-φος*, *-φη* in *ἀπαφος* : *ἔποψ* (p. 199) and *ταρίφη* : *τάρπη* (p. 205). *κάφος*, *E.M.*, Eust., beside *κάπτος* "breath," is of doubtful authenticity. Apparently the word was coined to explain the Homeric *κεκαφήστα θυμόν*. Eust., 1280. 34 f., says: *'Αποκαπύσαι δὲ πυχὴν τὸ ἀποπνεῦσαι. κάφος γάρ φασι τὸ πνεῦμα, ἐξ οὐ τὸ κεκαφήστα θυμόν. τὸ δὲ αὐτὸ καὶ ὁ κάπτος, ἐξ οὐ καὶ ὁ κῆπος, ὡς ἀλλαχοῦ εἴρηται*.³ I doubt the connection of *στύπος* "stick" with *στυφοκόπος* = *ὅρτυγοκόπος*.

On *λίσπος* beside *λίσφος*, see p. 202, and on *μαστροφός* beside *μαστροπός*, see p. 206.

3. *β* : *φ*.—One of the best-known features of the Macedonian dialect is the development of the Indo-European mediae aspiratae into mediae. In the present connection we need mention only those words in which Macedonian *β* stands as stem final beside general Greek *φ*. The most certain instances are *κάραβος* : *Σκάρφη*, *κόμβος* : *γόμφος*, *γομφίος*, and *νίβα* : *νιφά*. (See Hoffmann *Die Makedonen* 28, 37, 52.) For the personal name *Κόρραβος*, Hoffmann, *op. cit.* 146, thinks of the suffix *-φος*, but the suffix *-βος* is more common in personal names (see *CP*. V. 337 ff.). We may add to Hoffmann's material *κυβός* = *κυφός*, *Orion* 38. 6 (Herwerden), and the geographical name *Ottolobos* = *'Οκτώλοφος*, which Livy (31. 36, 40, 44. 3) uses

¹ The papyri and ostraka show that Sophocles, *Lexicon* s.v., was wrong in assuming nominative *κοῦφος*. The feminine *κοῦφη* is very late.

² See Kretschmer *BZ*. 10. 581, and Triandaphyllidis *Lehnwörter d. mittelgriech. Vulgärliteratur* 168 footnote. (In line 5 *κόλπος* is a misprint for *κόλφος*.)

³ Cf. Fay *CQ*. 1. 18. On the etymology of *κεκαφήστα*, see Solmsen *Beitr. z. griech. Wortforschung* 123.

of a place in Macedonia and of another in Perrhaebia on the Macedonian border.

Hoffmann, *op. cit.* 37, also finds a Macedonian word *νίβā* "spring" in the Hesychian gloss, *νίβα· χιόνα, καὶ κρήνην*, interpreted in the light of the version given by Suidas and Photius: *νίβα· χιόνα. καλεῖται δὲ οὕτως καὶ κρήνη ἐν Θράκῃ*; for he thinks that the second sentence necessarily implies a nominative *νίβα*. He finds confirmation of such a Macedonian form in the derivative *Νίβας*, the name of a place near Thessalonica. There is no doubt that the article in Hesychius treats two distinct words, but the true form of the second is shown by *Νίψ, Νιβός· ὄνομα κρήνης, E.M. 568. 16*, and *Νίψ, Νιβός· κρήνη, Sophonius in Hilgard's Theodosius 2. 402. 8*. With the last-mentioned glosses Hesychius is in perfect harmony, while the phraseology of Suidas and Photius is not necessarily inconsistent with them. The substitution of *νίψ, νιβός* for Hoffmann's *νίβā* does not of course affect his argument that the word, together with *Νίβας*, is Macedonian and belongs with Ir. *snigim* "drop, rain," and Skt. *snīhyati* "become moist, sticky," etc., from a root *sneiguh-* (whether this group is to be combined with that meaning "snow" is, however, a further question). But it is also possible that the root is *neig-*, which appears in *νίζω, νίπτω, νίπτρον, χέρνιψ, χέρνιβον*, Skt. *nenekti, nejayati* "wash," Av. *naēnižaiti* "wash something off," etc. In that case there would be nothing in the form of the word to suggest Macedonian origin.

The Indo-European interchange between media and media aspirata appears, for example, in *ἄλφος* "wealth," Skt. *árvati* "earn" : *ἀλφή* "gain," Skt. *árhati* "deserve," *arghá* "worth"; *κύβος* "a hollow above the hips of cattle," Eng. *hip*, Lat. *cubo* : *κυφός* "stooping, hump-backed" (Walde, *s.v. cubitum*); *στραβός* "squinting," *στρόβος* "a whirling," *στρεβλός* "distorted," Lat. (originally Umbrian) *strebula* "meat from the hips of oxen" : *στρέφω, στρόφος* (Walde); Ir. *mebul* "disgrace," Goth. *bi-mampjan* "mock, deride" : *μέμφομαι, μομφή, μεμφωλή* (Fick 2⁴, 208, keeps Ir. *mebul* separate). *ὅροβος* "bitter vetch," *ἐρέβινθος* "chick pea" : Lat. *ervum*, OHG. *araweiz*, NHG. *Erbse* may represent I-E. **erogʷo-* : **erogʷho-* (Walde; cf. *CP. V. 332*).

In several words analogy has led to the substitution of *φ* for an original *β*. *καλυφή* "covering," papyrus of the first century A.D., in

the phrase *ἀπὸ καλυφῆς αἰγαλοῦ* "from high water mark" (or possibly "from low water mark"), beside *καλύβη* "hut, cell," Hdt., +, was formed from *καλύπτω* on the basis of the pairs *κρυφή* : *κρύπτω*, *τρυφή* : *θύρπτω*, *βαφή* : *βάπτω*, etc. Similarly *ἀκαλυφής*, Soph., +, and *ἀκάλυφος*, Diog. L., were formed from *καλύπτω* on the model of such pairs as *ἀναφής*, Plat., +, : *ἀπτομαῖ*, *ἀρραφής*, Arat., *ἀρραφός*, N.T., +, : *ῥάπτω*, *ἄγναφος*, N.T., +, : *γνάπτω*, *ἄταφος* : *θάπτω*, *ἄτρυφος*, Alem., : *θύρπτω*. *κολυμφρόν* ἐλαφρόν, Hesych., beside *κολυμβάω* "dive," *κόλυμβος* "diver," Ar., etc., Goth. *hlaupan*, NHG. *laufen* (Zupitza *German. Gutturale* 118) shows the influence of *ἐλαφρός*.

If *τρίφος*, which Du Cange cites from a gloss as equivalent to *τρίβος*, is a genuine form, it was made from *τρίψω* and *ἔτριψα* on the model of *σκάφος* : *σκάψω* and *ἔσκαψα*, *ὅροφος* : *έρέψω* and *ἥρεψα*, etc. If *στίφος* "throng, mass" and *στιφρός* "firm, solid" are akin to *στείβω*, their *φ* is due to some similar analogical influence (cf. the ambiguous *στιπτός* "trodden down" and "tough, sturdy"). Uhlenbeck's (*Etym. Wörterb. d. al. Sprache*) connection of Skt. *stibhiś* "tuft, bunch" with these words is not probable enough to warrant the assumption of a third root form beside **steip-* and **steib-*. For *γρυφός* beside *γρυβός*, see p. 200.

The reverse analogical change of original *φ* to *β* also occurs. In *κρυβήσομαι*, Eur., *ἐκρυβον*, *ἐκρύβην*, Apollod., +, *κρυβῆ*, *ἀποκρυβῆ*, *ἀποκρυβήσομαι*, LXX, +, *ἐγκρύβω*, Diod., +, *Κρύβηλος* Hesych., *Κρυβοί*, a Byzantine geographical name, etc. (cf. also Lobeck *Phryn.* 317), beside earlier *κρυφηδόν*, Hom., *κρύφιος*, Hes., +, *κρύφα*, etc., the change was due to the analogy of *τρίβω* beside *ἔτριψα*, *βλάψη*, *ἐβλάψην*, beside *βλάπτω*, and the like, perhaps in this case assisted by the existence of the adverbs *κρύβδην* and *κρύβδα*. Modern Greek has not only *κρύβω*, but also *σκάβω*, *ράβω*, *κλέψω*, etc. Cf. Hatzidakis *KZ*. 27. 76. If we assume an original aspirate for *βόμβος* on account of Skt. *bambharas* "bee" (found only in lexicons), *bambhāravas* "lowing" of cows, *bambharālis* "fly," a persistent feeling for the onomatopoetic character of the word would help explain the change from voiceless *φ* to *β*. The same consideration applies to *στόμβος*. *Βαρύγχος*, *Βαρύφθογγος*, Galen *Lex. Hipp.*, beside *στόμφος* "bombast," *στομφός* "bombastic," *στόμφαξ*, *στομφάξω*, Ar.¹

¹These words have no connection with *στόβος* "abuse, bad language," or with *σομφός* "spongy," of sounds, "hollow, loud."

There remain a number of words which show a variation between ϕ or $\mu\phi$ and $\mu\beta$, on the basis of which a number of scholars have inferred a change in Greek itself of aspirate to media after nasals.¹ The group $\mu\phi$, however, often remains (e.g., $\gamma\mu\phi\sigma$, $\nu\mu\phi\eta$, $\mu\mu\phi\eta$), and no satisfactory limitation of the operation of the supposed phonetic law has yet been proposed.

In some cases the variation is clearly Indo-European (see Brugmann *Grundr.* 1². 633), as $\dot{\alpha}\sigma\tau\epsilon\mu\phi\eta\varsigma$ "firm," $\sigma\tau\epsilon\mu\phi\eta\lambda$ "olives or grapes pressed dry," Skt. *stambhate* "become firm or rigid": $\sigma\tau\epsilon\mu\beta\omega$ "shake," OHG. *stampfon*, Eng. *stamp*; $\dot{\alpha}\phi\beta\varsigma$, $\nu\epsilon\phi\sigma$, etc.: $\ddot{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$, Skt. *ámbu* "water," Arm. *amp* "cloud;" $\theta\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\varsigma$ "astonishment," ON. *dapr* "sad": $\tau\acute{\alpha}\phi\sigma$ "astonishment;" $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\phi\omega$ "wither," $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\phi\eta$ "hay," $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\phi\phi\sigma$, Lith. *skrebiú* "become dry": $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$ "dry, loud," Ar., $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$ "dry, roasted," Hesych., $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\omega$ "roast," Diphil., NHG. *rümpsen*. In $\mu\epsilon\mu\phi\eta\alpha\iota$: Ir. *mebul*, Goth. *bimampjan* (see above, p. 212) Greek has preserved only the aspirated form of the root. We have a similar interchange of I-E. labio-velars in $\ddot{\phi}\phi\varsigma$, Skt. *áhīs* "snake": OHG. *unc* "snake," $\dot{\iota}\mu\beta\eta\varsigma$. $\dot{\iota}\mu\beta\eta\varsigma$, Hesych. Perhaps, however, we should omit the last word on account of its vocalism (Brugmann *Grundr.* 1². 634).

$\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$ "top" : $\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\phi\omega$, $\sigma\tau\acute{\alpha}\phi\phi\sigma$, etc., was probably influenced by $\dot{\rho}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$ "top."

The tendency established by such pairs as $\dot{\alpha}\sigma\tau\epsilon\mu\phi\eta\varsigma$: $\sigma\tau\epsilon\mu\beta\omega$, $\dot{\alpha}\phi\beta\varsigma$: $\ddot{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$, $\tau\acute{\alpha}\phi\sigma$: $\theta\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$, $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\phi\omega$: $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$, sometimes became effective even where it was not assisted by similarity of meaning with any of these.² Thus we find $\mu\beta$ instead of ϕ in $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$ "summit, hairpin," $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\eta$ "hairpin": $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\phi\eta$, $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\phi\phi\sigma$ "summit, peak, hairpin" (see above, p. 204); $\beta\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$ = $\beta\acute{\alpha}\mu\phi\phi\sigma$, Hesych.; $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\phi\sigma$, $\kappa\acute{\alpha}\mu\beta\eta$ "cup" : Skt. *kumbhás* "cup," Av. *xumba-* "pot"; $\dot{\alpha}\tau\epsilon\mu\beta\omega$ "cheat" : Skt. *dabhnóti*, *dábhati* "injure, deceive." Perhaps we should set down here

¹ Most recently Otto Hoffmann, *Die Makedonen* 240 f., who gives references to earlier discussions. All the examples contain Greek labials except $\pi\acute{\nu}\eta\delta\alpha\varsigma$ $\pi\acute{\nu}\theta\mu\eta\varsigma$, for which Brugmann, *Grundr.* 1². 633, suggests Indo-European variation between *d* and *dh*.

² For such imitative substitution, which is not to be denied a wide scope in language, and which many regard as a fundamental factor in the regular phonetic changes, compare Wheeler "Causes of Uniformity in Phonetic Change," *Trans. Am. Phil. Assn.* 32, 5 ff., especially p. 14, and Thurneysen *Etymologie* 17 ff., *KZ* 44. 111.

κύ(μ)βη "head," *E.M.*, Georg. Sanguinatius : Cretan *κυφά* "head," Hesych. *λιμφός· συκοφάντης . . . ἡ μηνυτής παρανόμων*, Hesych., is probably not to be identified with *λιμβός* "greedy," Hesych., +.

That the change in question took place after the dissimilation of aspirates is indicated by *κύμβος* : Av. *xumba-* from **khumbho-*, and *ἀτέμβω* : Skt. *dábhati* from **dhebh.*¹ Hence in *θρόμβος* "lump, clot of blood" : *τρέφεσθαι* "curdle," *ταρφύς*, etc., and *θρεμβός* "fat," *CGL.* : *τρέφω* (cf. *CP.* V. 334), we have to account for the initial aspirate by the analogy of such forms as *θρέψω*, *ἔθρεψα*, and *τέθραμματι*.

The occasional interchange of *bh* and *b* in the parent speech and of *φ* and *μβ* in Greek furnish us two possible points of contact between the suffixes in *φ* and *β*. Perhaps, then, it is not altogether accidental that both the suffixes are employed to form animal names and derogatory adjectives. See *CP.* V. 331, 333 ff., and Niedermann, *IF. Anz* 19. 32 f. The present writer, however, does not know of any word with Indo-European suffix *-bo* from *-bho*. We may, perhaps, suspect some such relationship between *ἀσκάλαφος*, *κάλαφος*, an unknown bird, Arist., +, and *ἀσκάλαβος*, *καλαβάς* "spotted lizard," Nicand., +. That the words date from prehistoric times is indicated by the fact that both *Ἀσκάλαφος* and *Ἀσκάλαβος* occur as mythological proper names. Their etymology is unknown. As was shown in *CP.* V. 326 ff., the Greek suffix *-βος* is chiefly due to adaptation in Greek itself. To the factors there discussed we may now add one more: the Greek substitution of *μβ* for *φ* seems to have affected a few words in which *φ* was a formative element.

The preceding discussion covers the words in which *φ* appears to be a formative element. The great majority of words in *-φη*, *-φης*, and *φος* are forms with radical *φ*, which, with their numerous compounds, e.g., *-γραφος*, *-σοφος*, *-τροφος*, swell the lists to such proportions that their publication must be deferred.

¹ *τύμβος* "foolish," a word that has been inferred from Euripides' *γέροντα τύμβον*, and Hesychius' *τυμβογέρων* *ἴσχατόγηρως*, and compared with *τῦφος* "smoke," is purely imaginary.

NOTES AND DISCUSSIONS

SOLON'S TROCHAICS TO PHOKOS

εἰ δὲ γῆς ἐφεισάμην
πατρίδος, τυραννίδος δὲ καὶ βίης ἀμειλίχον
οὐ καθηλάμην μάνας καὶ καταισχύνας κλέος,
οὐδὲν αἰδεῖμαι· πλέον γὰρ ὅδε νικήσειν δοκέω,
πάντας ἀνθρώπους.

οὐκ ἔφη Σόλων βαθύφρων οὐδὲ βουλήεις ἀνήρ
ἐσθλὰ γὰρ θεοῦ διδόντος αὐτὸς σύνκ εδέξατο·
περιβαλλὼν δ' ἄγραν ἀγασθεὶς οὐκ ἐπέπιπτεν μέγα
δίκτυον θυμῷ θ' ἀμαρτῆ καὶ φρενῶν ἀποσφαλεῖς·
ἡθελον γὰρ κεν κρατήσας πλοῦτον ἄφθονον λαβὼν
καὶ τυραννεύσας Ἀθηνῶν μούνον ἡμέραν μιαν,
ἀτκὸς ὅτερον δεδάρθαι κ' απιτεγρίφαι γένος.

The purport of these lines has often been misunderstood. The second fragment is simply a dramatic and ironical statement of the view of the man in the street that Solon was a fool in not making himself tyrant. There is nothing in either fragment to justify the interpretation that they are Solon's serious apology for not having seized and used the tyranny in the interests of either of the two political parties. That interpretation may or may not seem to be suggested by the words in the additional trochaics in Aristotle's *Politeia* 12. 3:

οὐδέ μοι τυραννίδος
ἀνδάνει βίᾳ τι ῥέειν.

The occurrence of the idea there would not necessitate its importation here.

If we should concede for the sake of the argument that the passage before us is a real political apology, to whom is it addressed? All hypotheses in this matter are based on the comments of Plutarch in his Life of Solon (c. 15). But Plutarch is himself really interested only in his Platonizing moral interpretation of Solon's scorn of the tyranny. And so he does not even make it quite clear which party we are to suppose to have urged the tyranny on Solon. He says in c. 14 that it was *οἱ προιστάμενοι* and even many *τῶν διὰ μέσον πολιτῶν*. The word *εὐτολμότερον*, if we could press Plutarch's words, would perhaps imply that Solon was expected to exercise the tyranny in the interests of the popular party. The *προιστάμενοι* might be the leaders of the people, or the prominent citizens generally, or, since Plutarch

says that both parties hoped that he would favor them, the leaders of both parties. Plutarch throws no further light on the question, and from this point on his vocabulary and phrasing have ethical rather than political significance—*ἐκάκιζον*, *καταγελῶντες* *τοὺς πολλοὺς καὶ φαῦλους*, on which I will comment later. This vagueness of Plutarch seems to have affected his modern interpreters. Croiset says “les partisans du régime monarchique l'ont trouvé naïf” (*Lit. Grecque* II, 127). Busolt assumes (II, 296) that it was expected “dass Solon seine Macht zur Aufrichtung einer volksfreundlichen Tyrannis benutzen würde.” This seems to imply that the lines to Phokos are an apology to the popular party, and Busolt confirms this by the observation that Plutarch lays the reproach in the mouths of the *πολλοὶ καὶ φαῦλοι*, which words, as we shall see, have ethical, not political, meaning. Busolt, however is not quite clear, for he continues: “Trochaeen die er an Phokos richtete rechtfertigen vorzugsweise seine Ablehnung der Tyrannis. Gegenüber der Volkspartei berief er sich auf das Zeugniss der Mutter Erde.” This sentence seems to imply a false antithesis, since on Busolt's theory both defenses are addressed to the popular party. He may have been unconsciously influenced by von Wilamowitz, who writes (*Aristoteles und Athen* II, 310), “Waren die Trochaeen in erster Linie bestimmt seine Ablehnung der Tyrannis zuverteidigen, so setzte sich Solon mit den Vorwürfen der Armen in dem Iambos auseinander,” etc., where, unless the implied antithesis is misleading, we have a distinct assumption that the apology in the trochaics is addressed to the *aristocratic* party. I do not mean to cavil at the expressions of these distinguished scholars, but merely to show how the uncertainty of the subject betrays itself in the embarrassment of the style. The political aspect of the matter is by no means clear. But the meaning of the verses is perfectly clear, as soon as we perceive that the apology which they contain is not a political apology at all. It is at the most the ironical apology of the higher morality to the lower morality of the man of the world—the apology of a Socrates to a Callicles (*Plato Gorg. 522D*).

That Plutarch took it so is apparent from his introductory words to the second fragment: *ἀ δὲ φυγόντος αὐτοῦ τὴν τυραννίδα πολλοὶ καταγελῶντες ἔλεγον*, etc. This is what the multitude said when all was over. The words above, *οἱ συνήθεις ἐκάκιζον*, refer perhaps to the taunts of cowardice while he was hesitating. A little farther on the words *τοὺς πολλοὺς* do not mean the popular party; they are simply the Platonic “many,” the ordinary man to whom as to Thrasymachus and Callicles moral disinterestedness is foolishness (cf. *Rep. 360D*; and *Gorgias, passim*). One cause of the misinterpretation of the first fragment is the misunderstanding of the words *οὐ . . . μάνας καὶ κατασχήνας κλέος*, which will hardly bear Wilamowitz' interpretation, “mag ich auf meinen Ruf als weiser einen Schandfleck damit gebracht haben dass ich die Tyrannis verschmähte.” The word *μάνας* is altogether too strong, I think, for the hypothetical reproach of neglecting

to seize a political opportunity with unscrupulous audacity. But it is just the right word to express the Greek feeling and Solon's own feeling of the guilt and shame that attached to tyranny, and a little attention to an often overlooked but not infrequent idiom enables us to take it so. The negative force of the *οὐ* extends not merely to the verb but to the two participles. What Solon says is, "I am not ashamed if I did not bring pollution and disgrace upon my fair fame by seizing [and did not seize] ruthless tyranny." For other examples of this construction, cf. Plato. *Timaeus* 77B, with my note in *AJP*, X, 74; *Rep.* 582B, where some commentators go astray; Homer *Il.* 22. 283; *Hymn to Demeter* 157; Pindar *Nem.* iii. 15:

ὧν παλαιάφατον ἀγοράν
οὐκ ἀλεγχέεσσιν Ἀριστοκλείδας τέαν
ἔμιανε κατ' αἰσαν ἐν περισθενεῖ μαλαχθεῖς
παγκρατίου στόλῳ.

Wilamowitz argues that the second fragment must precede the first because *βαθύφων* and *βουλήεις* defined the *κλέος*, which is said to be stained in the first. But this implies not only that Plutarch quotes the passages in the wrong order, which is possible enough, but that he positively misinterpreted the first fragment. For Plutarch says, not with reference to *βαθύφων*, etc., but of the *κλέος* of the first fragment, *ὅτεν εὐδηλον ὅτι καὶ πρὸ τῆς νομοθεσίας μεγάλην δόξαν εἶχεν*. But apart from Plutarch's testimony it is obvious that the ironical words, "Solon was not a deep or shrewd-witted man," are not the natural description of the kind of moral *κλέος* that could be polluted and put to shame. Professor Wilamowitz' own translation of the line betrays some uneasiness. He renders "Solon hat also den Ruf der Weisheit nicht verdient." But this surely implies an *ἀρά* which is not in the text.

The dramatic irony of the passage has been still more strangely misunderstood by Croiset, who in the second edition of his *Greek Literature* (II, 127) takes the last four lines as Solon's "indignant and eloquent reply," and translates them: "Je voudrais, si j'avais pris le pouvoir et mis la main sur d'immenses richesses, si j'avais été, ne fût-ce qu'un jour, tyran d'Athènes, je voudrais que de ma peau écorchée on fit une outre et que ma race fût abolie." This, of course, is a complete misunderstanding. The words are simply Solon's dramatic and satiric attribution to his critics of the immoral sentiment that the enjoyment of tyranny even for a day is worth any crime and any punishment. They are exactly in the vein of the oft-quoted speech of Eteocles which Plato reprobated. Eurip. *Phoenissae* 503 ff.:

ἔγὼ γὰρ οὐδέν, μῆτερ, ἀποκρύψας ἔρω·
ἀστρον ἀν ἔλθομι ἡλίου πρὸς ἀντολὰς
καὶ γῆς ἐνερθεν, δινατὸς ὃν δρᾶσαι τάδε
τὴν θεῶν μεγίστην ὄστ' ἔχειν Τυραννίδα.

PAUL SHOREY

ON A NEW ARGIVE INSCRIPTION

Bull. Corr. Hell. XXXIV (1910), 331 ff.

An important fifth-century inscription of Argos, found in 1906, is published for the first time by Vollgraff in the last number of the *Bulletin de correspondance hellénique*. The editor accompanies the text with a translation and an exhaustive commentary which are in most respects admirable. But exception must certainly be taken to the punctuation and interpretation of ll. 3-6, which he reads and translates as follows:¹ *χρέματα δὲ μὲν τητασκέσθο δι Κνόσου[ς] ἐν Τυλισῷ, δὲ δὲ Τυλίσιος ἐν Κνοσῷ. δι χρέι[ο]ν μεδέ διόραμνεσθαι μέδατέροις μεδέ διπλανσαν διφαρίσθαι,* "Les Knossiens ne pourront acquérir de biens à Tylissos, ni inversement les Tylissiens à Knossos. Les créanciers ne pourront enlever tout ou partie ni aux uns ni aux autres." This interpretation involves four serious difficulties: (1) the absence of a negative before *Τυλίσιος*, (2) the construction *χρέι[ο]ν . . . διπλανσεσθαι*, (3) an unknown use of *χρέιζω*, (4) the accusative *μέδατέροις* translated as if it were a genitive or a dative of interest. Upon the first point the editor makes no comment. But surely *μεδέ* is required to justify the translation "ni inversement les Tylissiens," whereas the clause as it stands with *δέ* can only denote a contrast to the preceding prohibition. Upon the second and third points the editor comments as follows (p. 350): "Il y a ici confusion entre deux constructions également bonnes: δι χρέιζον . . . διπλανέσθο, et: τὸν χρέιζοντα . . . διπλανεσθαι." "Xρέιζω signifie généralement: *avoir besoin de, désirer, quelquefois: rendre un oracle*. Je ne connais pas d'autre texte où il ait, comme c'est le cas ici, la signification de prêter. On sait que, pour rendre ce dernier sens, les Grecs se servaient couramment du présent *κίχρημι*."

All these difficulties are removed by a simple change in the editor's punctuation. The first sentence ends, not with *Τυλισῷ*, but with *χρέι[ο]ν*, and means: "The Cnossian may not acquire property in Tylissus, but the Tylissian may do so in Cnossus if he wishes." Of the two Cretan cities in question (with whose relations to each other and to Argos this Argive inscription deals), Tylissos was of course the weaker and was protected against the aggrandizement of Cnossian capitalists, just as the allies of Athens were protected by a similar prohibition of acquisition of their property by Athenians. Cf. Dittenberger *Sylloge*, No. 80, ll. 35 ff., aptly quoted by the editor, p. 338, with whose comments our translation accords better than his own. For Cnossos had no need of such protection, and so it is expressly stated that any Tylissian who wished (*δι χρέιζον = δι βουλόμενος*, as often) might acquire property in Cnossos. The second sentence is also now in order, *μέδατέροις* being of course the subject of the infinitives: "Neither party shall seize a part of the land or appropriate it all."

I add a few minor comments. *κέλ Δευκόπορον*, l. 8, the editor says is for *καὶ ἐν Δευκόπορον*, comparing *ἐλ (=ἐν) Δακεδάμονι*, *IG. IV*, 952. In the

¹ I change the editor's style of transcription to the extent of inserting the macron over *ε* and *ο* where they stand for long vowels.

Argive dialect it must stand rather for *καὶ ἐ(ν)ς Λευκόπορον*, to be compared with Lac. *Ἄλλα Λακεδαιμόνια*, Att. *τὸλ λιθός*, Cret. *τοῦλ λείονσι*, etc.

In l. 9 we read *‘ἴ κα τοῦ Μαχανέθ θύμεις τὸν μετέκοντα τελέοντος ὅφις*, “whenever we sacrifice the sixty wethers to Zeus Machaneus.” The editor remarks, p. 351, “Le mot ‘ἴ est nouveau. Il ne s'est rencontré, jusqu' ici, ni dans les auteurs ni dans les textes épigraphiques.” He quotes two other hitherto unpublished inscriptions of Argos in which the same form occurs, but with locative force “where,” and rightly concludes that the temporal use is secondary. He explains the form as an old locative of ὅς, and parallels ἵ, ὅν, ὅθι, with ἄγχι, ἄγχον, ἄγχόθι. But ἄγχι, from which ἄγχον, ἄγχόθι are formed after the analogy of o-stem forms like ὅν, ὅθι, etc., is certainly not itself an o-stem locative, nor is it possible so to explain ἵ, if this is understood as representing a form with inherited *ε*-vowel. This new ἵ is nothing more nor less than the well-known West Greek ε̄ in a spelling which is indeed surprising in so early an inscription, of any other dialect than Boeotian, but which ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, l. 6, = Att. ἀφαιρεῖσθαι, though this of course is not a case of a genuine diphthong, sufficiently justifies us in recognizing. In later Argolic inscriptions we find *καλλίσθαι*, *Δινία*, *Κληναγόρον*, *Τιτικάρτεος*, etc. See Hoffmann, in *SGDI*. IV, 427. Why this spelling was especially persistent in the case of ἵ, which in the later inscriptions quoted by Vollgraff occurs three times, although ε̄ appears in other words, as *ἀποδεῖξει*, *Λυκείον*, *εἰκόνι*, I do not pretend to explain. But the identity of this ἵ with ε̄ appears to me inevitable.

The inscription exhibits the characteristics to be expected in Argolic, such as, not to mention general Doric features, *νσ* in ἐνς, τόντος, ἀπλανταν, etc., *ιαρός* with lenis (but also ἀπλανσαν!), *ποί*, *ձλαια*, *ձբրեւե*. For the first time ὅς = Lat. *oris*, Skt. *avis*, etc., is quotable with its original *F*, namely acc. pl. ὅφις, l. 10. Note also ὅրυ ‘whither’ like Cret. ὅρυ (but was already known in Argolic), *πρεցγέաν* with *πρεց-* as in Attic but γ as in Boeot. *πρισγέεις*, Cret. *πρεցγν*, etc., and especially *օντο* l. 14 = *τοῦτο*, as in Boeotian. But the most interesting form is the third plural imperative middle *ποւրպանսթō*, l. 26, on account of its bearing upon a question which is discussed in Kühner-Blass *Griech. Gram.* II, p. 62, and Brugmann *Griech. Gram.* 3, p. 344, footnote, and is referred to briefly in my *Greek Dialects*, p. 106, § 140, 3b. After citing Epid. *փերօսթō*, Lac. *ձնելօսթō*, Heracl. *էպելասթω*, as coming from *-νσθω* (formed of course after the analogy of the active *-ντω*) with the same loss of *v* without vowel lengthening as is regular in the case of inherited *νσ* + consonant (§ 77.2), I add “But Corcyr. *էկլօցօնսթω* comes from *-օνսթω* of later origin and with later treatment of *νσ*, (77.3, 78), and it is possible to read *փերօսթō*, etc., likewise early Att. *-օսթων*.” Now that Arg. *ποւրպանսթō* ranges itself beside Corcyr. *էկլօցօնսթω*, the probability that the same history is to be assumed for the other forms is greatly increased and I should now definitely prefer the latter view.

CARL D. BUCK

LATIN *ss* INSTEAD OF INTERVOCALIC *r*

One of the standing riddles of Latin morphology is presented by the superlatives in *-issimus*. It seems clear that the suffix stands in some relation to the suffix *-simus* (from *-s-mmo-*) of *maximus*, *proximus*, etc., and to *-isimus* (from *-is-mmo-*) of *pulcherrimus*, *facillimus*, etc.; but no satisfactory way of accounting for the double *s* has yet been suggested.

Precisely the same difficulty is met in the archaic *s*-futures and *s*-subjunctives from vowel stems, such as *indicässō*, *negässim*, *prohibëssit*. Their parallelism with *faxo*, *faxim*, *capso*, *empsim*, etc., is perfectly obvious, and one can scarcely doubt the connection of both with the Indo-European *s*-aorist; but here again none of the various attempts to account for the double *s* etymologically has won any general acceptance.

We may get some light upon the second group of forms by observing the behavior of the *s*-aorist in Greek. In that language intervocalic *s* was regularly lost, but in all *s*-aorist forms which retained their aoristic use, and in most futures (originally aorist subjunctives), intervocalic *s* appears as *o*: **στησα* and **λυσα* were prevented from becoming **στηρα* and **ελυρα* by the analogy of *δειξα*, *λευψα*, etc. (see Brugmann *Greek Grammar*³ 314). Similarly, I think, *capso*, *faxim*, etc., prevented **indicäso* and **prohibës* from becoming **indicäro* and **prohibërit* at the time when **genesis* was becoming *generis*. But the effort to pronounce the significant *s* of these words at a time when in other words intervocalic *s* was becoming every day less and less familiar led to an "over-correction." Instead of a simple intervocalic *s*, people pronounced a long or double *s*.

In similar fashion, the influence of *maximos*, *proximos*, *pessimos*, etc. (possibly also of **pulchersimos*, and **facilisimos* from **pulchr-is-ymos* and **facil-is-ymos*), induced a change of **ditisimos* to *ditissimos* rather than to **ditirimos*. This suffix *-isimos* is, of course, the same *-is-ymos* that appears in *pulcherrimus*, *facillimus*, etc., but without syncope of the antepenultimate vowel.

Double *s* for intervocalic *s* appears also in *quaeso* (*quaesso*, *CIL* 10. 2311, Plaut. *Ps.* 1322). The perfect **quaes-si* (see Sommer *Handbuch* 612) induced the development of the present **quaeso* to *quaesso*, although in another part of the community or in a different usage the regular change to *quaero* took place. *Näsus* (*nassum*, Plaut. *Merc.* 310), beside *näris* and *näres*, similarly owes its *ss* instead of *r* to **näs*, the nominative singular of the consonant stem (cf. Osthoff *MU*. 2. 48 f.). Another example may be found in *väs*, *väsis* (*vassa*, Plaut. *Merc.* 781), although the etymology of the word is unknown. The *s* of Umbrian *vasor*, *vaso*, *vasus* would also have to be explained by analogy.

E. H. STURTEVANT

BOOK REVIEWS

The "Iphigenia in Tauris" of Euripides. Translated into English Rhyming Verse with Explanatory Notes by GILBERT MURRAY, LL.D., D.LITT., Regius Professor of Greek in the University of Oxford. Oxford University Press (American Branch), 1910.

The reader knows pretty well by this time what he may expect from a new translation by Professor Murray of a play of Euripides. Looked at as an English poem it will be certain to give pleasure. A strong sense of beauty in general will be exhibited, and an excellent technical facility. Comparison with Swinburne will inevitably suggest itself, and Professor Murray would doubtless be the first to declare that he cannot afford such a comparison. Still it must be said that if the swell and surge of Swinburne's line is not to be expected, Swinburne's characteristic vices are absent as well. As far as taste can take the place of genius Professor Murray is competent to make the substitution. He could not be guilty of bombast or redundancy or turgidity, and doubtless the restraint of his verse will cause it to be felt by many as more "Greek."

"Iphigenia in Tauris" is a poem so specially adapted to Professor Murray's talents that it is surprising he has left it so long untranslated. It is a romantic play with a happy ending, altogether modern in its psychology and as tightly bound together as though it were by Sardou. The dreadful problem of the Eumenides, of sin and remorse, which makes some Greek plays such hard reading, is here treated quite simply in the spirit of Ibsen by showing Orestes as the victim of fits, apparently epileptic in character. The noble rivalry in self-devotion of the two young heroes, the quiet competence of the heroine, the sympathetic action of the chorus allow the modern reader to know where he stands—a privilege he certainly loses when Jason and Medea wrangle, when Hercules gets drunk, when the objections of Pentheus (apparently so well founded) to the doings of the Maenads bring him to ruin. In a word, Euripides and Professor Murray have here collaborated to produce what should be the most popular of their joint works.

It would be interesting to secure, if we could, the opinion of Euripides on the question of rhymed verse as his English vehicle. In the matter of dramatic dialogue we may perhaps guess that he would approve the great English tradition of unrhymed verse. It is difficult to see any advantage of the rhymed couplet capable of offsetting its obvious disadvantages, but Professor Murray rhymes easily and well, and naturally likes to do it. The

question of the choruses is altogether different. Here the English tradition is all for rhyme; to omit it would be to lop off one of the wings on which the lyric flies. And yet Professor Murray's lyrics, graceful, charming, and certain as English songs, are precisely the most doubtful part of his rendering of the original. They come too trippingly on the tongue. There seems to be a fallacy in supposing that because a Greek strophe can be conveniently divided on the page into short verses it can be represented by an English strophe of equally short verses with a rhyme at the end of each. The rhyme interrupts the rhythm as the natural pause does not—it is a pebble on which the stream breaks, whereas the pause is a ripple due to the laws of motion of the fluid itself. Thus the movement of

τὸν πολυόρνιθον ἐπ' αἷν,
 λευκὰν ἀκτάν, Ἀχιλῆος
 δρόμους καλλισταδίους,
 δξεινον κατὰ πνύτον; (435-38)

is not reproduced by the movement of

Birds, birds, everywhere,
White as the foam, light as the air;
And ghostly Achilles raceth there,
Far in the Friendless Waters.

To go through Professor Murray's poem line by line with the original at hand gives a fresh sense of his dexterity as a translator. It is perhaps worth noting that he is unfortunate in retaining a discredited reading in l. 258 and in rendering ll. 258-59

"Tis so long a time, and never yet,
Never, hath Greek blood made this altar wet,

since Orestes speaks at l. 72 of the altar "where Hellene blood is shed," and Iphigenia herself explains that a captive who died at her hands wrote her letter for her. And in view of the fact that she could not write, there is something droll in the expansion of ll. 206-7 into

From the beginning Strife,
As a book to read, Fate gave me for mine own.

Expansion is in fact the temptation Professor Murray cannot resist, but a single example must suffice to warn the reader that he is not reading Euripides. Whereas Iphigenia said in Greek (369)

Ἄιδης Ἀχιλλεὺς ην δρ', οὐχ δὲ Πηλέως,

she says in English:

Is he a vampyre, is he one
That fattens on the dead, thy Peleus' son?

But this is captious. Professor Murray's versions are to be received with gratitude. They are of great interest to scholars, and they have had a surprising effect in mollifying a public disposed to eliminate scholarship.

EMILY JAMES PUTNAM

Die Komposition der pompejanischen Wandgemälde. Von GERHART RODENWALDT. Berlin: Weidmann, 1909. Pp. 270. Mit 38 Abbildungen im Text.

This book, a dissertation presented at Halle in 1908, of which the first three chapters were printed under the title "Qua ratione pictores Pompeiani in componendis parietibus usi sint," is an interesting attempt to solve the much-debated problem how much is Greek and how much Roman in the Pompeian wall paintings, or, at least, to contribute to the solution of the question by a careful study of one aspect of the paintings, namely, the composition.

Briefly stated, Dr. Rodenwaldt's contention is that landscape painting and, in general, the elaborate backgrounds and attempts at spatial effect which are so common in the Pompeian wall paintings, represent a development of the Roman period and do not go back, as has often been maintained, to Greek originals of the Hellenistic age. In expounding this thesis, Rodenwaldt in his first chapter discusses "Raumdarstellung auf griechischen Tafelbildern," arguing, from various bits of evidence, both literary and monumental, that the Greek painters of easel pictures never advanced very far in the direction of giving depth to their compositions by the use of perspective and a free distribution of the figures in space. Even in the post-Alexandrian period, he maintains, the figures in Greek easel pictures were commonly all placed on the same level and moving parallel to the plane of the picture like figures in relief; and the frame of the composition was never more than a narrow, stage-like space, bounded at the back by a wall or a mass of trees and rocks, or by a group of figures crowded close together as in the famous Alexander mosaic in Naples. In his second chapter, then, which treats of "Römische Wandbilder," the author calls attention to the marked contrast between such Greek paintings and works like the Vatican landscapes with scenes from the *Odyssey*, and on the basis of paintings of the second Pompeian style found in Rome postulates a development in the art of wall painting from (1) simple landscapes to (2) landscapes with figures and (3) landscapes with figures combined into mythological scenes. For such a development he finds evidence in literature, especially in the often-quoted passage in Vitruvius (vii. 5. 1) and in Pliny's account of Studius (*N.H.* 35, 116). The beginnings of such landscape painting he would place some time between 60 or 50 B.C. and the date of the *De architectura*. Furthermore, in the landscapes with figures, the figures themselves are often absolutely different from the relief-like types of the Greek painters. Not only are they freely distributed in space, but they usually move obliquely to the plane of the picture, and are represented in very lively action; the proportions are notably slender, the joints small, the whole effect un-Greek. On the other hand, in many of the wall paintings found in Rome, and even more in the paintings from Pompeii, figures and groups of pure Greek style appear in elaborate settings which

show the influence of the Roman development. Such *contaminatio*, Rodenwaldt maintains, is due to the influence of Greek easel pictures, an influence that made itself felt as soon as the simple landscape developed into the landscape with figures and increased in importance as time went on.

Having thus expounded his theory, Rodenwaldt next proceeds to an analysis of a great number of Pompeian wall paintings, with a view to showing how the Greek and the Roman elements were combined in the second, the third, and the fourth Pompeian styles and for different classes of subjects (chaps. iii-ix). The concluding chapter, "Ein griechisches Kompositionsprinzip," is an excursus on the principle of composition embodied in the Alexander mosaic and other works.

Against the theory which is here advanced many objections can be urged. The evidence on which Rodenwaldt relies to determine the character of Hellenistic painting is not sufficient to establish his contention that the Greeks never advanced beyond a simple "Ausfüllung der Fläche" or the production of "einen engen bühnenartigen Raum"; he does not consider the possibility of the development in the post-Alexandrian period of an art of wall painting independent of the development of the easel picture; his interpretation of Vitruvius vii. 5.1 f. (pp. 22 ff.) is less satisfactory than the older interpretation of Helbig and Woermann which makes *antiqui* (i.e., the painters of the Hellenistic period) the subject not only of *imitati sunt* but also of *ingressi sunt*; and many will hesitate to accept as Roman compositions the landscapes with scenes from the *Odyssey* and the paintings from the *casa degli epigrammi* with their Greek inscriptions.

But whatever one may think of Rodenwaldt's theory, there can be no doubt as to the value of his analytical chapters. These are full of interesting comparisons and suggestions, not only in respect to the Pompeian paintings themselves, but also in respect to the Greek originals on which they are based; see, for instance, the remarks on the "Master of the Europa Picture" (pp. 69 ff., 85 ff., 108 ff.) and the proposed attributions to Timomachos or his school (p. 58) and to Nikias (p. 77). In these chapters the author displays a knowledge of his material which is at once comprehensive and intimate, and it is here that he has made his most important contribution to the study of the Pompeian wall paintings. This part of the book, at least, can be heartily recommended to all who desire more than a superficial knowledge of these important monuments of ancient art.

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Scholia Vetera in Pindari Carmina. Recensuit A. B. DRACHMANN.
Vol. II: *Scholia in Pythionicas.* Leipzig, 1910. Pp. xvi+270.
M. 6.

The first volume of this work, containing the scholia on the Olympians, was issued in 1903, before *Classical Philology* had begun publication. The

present notice will therefore include some account of the book as a whole, which is to be concluded with a third volume, containing the Nemean and Isthmian scholia.

The scholia to Pindar are among the most important which we possess for any classical author, and are not only indispensable for the understanding of Pindar himself, but also are full of information concerning ancient history, myth, and religion. Indeed they have probably been studied quite as much for their bearing upon these more general subjects as for the light they throw upon the meaning of the most difficult, and yet most rewarding, of poets. A new edition of these scholia was very much needed, for the great work of Boeckh (1819) does not separate the scholia according to their manuscript sources, as indeed was scarcely possible with the scanty evidence at Boeckh's disposal. The edition of Abel (1884), and particularly of his successor (1891), is chiefly valuable as showing how such a work ought not to be done.

The present work, prepared in close connection with Schroeder's masterly edition of the text of Pindar (1900), must form, with Schroeder's, the basis of all serious study of Pindar for many years to come. Drachmann's first volume has now been before the public so long that it is unnecessary to dwell upon the accuracy and fidelity with which he has performed his duty. The endless labor which he has spent upon the manuscript study of the scholia—the most difficult of all paleographical work—is amply rewarded, and he presents to the philological world, in these modest volumes, a masterpiece of solid but unpretentious scholarship. The Pythian scholia are but little more than half as voluminous, in proportion to the text, as the Olympian. The student will therefore not expect the fulness of explanation, or the variety of alternate interpretations, which was found in Vol. I. Yet even here he may choose between no less than four slightly different views of *κτίλον Ἀφροδίτας* (P. 2. 31), and similarly of *τὸ πλοντεῖν δὲ σὺν τύχᾳ* (P. 2. 101), *γένοι δ' οἷος ἔστι μαθών* (P. 2. 131), and elsewhere.

Drachmann complains that he has not been so successful in emending the text of the scholia in this second volume as in the first. He is inclined to attribute this partly to weariness of brain, and partly to the different nature of the errors in the Pythian scholia, which seem to be less simply verbal than in the Olympian scholia. But the reader will detect no falling off in our editor's insight, for the traces of Drachmann's improving hand are by no means rare. So in a scholium on *Ιξίον φαντὶ ταῦτα* (P. 2. 40) he reads *παρεκβέθηκε* for *παρεμβέθηκε*, a manifest improvement; and two pages later, on *ἔμαθε δὲ σαφῶς* (P. 2. 45), he substitutes *διατεθεῖσιν* for the unintelligible *διατεθεῖσις*, though the note still seems incomplete. In the note on the Centaurs (on P. 2. 85), Drachmann's *οὐ κατέσχον ἔαντούς* is far better than any reading in the manuscripts, and the same may be said of *τῆς Ἀρχιλόχου δυσφημίας, φησίν δὲ*, in the note on P. 2. 113. But the emendations which Drachmann has adopted from his keen-sighted friend Schroeder far outnumber his own—evidence of a modesty as rare

as it is admirable. Though a considerable number of passages, as was inevitable, are still marked *vix sanum*, or *sensu cassa*, yet the scholia, in this new edition, read intelligibly for the most part. And since these scholia form the chief basis of all our knowledge of Pindar, we cannot be too grateful to Drachmann for the self-sacrificing labor which he has so devotedly, and at the same time so profitably, spent upon them.

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The So-called Rule of Three Actors in the Classical Greek Drama. By KELLEY REES. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1908. Pp. 86. \$0.79.

Professor Rees has amplified his dissertation by the following papers: "The Meaning of Parachoregema," *CP* II, 387 ff.; "The Number of the Dramatic Company in the Period of the Technitae," *AJP* XXXI, 43 ff.; and "The Three-Actor Rule in Menander," *CP* V, 291 ff. In the earliest period of tragedy but a single actor appeared upon the scene at a time; Aeschylus was the first to employ a two-actor scene; and Sophocles was the first to see the dramatic possibilities of the three-actor scene and to handle it with facility. This development is outlined in Aristotle's *Poetics* 1449a 15, and the aesthetic canon resulting therefrom is expressly stated in Horace's dictum: *nec quarta loqui laboret (Ars Poet. 192)*. But the misinterpretation of these passages and of a gloss in Hesychius (*s.v. νέμησις ἵποκριτῶν*, which really refers to the manner of assigning protagonists to poets) has caused modern scholars to formulate the rule that ancient playwrights had only three actors at their disposal. An examination of the extant plays and of the new Menander fragments shows that for a variety of reasons three actors occasionally seem insufficient for presenting certain passages, that frequently rôles must be split (as in the *Oed. Col.*, where, if only three actors were available, the part of Theseus must be carried by all three in turn) and that such splitting results in overloading, "lightning" changes of costume, and incongruous assortment of parts (e.g., the rôles of Heracles and Deianeira in the *Trachiniae* must be performed by the same person). Furthermore, if we except the period of the Peloponnesian War and of the synchoregia in 406/5, there was no excuse for such thrift as all this would imply. On the other hand, it is likely that outside of Athens, in the period of the guilds (third and fourth centuries), such a restriction did obtain, and it would then naturally take its rise from the need of economy by the manager of a traveling troupe. Fortunately, four Soteric inscriptions for the years 272-269 B.C. are extant and in every case the dramatic troupes (twenty-two in all) consist of three actors. The controversial term *παραχορίγμα* belongs to the same period and has no connection with the choregic system. It is derived from *χορηγεῖν* in its non-technical sense of "spend" and

denotes any "extra expense"; i.e., by special contract the authorities might secure an addition (usually a fourth actor) to what the technitae would normally provide. In the later literature protagonist, deuteragonist, and tritagonist were used in the sense now generally understood, but originally they referred not to the character of the rôles which an actor was to play but to his own histrionic ability—the protagonist was a star; the tritagonist a "ranter." Thus, three second-rate actors might form a "barn-storming" troupe and in the traditional view one would be the protagonist, another the deuteragonist, and the last the tritagonist; but properly speaking they would all be *δευτεραγωνισταί*. Finally, in the case of nine plays the old three-actor distribution of parts is contrasted with a new one of Rees's own devising—allowing from four to seven actors in each cast. In these new arrangements he tries to assign a separate actor to each important part, to avoid the combination of male and female rôles and of extremes in age, and in general to form only such groupings as would be likely to escape the spectators' attention.

The skill with which Professor Rees urges his views, the neatness with which they reinforce one another, and the flood of light which they shed upon certain dark gaps in our knowledge give his theories considerable weight—in fact, with most of his conclusions the reviewer finds himself in substantial accord. Sometimes, however, an attempt seems to have been made to prove too much; for example, in the statement that "'tritagonist' is a term apparently invented by Demosthenes, was applied only to Aeschines, and was never in any period a recognized title" (p. 34). This is improbable enough in itself, seems inconsistent with the statements made on the very next page, and is expressly disproved by Demos. *De Falsa Legatione* § 247: *ιστε γὰρ δίπον τοῦθ' ὅτι ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς δράμασι τοῖς τραγικοῖς ἔξαιρετόν ἔστιν ὅσπερ γέρας τοῖς τριταγωνισταῖς τὸ τοὺς τυράννους καὶ τοὺς τὰ σκῆπτρ' ἔχοντας εἰσιέναι.* This passage is earlier than Demosthenes' use of the term elsewhere (viz., in the *De Corona*), and, though Aeschines is of course mentioned in the context, both the sentiment itself in the form of a general statement and the use of the plural *τριταγωνισταῖς* and of the phrase *ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς δράμασι τοῖς τραγικοῖς* show that this was no word newly coined for the occasion and distinctly imply that tritagonists, whatever their function, were well known to Demosthenes' contemporaries. It is, therefore, hard to believe that in a contemporaneous passage, Arist. *Poetics* 1449a 16, *Αἰσχύλος . . . τὰ τοῦ χοροῦ ἡλάττωσε καὶ τὸν λόγον πρωταγωνιστὴν παρεσκείασεν, πρωταγωνιστὴν* has no reference to acting (pp. 31 f.). Other possibilities are excluded by the fact that theatrical matters are under discussion, an argument which Rees himself accepts as satisfactory in another instance (p. 32, n. 6). Now if we ask ourselves whether Aristotle considered the dialogue in Aeschylus the protagonist because it was first in order of appearance in a play or better than choral parts to perform or as having the chief rôle, we must surely accept the last reason. Yet this conclusion does not invalidate

Rees's main thesis, for it is quite possible that the rule of three actors and consequently the traditional meaning of protagonist, etc., go back farther than he supposes and actually antedate this period. Rees is himself of the opinion that the use of *δύωντζομα* and its compounds with reference to actors began "soon after the introduction of the actors' contest in 449" (p. 35). Before the organization of formal guilds, at Thoricus and elsewhere in the fifth century and in almost every deme in the fourth century dramatic spectacles were celebrated (p. 65); and since it was within the range of possibility for three actors unassisted to present most plays (at least with slight alterations), it is likely that the troupes which visited these festivals were usually no larger. Hence, there may well have arisen in the "provinces" an unofficial nomenclature which would obtain no recognition at Athens or, indeed, in official records anywhere. In this connection it is significant that "wherever Aeschines is spoken of as 'tritagonist' to anyone, it is with reference to performances in the country" (p. 34, n. 6).

Again, is not the possibility worth considering that Aeschylus introduced the second actor (and consequently the two-actor scene) but had no others at his disposal; that Sophocles added the third actor (and consequently the three-actor scene) but had no more than this at his disposal; and that, somewhat later, more actors became available but without further additions to the number appearing together in one scene? There must have been a dearth of actors in the early days (pp. 60 f.); and just as the supply would seem about to exceed the demand, a corresponding change in dramatic technique would cause a need of still more. Certainly, the early plays have little fault to find with the two-actor arrangement; and if Aeschylus had been amply provided with actors, is it conceivable that a man of such inventive genius and initiative would not once in over thirty years have allowed three of them to appear together?

Other matters may be dismissed more briefly: p. 20, n. 1, l. 3, for "plays to be given" read "poets competing"; p. 23, the quotation from the *Ars Poetica* comes from l. 192; p. 34, n. 6, *ἐπιτραγωνιστέως* (sic); pp. 36 f., another example of *τὰ δεύτερα λέγειν* referring to but one rôle occurs in Plutarch *Cicero* xii; p. 40, n. 1, perhaps "completed the trio" would be a preferable translation; p. 48, n. 1, a better explanation of *Alectis*' silence is advanced in Haigh's *Tragic Drama* 288; p. 54, ll. 18 f., O'Connor has already pointed out the inapplicability of the reference to Aeschines; p. 58, l. 5, for "Chrysothemis" read "Hermione"; p. 63, n. 4, add a reference to Plutarch *De Gloria Ath.*, p. 348f.-349a; p. 72, "Four men and a boy constituted the normal (Elizabethan) traveling troupe." Is there other evidence for this? The play quoted as proof in the footnote seems to point in the other direction: "But one boy? Then, I see there's but few women in the play." As Dr. Rees is fond of Elizabethan parallels, it may be not out of place to cite Brander Matthews' suggestion that Touchstone's disquisition on lies is "put precisely where it is to give Rosalind time to change from

the boyish costume of Ganymede into the ampler habiliments of her own sex"; cf. *A Study of the Drama* 129.

This subject has received no independent treatment since Hermann (1840), Richter (1842), and Beer (1844), and such an investigation was badly needed. Every reader of the later plays must feel and resent the artificiality and the absurdities which the current theory involves. Few would find solace in such suggestions as the following by Hermann: "The effect would be heightened still more when the spectator saw the same actor, who earlier in the play had been led forth to the tomb in the character of Antigone, return in the character of a Messenger to relate her death. Though the mask and dress were changed, the same voice and stature were perceptible in both, so that the spectator would feel that the ghost of Antigone was speaking through the mask of the Messenger" (p. 14). If Professor Rees's conclusions are accepted (as they inevitably must be in all essential particulars), we shall rest under no further necessity for such apologies. Finally, I would express the hope that these studies be continued into the field of Roman comedy, which likewise has not for some time been thoroughly examined from this point of view and would certainly yield valuable, though probably less revolutionary, results.

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Demetrii et Libanii qui feruntur ΤΤΠΟΙ ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΚΟΙ et ΕΠΙΣΤΟΛΙΜΑΙΟΙ ΧΑΡΑΚΤΗΡΕΣ. Edidit VALENTINUS WEICHERT. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910.

The appearance of Foerster's text of Libanius gives the signal for his pupils to produce the dissertations inspired by his life-long work in this field. Weichert's little book is not labeled a dissertation, and in form it appears as an addition to the texts of the Teubner Library. But it has all the earmarks of a dissertation, and on page lxxiv, in an addendum, its author has forgotten to remove the words *haec dissertatio*. The brief tract which has come down to us under the name of Demetrius of Phalerum discusses 21 types of letters. The writer, allowing for the increasing complexity of life, prophesies that time will give birth to many other such types, but asserts that he has personally met with only those on his list, a pathetic admission, since the love letter is not included. His examples of letters of introduction, condolence, congratulation, and the rest are as frigid as one would expect from an author whose first sentence takes up 13 lines of Teubner text. The most curious type is the allegorical, which corresponds remotely to the modern communication by code or cipher, though its real meaning seems to have been left to the intelligence of the unhappy recipient. Demetrius offers certain epistolary problems of this sort, with their solutions.

The tract ascribed by some to Libanius has more claim to be called a "Complete Letter Writer," and defines 41 types, not omitting the love letter. His examples are less stilted than the other's, but we cannot believe that such a handbook had any vogue outside the school of rhetoric; in fact we have letters enough among the papyri collections to prove that the real thing was unlike in all respects to the school formula. But there was, no doubt, a special etiquette for writing to a sophist, and perhaps it was such a handbook as this that inspired Marcus Aurelius, whose epistolary style is so admired by Philostratus, with his exclamatory letter to Fronto—"O verba! O nitor! O argutiae! O kharites! O *δοκησις*! O omnia!"

In his Introduction Weichert collects the precepts of the rhetoricians on the varieties, style, and subject-matter of the model letter. One observes that such rules were made to be broken. The pupil is warned by Demetrius to avoid philosophic reflections, circumlocutions, sententiae, and other sophistic devices, but we know well that no sophist or pupil of a sophist had the heart to leave them out.

On the question of the authorship of these two tracts Weichert decides that the Demetrius who composed the *τετρα* was not he of Phalerum, and he follows Brinkmann in assigning the work to the second century B.C.; it was written by one Demetrius, in Egypt, and is the oldest extant handbook of its type. Weichert was able to test the tract assigned to Libanius in the tradition by an analysis of that sophist's own letters, and decides that they reflect the school of Libanius, so that we have here the familiar ghost of the pupil who publishes his master's notes in a form not intended by the lecturer. And since another tradition assigned the tract to Proclus the Platonist, which is impossible, it is evident that here we have the clue to the pupil's name, especially as we know that Libanius had no less than three correspondents named Proclus. This is a very neat explanation of the Proclus tradition and of the obvious likeness to the style of Libanius himself. This gives us for both the tracts that other soothing apparition—another man of the same name.

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February, 1911

A Study of the Greek Epigram before 300 B.C. By FLORENCE ALDEN
GRAGG. *Proceedings of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences.* Vol. XLVI, No. 1 (September, 1910). Pp. 62.

The material of Miss Gragg's essay includes 324 epigrams from monuments and from the literary tradition. The writer's purpose is to define the characteristics of these epigrams, and in so doing to mark such development as is discernible before the Hellenistic period. Although there is no trace of polemic in the discussion, the conclusions militate against Reitzenstein's views: Miss Gragg believes that satirical epigrams were written in the sixth

century, that "satiric, convivial, gnomic, and love epigrams are developing rapidly" in the fifth century, and that "the epigram was early considered a distinct branch of literature." To a considerable extent her disagreement with Reitzenstein is due to her less skeptical attitude toward the epigrams attributed to classical poets in the literary tradition, and to her inclusion of material from Archilochus, Theognis, Euenus, and others that is usually treated as elegy rather than epigram. To a less degree the difference may be due to the elasticity of descriptive terms: who shall say whether the mere appearance of the name of the dead or of the dedicatory *extra metrum* is sufficient to stamp an epigram as "a recognized form of *Kunstdichtung*"? All depends upon Reitzenstein's understanding of the terms employed; Miss Gragg is evidently attaching a different import to them.

In general the conservative attitude toward Reitzenstein's ingenious theories is commendable, especially in respect to the contention of the German scholar that the "literary" epigram necessarily presupposes the collection in book form of inscribed epigrams; nor are we disposed to object to the charity of the author in recognizing the authenticity of epigrams ascribed to early poets in MSS. But we must demur to the inclusion of the short elegiac poems of Euenus, Theognis, and others in an account of the epigram. Not that these poems do not belong in such a study, but simply that the writer, having once included them, immediately imposes upon herself a larger task—the history of $\tau\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{e}y\acute{e}ia$ and not merely of the epigram. For whatever connection they may have with epigram, their precise relation cannot be appreciated if they are considered apart from longer elegies. Miss Gragg does not need to be reminded that historical study of the epigram before 300 is impossible; the only historical introduction to the Hellenistic epigram is through $\tau\alpha\ \acute{\alpha}\lambda\acute{e}y\acute{e}ia$ in the broadest sense.

The essay bears every trace of careful workmanship: it shows an admirable command of the sources and of the interpretative material; it contributes interesting notes on the influence of other types, on meter, and on dialect; and it serves a very useful purpose in the mere collection of the scattered remains of early epigram, and in the convenient tabulation of recurrent details and formulas in the inscribed epigram. Although a defect in the plan has given rise to partial truth or total error, in execution the study is a model *Erstlingsarbeit*.

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P. *Terenti Afri Hauton Timorumenos*. Edited, with Introduction, Notes, Critical Appendix, and Index, by F. G. BALLENTINE. Boston: Benj. H. Sanborn and Co., 1910. Pp. xxi+129.

This is a difficult book to review. It shows careful study of Terentian literature (with one odd gap, noted below), and independent examination

of the play itself. But the editor fails to keep clearly in mind the class of readers for whom he was, in theory, writing. The book forms part of a series professedly intended for college students. Such students will find much that it contains of no help, mere extraneous erudition; they will also miss much which they have a right to expect.

Of the sixteen pages of the Introduction four treat briefly the production of the *Hauton*, its plot, characters, and reputation. The other twelve present a new feature in editions of Terence, an excellent discussion of the Influence of Terence upon English comedy. There is not a word, however, about Terence's life and work, his merits and his weaknesses, his countrymen's estimate of him, his place in the history of Greco-Roman comedy and in Latin literature, his meter and prosody, stage performances, etc. Mr. Ballantine explains the omission of "the meter, prosody, etc., of Terence" as due to the fact that they are found in practically all of the annotated editions of Terence. But nowhere does he enumerate such editions or give a list of books or articles to which the intelligent student may go for light on the important topics named above. Yet the Notes and the Critical Appendix are full of references (e.g., to metrical matters, the illustrated MSS) which assume a large measure of the knowledge which the editor nowhere helps the student to acquire, at least in any systematic way. Too often, also, there are no notes on lines or groups of lines which, as the reviewer knows from experience, trouble college students. Help is not always given where it is first or most needed; *amicum* is genitive in 24, *iniquom* in 27, yet the form is first discussed in 606. One other fault in the presentation of the editor's stores of information is the fact that often books which have passed through many editions, such as the *Latin Grammar* of Stoltz and Schmalz and the *Antibarbarus*, are cited without indication of the edition he was using.

The best part of the book is the Critical Appendix. Here the editor shows independence, knowledge, judgment, good taste. He is in general a conservative, yet is capable of innovation. He made good use of Professor Warren's *Bibliography of Terence* and his copy of Umpfenbach's edition, with Warren's own corrections and additions (see the Preface). Only a hint of the good things can be given. He rightly retains *suum* in Per. 7, keeps the MSS verse-order in 3 ff., retains 6-9 (with *simplici*, however, in 6), 48-50, and keeps *agrum* in 63 (of course he declines to insert it in 64). At 72 he gives a good text in reading *At enim me quantum*, etc. In 83 he declines to emend *meruisti* to *commeruisti*. In 135 he reads *dignum quovis* (instead of *quovis dignum*), correcting Umpfenbach's report of A's reading. For other good textual notes see on 176, 183 (here he omits *magna* as a gloss, and retains *usque*; *iam inde usque a pueritia*, it might be added, makes an adjective with *familiaritas* needless), 192. Punctuation comes in for a good share of attention, with results usually good: see on 82-83, 114, 128, 140, 163, 181.

The change in 162, however, gives an unnatural place to *hodie*: no one need be afraid of medial incision (see Professor Goodell's paper, "Bisectioned Trimmers in Attic Tragedy," *Classical Philology* I, 145-66).

In the commentary there is much of interest and value. Especially good are the notes describing various expressions as "proverbial" and the notes bringing Terence's verses beside their Greek originals, real or supposed (see, e.g., on 61-62, 63-64, 293-95). In the latter connection, however, the editor has missed a chance (see, e.g., on 440) to bring out the wide difference which sometimes obtains between Terence's verses and those cited by ancient authority as his originals. Professor West, in his edition of the *Andria* and the *Hauton* (1888), pp. xxix, 154-55, showed very briefly but well how such a discussion might illuminate the question of the originality of Latin literature. The lack of such a general discussion is emphasized by the fact that the Index contains no caption referring to Greek at all and does not contain the name of Menander or that of Philemon. The citations from modern English plays help at times. Notes giving reminiscences of Plautus in Terence and reminiscences of Terence in later Latin authors are also good and helpful.

The author seems oddly unfamiliar with American work which touches Terence more or less closely. A knowledge of Miss Saunders' dissertation, *Costume in Roman Comedy* 30-39, would have eliminated from p. 57 the groundless statement that the Prologus carried an olive branch; the two passages cited from Livy are in no way relevant and the illustrated MSS are against Mr. Ballentine's view. In the note on 46 there should have been a reference to Professor Flickinger's paper, "On the Prologue to Terence's *Heauton*," *Classical Philology* II, 157-62. Study of Professor Clement's paper on "The Use of *enim* in Plautus and Terence," in *AJP* XVIII, 402-15, and of Professor Kirk's on "Etiam in Plautus and Terence," *ibid.* 26-42, would have led to better notes (e.g., on 72, 235, etc.) on these two poor words, so shamefully treated by editors and critics of Plautus and Terence. On 313 a reference might have been added to Professor Harkness' paper in *AJP* XXXI, 154-74, "The Final Monosyllable in Latin Prose and Poetry."

In a number of places I differ from Mr. Ballentine in interpretation, in others again I think more helpful matter might have been added to his notes, even by one who kept steadily in mind the college student. But for detailed discussion of such points there is here no room.

To sum up, there is in this book abundant evidence of long, faithful, and fruitful study of Terence. It is to be hoped that Professor Ballentine will continue that study. Increasing experience in editing will brush aside the weaknesses which this book shows on the side of presentation.

CHARLES KNAPP

COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY

Libanii Opera. Recensuit RICHARDUS FOERSTER. Vol. V. Declamationes i-xii. Leipzig: Teubner, 1909.

Foerster, with this volume, begins a series of four that are to be devoted to the more definitely sophistic works of Libanius. The Declamations were more read in the Middle Ages than the Orations and consequently survive in more MSS, and have been more exposed to the carelessness of copyists: the greater the opportunity for emendation. Nor had the editor for this part of his task any MS so trustworthy as the Augustanus and Chisianus had proved for the Orations. He has forsaken the order followed by Reiske, and arranges, according to the subject-matter, first the mythographical, then the historical and ethical compositions, but he has put first of all the *Apology* of Socrates because of its kinship to the Orations. Here Libanius assumes the rôle of a friend of Socrates attacking Anytus. The speech is written with the ardor and the fellow-feeling to be expected from one who was himself an instructor of youth, and Libanius neglects the charge of impiety to defend Socrates from what he thought a graver accusation. Foerster explains certain obscurities in the argument by the theory that Libanius had before him that notorious speech by Polycrates the sophist which Isocrates had attacked, and that he is refuting this speech point by point, though, as the fragments of Polycrates show, he did not follow it slavishly. Here Foerster differs from Dindorf and Cobet. Anthologists and grammarians neglected this *Apology* and it survives in few MSS. Reiske omitted from his collection the declamation that follows, "On the Silence of Socrates," though it was evidently popular. A pupil of Socrates pleads to be allowed to talk with his master in prison, alleging, against the historical evidence, that this privilege was denied to all. The composition bristles with the regular sophistic commonplaces, nightingales and swan songs, Marsyas and Orpheus.

What the readers of Libanius preferred were the mythographical exercises that follow, the speeches of Menelaus and Odysseus to recover Helen, Achilles replying to Odysseus as he might have replied in the Ninth *Iliad*, for the Trojan saga still fascinates beyond every other theme. Orestes defends himself before a jury, Poseidon and Ares bring charge and counter-charge over the death of Halirrhothius, and the volume ends with imaginary speeches by Themistocles and Cimon, which had considerably less vogue. Foerster rejects from the corpus and assigns to Choricius on the grounds of style, the speech of Patroclus, the 'Πύτρος λόγος and the "Apology of a Father." More than once he speaks of forthcoming dissertations, presumably by his pupils, which will support with fuller arguments than he can give his editorial decisions.

The English quotation on p. 451 might have been revised to make sense, and we note that though this is a volume of declamations, "Orationes" appears on the back of the cover.

WILMER CAVE WRIGHT

BRYN MAWR COLLEGE
November, 1910

Die Entstehung der Odyssee und die Versabzählung in den griechischen Epen. By AUGUST FICK. Goettingen, 1910. M. 7.

In this work of his advanced years Fick assumes the entire truth of the theories with which his name has long been associated; there are no doubts and no misgivings—his most common expressions are “sicher,” “zweifellos,” and “ohne Zweifel”; there are no more facts of any value to be found regarding the language or the origin of the Homeric poems; Ruth need expect no gleanings in the fields of this thrifty Boaz.

According to Fick the *Odyssey* consists of four original poems put together by botchers and blockheads. The four poems are a “Nostos” consisting of 1,944 verses divided into eight books of 243 verses each, composed in Chios about 700 B.C.; a “Gegennostos” of 1,215 verses, or five books of 243 verses each, composed in Rhodes a little after 700 B.C.; a “Tisis” of 3,520 verses and an introduction of 110 verses, composed in Crete early in the seventh century; a “Telemachie” of 1,760 verses composed in Laconia about 620 B.C. The two “Nostoi” were blended by Aleman; later poets without poetic ability and with no sense of humor started to piece out and interweave with their own wretched verses these four poems; the absurdity of the one was surpassed by the ignorance of the next: “Dieser Unfug kann nicht von unserem Einleger in den Nostos herühren, denn es ist rein undenkbar, dass ein halbweg vernünftiger Mensch sein immerhin doch ganz verständig begonnenes Werk in so verrückter Weise fortsetze” (p. 150). It was Kynaithos beyond all others who brought ruin and disaster, he it was who “geschädigt und verwüstet die alten herrlichen Dichtungen.” The poems were mutilated by Kynaithos about 500 B.C., in Sicily, where he produced his version; he created the character of the blind poet Demodokos in order to praise himself; he has long been concealed behind this mask, but has been found out at last (p. 183): “Es kann wohl keinem Zweifel unterliegen, dass in diesen Einlagen der blinde Kynaithos unter der Maske des Demodokos selber steckt und sich in seiner masslosen Eitelkeit selbst verherrlicht.” The plan of the present *Odyssey* “is a crime against human intelligence” (p. 168): “Billig fragt man da, wie kam Kynaithos, denn dieser wird als Verüber dieses *Verbrechens gegen den gesunden Menschenverstand* nachgewiesen werden, zu einer so unsinnigen Anordnung?”

Each of the four original poems found in the *Odyssey* was composed in pure Aeolic Greek, since they can be rewritten in that dialect; verses that cannot be so changed reveal the later hand. The following examples will show how simple the change from the present traditional form to the pure original:

κ 35: καὶ μ' ἔφασαν χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον οἴκαδ' ἄγεσθαι. Simply drop the pronoun *μ'*, insert *γὰρ*, substitute *ἔφαν* for *ἔφασαν*, drop *οἴκαδ'*, insert *αὐτόν*, and behold we have a pure Aeolic verse,

καὶ γὰρ ἔφαν χρυσόν τε καὶ ἄργυρον αὐτὸν ἄγεσθαι.

μ 64: ἀλλά τε καὶ τῶν αἰὲν ἀφαιρέται λὶς πέτρη. Insert *ταν*, change *αἰὲν* to *αἰὲι*, *ἀφαιρέται* to *ἀγρεῖ*, and we have the verse, metrically impossible,

ἀλλά τε καὶ τάων ταν αἰὲι ἀγρεῖ λὶς πέτρα.

Yet we are asked to believe that bards could make such wholesale changes, but left *κε*, *κεν*, *θεά* in the poems, because they could not force *ἀν* and *θεός* into the meter.

A numerical system founded on the calendar lies at the base of these poems: the week had nine days, the sidereal month twenty-seven days. Now multiply 9 by 27 and we have 243, which is the fifth power of 3; further, 3 times 243 is 729, and this again is twice $364\frac{1}{2}$, i.e., twice the length of the solar year. The number 243 is the number of verses in each of the 8 (8 is the third power of 2) poems of the "Nostos." This theory is not to be tested by the poems, but the poems by the theory. All verses which refuse to fit into 243 are to be rejected; e.g., cf. p. 127: "Man erkennt den späteren Ursprung teils schon durch ihre Sprachfehler, sicher jedoch allemal an der Unmöglichkeit, sie in das herrschende Zahlensystem einzufügen."

In the "Gegennostos" the calendar is different; Odysseus stays one year with Ciree, one month with Aeolus, a month on the island of the Sun; thus, if we add one month for his other adventures, we have fifteen months, and by figuring the month at thirty days, we have 450 days, or the exact number of verses in each division of the "Gegennostos," a coincidence so remarkable that accident is out of the question. To be sure no one of these divisions has 450 verses, but they can easily be changed. The numbers though fixed are fluid, since when Fick first published his hidden numbers for the "Urmenis" he found the divisions each had 242 verses, but now, since he has found the true number in the fifth power of three, each of these same divisions oddly enough has 243 verses, or a most remarkable agreement with the "Nostos."

Wonderful as the numerical agreements are in these poems it is in the "Tisis" that all the majesty is seen. "This poem has 3,520 verses with an introduction of 110 verses, thus, in all 3,630, and the 3,630 represents ten solar years or eleven sidereal years. Now take away the 110 and we have 3,520, or ten lunar years" (p. 93). To be sure, the introduction has 187 verses, but it must be reduced to 110, else it would not be a multiple of 5, 10, and 11, the only frame on which the poet of the "Tisis" could work.

On p. 193 proof is given to show that the week of seven days was known: "Philoctetes had seven ships, a certain proof of the seven days of the week, also the ship of the Phaeacians had fifty-two men, hence the year had fifty-two weeks." The author hints that this knowledge of a week of seven days and a year of fifty-two weeks may be due to Babylonian influence.

However, the year was most accommodating and shifts at will; cf. p. 200: "Odysseus had twelve ships and in the capture of the goats each ship received nine goats as its share of the booty. Now then, 9 times 12 is 108,

or one-third of 324, the number of days in a sidereal year. But Odysseus received for himself alone ten goats. Just add 10 to 108 and we have 118; but 118 is one-third of 354, the number of days in the lunar year." Here the lunar year has 354 days, while in the "Tisis" it obligingly had but 352, and the sidereal year here has only 324 days against the 330 of the "Tisis." Exact figures, as a rule, are exacting, but this calendar method requires only that we have some divisor or multiple of 350, 360, 364, 354, 352, 330, 324; or a divisor of some fraction of them, e.g., 243, is approximately two-thirds of 364, hence we can work in groups of 3, 9, 27, 81, and multiples thereof, and so with fractions of all the rest.

JOHN A. SCOTT

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The Rise of the Greek Epic. By GILBERT MURRAY. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1907. Pp. xi+283.

As a piece of fascinating and brilliant writing Professor Gilbert Murray's volume of Harvard Lectures deserves extended review. As yet another contribution to the deluge of Homeric "literature," it must be put off with a brief notice. He has actually accomplished the feat of writing nearly three hundred pages on the Homeric problem with little or no mention of Wolf, Lachmann, and the Villoison scholia. Instead of these things he gives a generalized yet vividly concrete and picturesque description by the methods of Renan of how the thing might have happened, thus plausibly leading us to his conclusion that it did in fact so happen.

He describes after Wilamowitz and on the analogy of the Germanic invasions of the Roman empire the weltering chaos in which the Mycenaean civilization broke up, and out of which emerged dimly discerned in the dark ages the Greece that we know—the Greece of the *πόλις*.

"Homeros is the name of an imaginary ancestor" worshiped by the schools of bards who reflect or conventionally preserve the traditions of these ages. The *Iliad* and *Odyssey* took shape in the public recitations of such bards at great Ionian festivals—prototypes of the Panathenaea. In these poems we are brought face to face "with something in a sense greater and more august than individual genius." We associate the unique imaginative intensity that pervades the *Iliad* with something personal. But this is an illusion. The existing texts cannot be accounted for on the hypothesis of one great poet working either near the beginning or near the end of the process. The grand style and imaginative unity of the *Iliad* means "that generation after generation of poets lived in the same schools . . . steeped themselves to the lips in the spirit of *this great poetry*" (italics ours). These schools and the exigencies of their audience maintained the archaizing conventions of the epic (bronze armor, for example) and expurgated the old "Pelasgian foolishness" that survives in Hesiod and even in Aeschylus.

But at the same time or a little later some of them wrought irreparable injury to the human race by permitting the invasion of the Milesian spirit of levity and lubricity into the greatest poem that the world has known. And Mr. Murray is not certain that he would "subscribe half a crown to save Aristeides of Miletus and all his kin from everlasting death." It would be interesting to learn how much his austere Puritanism would subscribe to redeem Milton, whose nuptials of Adam and Eve was evidently in part inspired by the "Milesian" marriage of Zeus and Hera.

All this is most entertaining and has received its full meed of praise from reviewers. Professor Murray has not only studied and utilized with consummate literary skill the suggestions of Cauer, Robert, Leaf, Bréal, and the rest, but he has read Matthew Arnold and Mr. Andrew Lang, and is aware that he cannot *prove* anything. Unfortunately he forgets this when he enters upon the detailed disintegrating analysis of the poems, and so permits himself an ingenuity of caviling hypercriticism that even Robert might envy.

There is space for but one illustration. On p. 44, arguing that the interpolation of the breastplate has introduced confusion of thought, Professor Murray quotes *Iliad* vii. 251: "Right through the shining shield came the strong spear and was driven heavily through the richly wrought breastplate, but he twisted aside and escaped black death," with the comment "Too late! You can twist aside from a spear that is coming through your shield but not from one that has already been heavily driven through your breastplate." If Professor Murray feels such absolute confidence in this argument, why does he substitute "driven heavily" for Lang, Leaf, and Myer's "pressed it on," and why, with no indication of the omission, does he omit the line "And straight forth beside the flank the spear rent his doublet"? Why does he fail to note in xi. 436 ff. the addition in identical context of the words "and tore clean off the flesh of the flanks, but Pallas Athene did not suffer it to mingle with the bowels of the hero"? The poet in both places thinks of a spear so directed that after penetrating all defenses it either just grazes or slightly wounds the flesh. This is reasonable enough. The position of the words "swerved and escaped black death" need not be pressed to mean that he swerved after the arrow had already penetrated the breastplate any more than Pallas Athene's miraculous guidance of the spear need be supposed to take place after it had pierced the shield and breastplate. In *Iliad* xx. 275 ff., where there is no breastplate, after it is said that Achilles' spear pierced Aeneas' shield and the shield cracked under it, the poet adds "and Aeneas crouched and held up the shield away from him in dread," etc. In all such cases, the naïveté of the formula is as natural a *husteron proteron* as is our habit of shrinking after we have seen the lightning flash. The intended meaning is clearly that the hero saw the weapon coming and crouched or swerved. If the absurdity is so patent, how was it accepted by the audience of Ionian warriors for whose sake "all the heroes were summarily provided with" (interpolated) "breastplates"? No Homeric

naïveté can exceed that of a critic who writes in his text that there is not a word about the breastplate in *Iliad* iv. 134 ff., and then inserts the footnote "I think the *θώρηξ* and the *μίτρα* are both interpolated here," or who accounts for the absence of the breastplate interpolations in K (the *Doloneia*) by the supposition that the breastplate interpolations took place while K was still separate and that "when K was modified and inserted in the *Iliad* the interest in the armor question had died down."

It is all, as I have said, very delightful reading, but when regarded as argument or science must be taken subject to verification.

PAUL SHOREY

Omero di Engelbert Drerup. Versione fatta da ADOLFO CINQUINI E FRANCESCO GRIMOD, con Aggiunte dell' Autore e appendice di LUIGI PERNIER. Bergamo: Istituto Italiano d'Arti Grafiche—Editore, 1910. Pp. 292. L. 10.

Professor Drerup's well-known book published in 1903 needs no further recommendation. But this Italian edition is in many respects a new work. The author guarantees the fidelity of the translation, and has brought the work down to date with the aid of such specialists as Professor Halbherr, Dr. Luigi Pernier, Dr. Roberto Paribeni, and Dr. Alessandro Della Seta. In addition to this, the number of the illustrations has been so increased (from 123 to 223) and their quality so improved that Professor Drerup is not claiming too much for the book when he says in the preface that in its present form it presents a better and fuller picture of the most ancient civilization of Greece than any other one book. Not only the archaeologist in the small college, but teachers of Homer everywhere will find it an immense convenience to have practically all the illustrative material that they need in the small compass of this beautifully executed volume of 292 pages. For this purpose the book can easily be used by those who do not read Italian, and the extremely moderate price brings it within the reach of those who cannot afford a costly Homeric and "Minoan" library.

The thanks of all scholars are due to the publishers of this handsome and helpful volume, and we trust that they will maintain the high standard which it sets in the promised second volume of their series, *La civiltà Ellenica*.

PAUL SHOREY

The Arts Course at Mediaeval Universities with Special Reference to Grammar and Rhetoric. By LOUIS JOHN PAETOW, PH.D. Vol. III, No. 7, The University of Illinois Studies. Urbana-Champaign: University Press, 1910. Pp. 134. \$1.00.

Dr. Paetow's monograph deals with the eternal problem of the classical, the scientific, and the "modern" course as it presented itself to the Middle

Ages—classics being represented by grammar in the classical and mediaeval sense of “the art of explaining poets and historians,” science by the scholastic logic and the Arabian Aristotle, and the practical business course by medicine, Roman law, and especially the *ars dictaminis*, or training in letter writing and the art of drawing up documents.

The mediaeval Renaissance, whose fruits were the schools of Chartres and Orleans and the humanism of John of Salisbury, did not find acceptance in the great universities of the thirteenth century, where the scholastic philosophy absorbed all interest not devoted to the professions. The plaints of the humanists and the strangely modern satire of the old French poem on the Battle of the Seven Liberal Arts were as powerless to check the tendency as is the wail of the twentieth-century Greek professor today. The up-to-date student disdained the discipline of grammar and the culture of the “authors,” and “logic,” the scientific philosophy of the day, confirmed him in his attitude—

Soothed him up with lofty talk
And bore him up on high,
And ere that he had learnt to walk
Would teach him how to fly.

In the century preceding Petrarch, the study of language and literature was at its very lowest ebb, and the brilliance of this morning star of the Renaissance is largely due to the fact “that it happened to be darkest just before the dawn.”

I am not sure that Dr. Paetow's theses are absolutely new. But I have already found his collections of facts not readily available elsewhere extremely useful, and expect to have occasion to use them again. A helpful bibliography is appended.

PAUL SHOREY

Some Figurative Uses of “Venire” and “Ire.” By JAMES RAIDER
Mood. Johns Hopkins dissertation. Baltimore: J. H. Furst
Company, 1907. Pp. viii+47.

The author has divided his subject into three chapters. Chap. i, “With Case,” deals with types like *ad (in) spem venire (ire)*; chap. ii, “With predicate Nominative or Accusative,” *comitem venire (ire)*, *leve (levius) venire (ire)*, *obortum venire (ire)*, *exoriens venire*, *dolendum venire*; chap. iii, “With Inanimate Subjects Thereby Personified,” discusses types like *fatum veniens (venturum, etc.)*. Throughout, the prose examples are separated from the poetical. In the conclusion the author summarizes his results, commenting on the range, growth, and meaning of the various usages.

The period covered extends from Plautus to the end of the second century A.D. The author realizes that the more promising field is the period lying

between the one he has chosen and the rise of the Romance languages, and evidently regards his present paper as merely preliminary to a more important investigation. Within his field, the author has omitted Trogus-Justinus and Curtius, both of whom would have furnished him additional examples of the usages he discusses. The collection of examples from the authors employed is not exhaustive. It is not essential, perhaps, to the plan of the paper to cite all the occurrences of a given phrase in each author, but it would be desirable to know, especially in chap. i, just how complete the lists are intended to be. Sometimes all the cases are listed, sometimes only a single example is given. At least the earliest example of a given usage should be included, e.g., p. 7, Ter. *Adel.* 240, *venias in periculum*, should be inserted as a parallel for the Caesar example on p. 12; p. 19, Ter. *Adel.* 677, *advocatum venire*, should be added to the Cicero examples, and p. 9, Nepos *Dat.* 11, *in conloquium venire*, to the Livy example.

I have noted a few slips of the pen and some typographical errors. In the quotation of Müller, p. 3, the German is bad; the citation from the *Tristia* should be 4, 10, 117 instead of 4, 10, 7, *indicem* should be read instead of *iudicem*, and quotation marks should be inserted before *ihre* and after *widerlich*; p. 7, Plaut. *Poen.* 185, read *venerit* for *venit*; p. 8, Sen. *Dial.* VI, 26, 3, read *percussoris* for *percursoris*; p. 24, Sext. *Turp.*, insert *ire* after *ebrium*; p. 27, Verg. *Aen.* VII, 470, read *Teucris* for *Tucris*; and p. 43, Verg. *Georg.*, read 1, 29 for 129.

It is to be hoped that Dr. Mood will complete his study and so double the worth of an already valuable investigation.

CHARLES H. BEESON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Palaeographia Latina. Exempla Codicum Latinorum Phototypice Expressa Scholarum maxime in usum. Edidit MAXIMILIANUS IHM. Series I. Lipsiae: In Aedibus B. G. Teubneri. M. 5.

If the increasing number of paleographical works may be taken as an indication of the growing recognition of the importance of paleography as a subject of instruction, those who are especially interested have every reason to be satisfied. The older generation had to be content with Arndt's *Schrifttafeln* (1874), now in its fourth edition (Tangl, 1904-1907). In 1903 Steffens published the first part of his excellent *Lateinische Paläographie*, so excellent, indeed, that a second edition and a translation of the work into French soon followed. In response to frequent requests the publishers of the great Leyden series of facsimiles issued a collection containing fifty-four plates (*Album Palaeographicum*, 1909).

Inexpensive as these works are in comparison with previous publications, the cost is still a drawback. Something was wanted that was within the reach of the average student to serve as the basis for the lectures of the

instructor. It is therefore in response to an actual want that the new collection has been published.

There are 18 plates containing 25 pages from 22 manuscripts. Some of them are new, others have been published in works not generally accessible; only a few are familiar. Practically all the authors are of interest to the student of the classics, Augustine's *Homilies* and Jerome's *De viris illustribus* being the only patristic works represented. The plates are excellent; they are arranged chronologically and represent the various scripts from square capitals to the humanistic script. More than half the manuscripts are in the library at Wolfenbüttel, e.g., the *Agrimensores* (uncial), Augustine's *Homilies* (Merovingian), Isidore's *Etymologies* (Italian half-cursive), and the following minuscule MSS: *Pompeii commentum artis Donati* (saec. VIII), Aurelius Victor (saec. IX), Suetonius (saec. XI), Propertius (saec. XI-XII), Martianus Capella (saec. XIII), Vegetius (saec. XIV), Juvenal (saec. XIV), Tibullus (saec. XV), the *Panegyrici* (saec. XV). The other libraries represented are: Berlin, Virgil ("Augusteus"); Florence, Virgil ("Mediceus"), Caesar, (Beneventine script); Bamberg, Jerome, *De viris illustribus* (half-uncial), *Scriptores historiae Augustae* ("insular"); Madrid, Isidore's *Etymologies* (Visigothic); Paris, Suetonius ("Memmianus"); Erlangen, Cicero, *De inventione* (saec. X), Isidore's *Etymologies* (saec. XII); Venice, Tacitus, *Dialogus* (saec. XV).

A booklet accompanying the plates contains a brief history, written in Latin, of the manuscripts, with a selected bibliography. There is no transcription of the text and discussion of the script.

Further series, of a more special character, are promised if the reception of the first is favorable. It is to be hoped that the untimely death of Ihm will not interfere with the project. It would be easy to combine in future issues a scientific and a practical purpose. It would be very desirable, for example, to have published a collection of plates from Spanish manuscripts no longer in Spain, to supplement the series published by Ehwald-Loewe.

CHARLES H. BEESON

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

M. Tulli Ciceronis Paradoxa Stoicorum, Academicorum Reliquiae cum Lucullo, Timaeus, De Natura Deorum, De Divinatione, De Fato. Fasciculus I. Ed. OTTO PLASBERG. Leipzig: Teubner, 1908. Pp. iv+196. M. 8.

The task of preparing a new (and much needed) edition of this group of Cicero's philosophical works was intrusted to Professor Plasberg by the Royal Prussian Academy fourteen years ago. The first fascicle contains the *Paradoxa*, the *Academica*, and the *Timaeus*. The *Academica* are printed in the following order: The *Varro*, or the first book of the *Academica Pos-*

teriora (the title of which, in the form *Academicus I*, has an unfamiliar look), then the fragments of Book II and part of the fragments of Book III, followed by the fragments of the *Catulus* and by the *Lucullus*. The other fragments of Book III and those of Book IV, since they are derived from the *Lucullus*, are entered as footnotes to that work on the appropriate pages. The ancient *testimonia* precede the *Academica* and also the *Timaeus*.

The distinguishing feature of this edition of the *Timaeus* is the interlinear arrangement of the Greek with the Latin text, an arrangement so convenient that it justifies the typographical difficulties it must have caused. Brackets inclose such passages of each author as are not found in the other, so that the relation of the Latin to the Greek original is easily made out.

The text of the *Paradoxa*, of the *Lucullus*, and of the *Timaeus*, like the text of earlier editions, rests primarily upon A B (Vossiani 84 and 86), and V (Vindobonensis 189). Besides these MSS the editor cites for the *Paradoxa* F (Florentinus Marcianus 257), M (Monacensis 528), Harleiani 2622 and 2682; for the *Lucullus* F, M, and, where V fails, N (Notradamensis Parisinus 17812); for the *Timaeus* F, M, L (Vossianus 10). Variants for the Greek text are occasionally cited from A, P, Y, F, and the *testimonia* of Proclus as given in Burnet's edition. For *Academicus I* some sixty MSS have been used, but the promised discussion of them has been postponed till the publication of the third fascicle, containing *De Divinatione* and *De Fato*, in order to avoid repeating the same subject-matter. Its place is taken by a brief summary (p. 33). The MSS are divided into two main classes, Δ , subdivided into "meliores," headed by Parisinus 6331 (Halm's P) and including a MS similar to Halm's V, and "deteriorum genera," including Halm's A; Γ , subdivided into "genus corruptum" and "genus interpolatum," which includes Halm's G. For further information the reader is referred to an article by Ed. Stroebel, *Philologus* 52, and to the dissertation by Otto Dieckhoff, *De Ciceronis libris de natura rerum recensendis* (Göttingen, 1894).

Besides the readings of the MSS and of the very early editions, the critical apparatus includes the readings of the editions of Halm and Baiter (1861), Baiter (1865), Müller (1878-79), and, for the *Academica*, Reid (1885). The edition of Schneider (1891) is occasionally quoted for the *Paradoxa*. The text is the most conservative that has yet appeared and the editor has done good service in relegating to the notes the greater number of the conjectures adopted by earlier editors, thus clearing the ground for further work on the text. For example I have noted in the *Paradoxa* 39 instances where the present text differs from that of Halm; in 31 conjectures have been replaced by MSS readings and in 12 readings of A have replaced those of V or of inferior MSS. The text of the *Lucullus* is closer to the text of Reid (whose arguments are often quoted) than to that of any other editor, but I have noted some 85 cases where the two editions vary; in 38 of them conjectures are replaced by MSS readings and in 24 the readings of A have replaced those of inferior MSS; in 11 cases MSS readings have been discarded in favor of

conjectures. Sixteen passages (ten of them in the *Lucullus*) are starred as being corrupt.

The editor has incorporated in the text a score or more of his own emendations. I give a few specimens: *Lucullus* 44, *convincitur* (*coniungitur*, MSS); 113, *hi minores* (*mihi* or *mi* *minores*, MSS); 124, *merus numerus* (*nummerus*, Bentley; *mens*, MSS), *Timaeus* 8, *fit* (*sit*, MSS).

When the text differs from the best MSS and often when it differs from the editions cited, the reading adopted is supported by references to articles by modern scholars or by cross-references to Cicero's other works. Not infrequently explanatory and linguistic notes are added, e.g., p. 66 (*Paradoxa* 7), *malo masculinum*; p. 160.9 (*Timaeus* 7), *in hac formula* (i.e., *de his quae diximus*) *nullo fere discrimine tribus pronominibus utitur, quae sunt hic, is, ille*. When Cicero has translated from Greek sources, the original Greek, if known, is usually quoted in the notes.

The value of the work lies in the full critical apparatus and in the usually close adherence to the best MSS rather than in any notable emendations of the text. It has taken rank at once as the authoritative critical edition of this portion of Cicero's works.

FLORENCE ALDEN GRAGG

SMITH COLLEGE

Die Blütezeit der griechischen Kunst im Spiegel der Reliefsarkophage. Von DR. HANS WACHTLER. Aus Natur und Geisteswelt, 272. Bändchen. Leipzig: Teubner, 1910. Pp. 112. M. 1.25.

To draw in firm outlines the history of Greek sculpture down to the end of the fourth century B.C., to comment incisively upon each member of a series of illustrative monuments, never to lapse into vagueness or gush or dulness, and to keep within the limit of little more than one hundred pages—this is Dr. Wachtler's notable achievement. His booklet well deserves translation into English, all the more as information is scanty in our language regarding the objects he has chosen for detailed study, viz., the magnificent sarcophagi from Sidon, now in Constantinople, and the hardly less magnificent Fugger sarcophagus in Vienna.

F. B. TARRELL

De Lycophrone Mythographo. Dissertatio inauguralis quam ad summos in philosophia honores et amplissimo philosophorum ordine Lipsiensi rite impetrandos scripsit HORSTIUS GASSE. Leipzig: Hoffmann, 1910. Pp. 73.

Dissertations on Lycophron are few and far between, and the advent of a new one deserves more than passing notice. In Fock's *Catalogue* eight titles only, not all of which are of actual dissertations, are entered under

Lycophron's name, as compared with over 1,000 for Homer and 650 for Sophocles. Perhaps this may serve as a speaking testimonial to the relative importance of these authors. And yet there are problems enough connected with the *Alexandra* which are not bad subjects for Doctors' dissertations. There are obscure passages which need further elucidation in spite of voluminous scholia, and the investigation of sources is always a fertile field; so that the novice has ample opportunity to win his spurs.

The dissertation before us belongs to the second of the two classes just mentioned. It is an investigation of sources. Holzinger and Ciaceri have worked in this field, as well as Geffken in his *Timaios' Geographie des Westens*, Walter in a Basel dissertation of 1903 (*De Lycophrone Homeri imitatore*), and others, and the work of these predecessors has naturally had to be considered by the author. Lycophron's indebtedness to Homer is apparent to every reader of the *Alexandra* and was set forth in detail by Walter; but there is such a mixture of Homeric and post-Homeric matter that Holzinger argued that in composing his poem Lycophron introduced the myths from memory. Gasse proposes another explanation. In a word, the thesis which he attempts to establish is that the poet used a prose source for these stories, that is to say that he had before him a compendium of the myths relating to the Trojan cycle. This compendium, he argues, was based upon the epic cycle, the later epic poems, tragedies, and books pertaining to certain regions. He relies upon two arguments for his proof: (1) that while the poet narrates certain incidents at length, others which are poetic in character and would easily lend themselves to elaboration and embellishment are treated very briefly; and (2) the fact that earlier and later stories are found together. The wanderings of Odysseus, ll. 648-819, are a good example. Both of these points may be admitted and, in fact, Gasse seems to have established them by sufficient evidence; but whether they necessarily lead to the conclusion which he wishes may be questioned. The argument is, however, ingenious and well set forth and the evidence skilfully marshaled, showing a good grasp of the subject. The thesis is decidedly above the average of Doctors' dissertations and an important addition to the literature of Lycophron; but a bibliography, even if short, should have been appended. If we are not mistaken the author will be heard from later.

WILLIAM N. BATES

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Costume in Roman Comedy. By CATHERINE SAUNDERS. New York: Columbia University Press, 1909. Pp. x+145.

In this addition to the Columbia University Series of Studies in Classical Philology the writer presents, under a somewhat dubious title, a methodical investigation of the conventions of Roman comic costume. This has been based chiefly upon the comedians themselves and Bethe's photographic

reproductions of miniatures from the Ambrosian and other manuscripts of Terence (Leyden, 1903). Other minor sources specified are Pompeian wall paintings, Campanian reliefs, statuettes and Roman terra cottas, Donatus, Euanthius, Pollux, and "scattered references mainly from Roman literature." Though the term costume has been used broadly to designate "not only the actual dress of the actors, but also such other properties as have a particularly close connection with the characters under discussion," so pertinent a topic as the use of masks has, by reason of its compass, been omitted. The chapters presented deal with Sources, Terminology, Prologus, Stock-Rôles, and Unusual Rôles. Critical consideration is given to the theories of the origin of the miniatures and the period represented by them, and, while "the value of the archetype or the faithfulness of the descendants to that archetype" is questioned (p. 12), a very just refusal is accorded the extreme view of Englehardt, that a mere illustrator of the text devised the series.

However a more positive faith, at least in the value of the archetype, seems necessary to justify the sober use made of the pictures, and more effort to discover, perhaps by a comparative method, the testimony of this archetype would have been both welcome and consistent. Without full use of C and P, which are still inaccessible, though Father Ehrle of the Vatican has promised a publication of the former, it seems that critical work upon the miniatures must lack finality and real effectiveness. In the discussion of the Prologus, the writer after distinguishing the Roman and Greek types is concerned chiefly with Fabia's theory of the probable costume of the Terentian prologue-speaker. The adverse criticism of his supposition, that Prologi carried as insignia fillet-wound branches (p. 36), gains much sympathy.

The examination, however, of his other main contention, that the *ornatus prologi* of Hec. Prol. ii was the *ornatus* of the *adulescens* as a stock-rôle, seems a sophistical effort to exalt the credibility of the miniatures at the expense of the literary evidence. From the variety of prologue types shown in the former it is assumed that "absolute identity and uniformity of make-up for the Roman Prologus may easily have been a matter of indifference" (p. 38).

Other chapters present at greater length the evidence from Plautus and Terence and the miniatures for the costuming of specific rôles. The miniatures themselves are obviously responsible for the method employed, by which their testimony is subjoined rather than correlated. The list of citations, unfortunately without index, is seemingly exhaustive within the limits determined for the title and supplies in convenient and reliable form an interesting collection of scenic matter. A few errors in type I have recorded elsewhere in an earlier notice of the monograph (*Class. Weekly*, III, No. 21).

Dr. Saunders has studied the miniatures with great care and ingenious insight into their crudities and, though the result emphasizes most perhaps

their many inconsistencies and consequent negative value for the purpose in hand, her scholarly analysis of their characteristics is an essential contribution to the perplexing problem of their status.

JOHN W. BASORE

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Zum Alexandrinischen Antisemitismus. Von ULRICH WILCKEN. (Des XXVII. Bandes der Abhandlungen der philologisch-historischen Klasse der Königlichen-Sächsischen Gesellschaft der Wissenschaften, No. XXIII.) Leipzig: Bei B. G. Teubner, 1909. Pp. 59. M. 2.40.

Wilcken has collected and discussed a number of documents relating to anti-Jewish feeling and demonstrations in the first and second centuries. An interesting series of texts is included, reporting trials and convictions of Alexandrians (Isidorus, Lampo, Appianus) before various emperors. These are interpreted by Wilcken as relating to Alexandrian Jewish-Hellenic controversies which being carried to Rome resulted disastrously for the anti-Semitic party. Wilcken holds, as formerly, that these so-called Acts of Martyrdom represent a novel type of Alexandrian literature, based upon official sources, but worked up for partisan purposes. The whole makes a very significant group of texts, and Wilcken's interpretation of them is striking and suggestive, if not in all points convincing.

EDGAR J. GOODSPEED

THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO

Corpus Medicorum Graecorum auspiciis Academiarum associatarum ediderunt Academiae Berolinensis Hauniensis Lipsiensis. X, 1.1: *Philumeni De Venenatis Animalibus eorumque Remediis e codice Vaticano primum edidit MAXIMILIANUS WELLMANN.* Lipsiae et Berolini: In aedibus B. G. Teubneri, MCMVIII.

The editor of this recently discovered text is the author of *Die pneumatische Schule bis auf Archigenes in ihrer Entwicklung dargestellt* (Berlin, 1895) and of many articles on the Greek physicians published in *Hermes* and in the journals of the learned societies. He is eminently fitted to write with authority upon his subject, Greek medicine, and in the present instance has performed his duties as editor in praiseworthy fashion.

As he says in his preface, Wellmann chanced upon the treatise *De venenatis animalibus* in the spring of 1907 in Cod. gr. 284 (s. XI) of the Vatican library. The contents of this manuscript, which seems to have

been designed as a convenient collection of authorities on medicaments, includes, first, books vi-xi of Galen's *περὶ κράσεως καὶ δυνάμεως τῶν ἀπλῶν φαρμάκων*, so interpolated from the *περὶ ὅλης ἰατρικῆς* of Dioscurides as to fill out the subjects not treated by Galen; second, the pseudo-Dioscuridean *περὶ δηλητηρίων φαρμάκων*; third, on foll. 264v-288v, the present treatise; the last two leaves are filled with miscellaneous excerpts. The manuscript was copied by an uneducated scribe.

Wellmann has supplemented the short discussion in the preface of his edition by an article in *Hermes* ("Philumenus," *Hermes* xliii. 374 ff.), in which he has more carefully traced the relations between Philumenus and later writers. Aside from the fact that hitherto Philumenus was known to us only as he was cited, the great value of the present discovery lies in the care that he generally takes to name the authorities from whom he draws, for Philumenus was a compiler rather than an originator. Chief of these is Archigenes, who Wellmann thinks was used even more than the actual citations show, and whose method of presenting the subject Philumenus follows. Other sources are Apollonius, Herophileus, Theodorus, Soranus, and Strato. Galen is not cited, and it is therefore conjectured that Philumenus was his contemporary and is to be dated about 180 A.D. Later writers, namely Aëtius Amidenus (sixth century) in his lib. xxiii. 1-44, Paulus Aegineta (seventh century) in his *Compendium de Re Medica* v. 1-26, and the pseudo-Dioscurides (seventh century) in the *περὶ ιοβάλων*, depend largely upon Philumenus, but in his *Hermes* article Wellmann adopts the view that all these citations come through the medium of the *Συναγωγαὶ ἰατρικαὶ πρὸς Ἰουλιανόν* of Oribasius, a considerable portion of which has been lost. Wellmann has been able, in editing the text, to use the portions of these later writers which are clearly dependent upon Philumenus. Inasmuch as the accounts in Aëtius, Paulus, and pseudo-Dioscurides are frequently fuller than those in Philumenus himself, it may be inferred that the latter has been purposely condensed for use in the compilation.

The treatise itself deals with the bites of venomous animals. The author generally presents a short description of each creature, follows this with an account of the symptoms attendant upon the wound which it inflicts, and finally enumerates the antidotes, often naming the physician from whose writings they are taken. The first five sections are occupied with the discussion of wounds inflicted by mad dogs, after which he treats of the various kinds of serpents, the wasp, bee, and spider, lizards, and other poisonous creatures. Indices of words and of writers will increase the value of the text for the ordinary classicist, while for the specialist in this field its interest will be extreme. I have noted the following misprints: p. 18. 20, *γύρον* for *γύπον*; p. 37. 21, *δηχθέντις* for *δηχθέντες*.

FRANK E. ROBBINS

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Νέαι Ἐρμενεῖαι Ἀναγλύφων. By ΙΩΑΝΝΗΣ Ν. ΣΒΟΡΩΝΟΣ.

Athens: 'Η ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἑλληνικὴ Ἐκδοτικὴ Ἐταιρεία, 1910.

Some years ago Professor Svoronos, one of the most brilliant of archaeologists, conceived the magnificent plan of publishing, with photographic reproductions, full explanatory and critical text, and complete bibliography, every piece of work of Hellenic antiquity preserved in the National Museum in Athens. This monumental work, in quarto form beautifully executed, is to appear in Greek and German at the same time, bearing the titles *Tὸ ἐν Ἀθήναις Ἐθνικὸν Μουσεῖον*, respective, *Das Athener National Museum*. Sixteen fascicles have already appeared, each containing at least twenty-four pages of text and ten photographic plates. Under the title given above the publishers have sent out selections from the numbers already published. They comprise illuminating discussions, in the author's brilliant style, of half a dozen votive reliefs and, as *pièce de resistance*, an account of his remarkable discoveries at Colonus Hill. Following an old clue given by Professor Kastriotes he found under a cottage on the southeast slope of the hill the opening of a deep chasm which he identified as the entrance to the subterranean dwelling of the August Ones. When in Athens last summer, I had the good fortune to be directed to this same house; Mme. Loukisa very kindly opened her home to me and permitted me to explore her cellar *ad libitum*. I found there a great hole, which might be the entrance to a deeper chasm. But I failed, through my own inability to see, perhaps, to discover that deeper "chasm into which one can make one's way for a distance of many meters without finding the end." We shall hope to see soon the excavations completed that Svoronos proposes to institute, that the shrine of the August Goddesses may become a place of pilgrimage for all who love the poet of Colonus Hill. The simple fifth- and fourth-century reliefs, with their representations of Heracles at the Gate of Hades, that led to this full discussion of Colonus and the Academy and their heroes and shrines will have a new and larger influence from henceforth.

WALTER MILLER

TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA

Κρίσις τῆς Πλατωνικῆς Ἐκδόσεως τῆς ὑπὸ ΣΠ. Μωραΐτου. By

ΓΕΩΡΓΙΟΣ Κ. ΓΑΡΔΙΚΑΣ. Athens: Sakellarios, 1908.

Pp. 72.

One of the striking features of the Hellenic spirit of today is the ambition of the Greek who has made a fortune at home or abroad to make that fortune a blessing to his people. An Ἀβερώφ builds a stadium; a Σάγγρης builds schools in every quarter of his kingdom; a Βαλλιανός erects a library, a Συγγρός a museum. In like generosity of spirit the Zographos Library was founded by the man whose name it bears for the publication of classical

Greek texts. In this Zographos Series not long since appeared the first volume of Plato: Introduction, *Apology*, *Crito*, and *Gorgias*, by Sp. Moraites. This new Plato has met with a warm reception at the hands of M. Gardikas, a classical docent in the University of Athens, who assails it at a thousand vulnerable points. Moraites' modern Greek, both in point of style and syntax and orthography, he finds faulty to a degree unpardonable in a philologist. And as an interpreter of Plato the editor fails utterly to satisfy his critic; he understands neither Plato's words nor his grammar nor his ideas. Moraites' textual criticism fares no better at his critic's hands. Gardikas even accuses him of misappropriation of the work of other editors and interpreters of Plato. Gardikas closes his monograph with some wholesome advice to the older scholar for the improvement of the later volumes upon the first.

The critique appears a little too polemical and severe. But the criticisms are not general, but backed up with copious examples and citations by page and line. There are many points of criticism that the reviewer would like to take up in detail; but this is not our fight.

WALTER MILLER

TULANE UNIVERSITY OF LOUISIANA

Culti e Miti nella Storia dell'Antica Sicilia. By EMMANUELE CIACERI.

Catania: Battiatto, 1911. Pp. x+324.

In this work we have gathered together in finished form, but with much additional material, the results of many separate studies by Ciaceri upon Sicilian cults and myths. The evidence from literature, from epigraphy, from archaeology, and especially from numismatics has been carefully collected and studied. Valuable too is the study of the survivals of antique ritual and beliefs in certain contemporary Sicilian festivals of the Catholic saints; such for example as the *festa* of Saint Agata, a clear survival of the *Isidis Navigium*, still celebrated at Catania on March 5.

The work falls into five chapters: i, "Culti indigeni ellenizati"; ii, "Miti e culti di carattere apparentemente orientale"; iii, "Le grandi divinità greco-romane"; iv, "Le divinità minori"; v, "Eroi e personaggi mitici"; and an index. To the reviewer these chapters appear of somewhat uneven merit. The treatment of the indigenous cults is sane and conservative. Only the cults of Ἀδρανός, the παλικοί, Δάφνις, πεδιοκράτης, and Ἔρυξ (sic) are demonstrably indigenous. Chap. ii, a good piece of destructive criticism, reduces the Phoenician element in the religion of the Sicilians to a minimum. It should serve as a corrective to the overemphasis on this element by Holm and Freeman. Especially convincing is the treatment of the Heracles myth, which Ciaceri rightly believes represents a Boeotian-Argive influence. In the chapter on the Greco-Roman divinities the author rightly lays stress on the position of Rhodes as the original seat for Sicilian cults

such as Ζεὺς Ἀταβύριος, Ἀπόλλων Καρνεῖος, Δημήτηρ and Κόρη, and upon the position of Syracuse and Gela as disseminating centers. The treatment of the cult of Δημήτηρ and Κόρη deserves special mention. Here, however, it would have been well to have set forth more fully the influence of the Sicilian cult upon that of *Ceres*, *Liber*, and *Libera* at Rome (cf. Wissowa *Religion und Kultus der Römer*, p. 246). The relation between the *θεογάμα* and the *sacrum anniversarium Cereris* seems reasonably sure. The combination by which Ciaceri reconstructs the features of the festival of Ἀρτεμις ἄγγελλος is ingenious and convincing. On the other hand, chaps. iv and v, while valuable as containing convenient narrative summaries of the dispersion of the worship of the minor divinities and the heroes, do not give such clear evidence of independence and conservatism. The treatment of Daphnis, for example, is very slight, not to say sketchy. The author is unacquainted with the excellent study of the Daphnis myth by H. W. Prescott, *Harvard Studies*, Vol. X.

In general, the reviewer has felt that Ciaceri at times has allowed his usually conservative scholarship to be led astray in two directions. On the one hand, we have too persistent an adherence to nature-personifications as the universal solvent for all mythological phenomena. Cf. the treatment of the legend of the *fratres pii* for an example. Again, Ciaceri is led astray by his fondness for conjectural combinations—the besetting sin of all mythographers, ancient and modern. Many scholars will be unable to assent to the attempt to show a relationship between γερέατις, γέρρα: γελεάτις, γαλεάτις, pp. 18, 19. Again on p. 177, even though the current explanations of the epithet βαιώτις as referring to the ears of Aphrodite, or as showing some connection with the fish βαιών are rejected, one may hesitate on historical grounds to believe in the transfer of this cult from the Campanian Baiae to Syracuse. On p. 183, to infer from ἐπὶ ιεροθύτα the existence of a cult of Hestia at Agrigentum is inadmissible, for ιεροθύτης (cf. Stengl *Kultusaltertümer*, p. 46) is a generic term for a sacrificing priest. Other examples might be cited, but these will be sufficient to indicate that, as in all mythographic works, the conclusions of this useful and valuable study must be carefully tested.

GEORGE CONVERSE FISKE

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Adnotationes super Lucanum primum ad vetustissimorum codicum fidem edidit JOHANNES ENDT. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner, 1909.
Pp. xi+445.

Of the two classes of *scholia* on the *Pharsalia*, the so-called *Commenta*—extracts and comments without the text of the poet—and the *Adnotationes*, the former existing in complete form only in the codex Bernensis 370 (C),

has long ago in Usener's *M. Annaei Lucani Commenta Bernensia* (Leipzig, 1869) received scholarly publication. The part of this commentary which also appears in another Berne manuscript (B) has been collated by Hagen (N.J. 131, 277).

The *Adnotationes* have heretofore been available only in the ancient, partial publication of Oudendorp (1728) and the *farrago of scholia*, drawn in part from the former, which Weber supplies in the third volume of his edition of Lucan (Leipzig, 1831). The miscellaneous and uncritical character of these has long been recognized, and the timely task of supplying a new text, based on fuller and more reliable manuscript authority, has fallen to the judicious care of Professor Endt. A thorough consideration of the relative value of the several manuscripts in which the *scholia* appear, in whole or in part, results in the discrimination of an original and a revised form, and the selection of the five manuscripts of the better class (W, C, U, G, P), dating from the tenth to the twelfth century, as the basis of the present text. The revisions of the *Adnotationes* and other *scholia*, which appear in five inferior manuscripts, have been collected and, it is intimated (p. ix), will be published. The deficiency of such an authoritative apparatus is easily discernible in the critical editions of Lucan by Hosius and Francken. The latter knew at first hand those in two Leyden manuscripts (V and U), one of which (V) Endt considers of inferior value (p. ix). The readings of the *scholia*, available to Hosius through Usener, appear in his *apparatus criticus* under (A), but by reason, no doubt, of their limited authority are in repeated instances widely discrepant (e.g., i. 35; i. 402; iii. 39; iv. 199).

To institute a general comparison with Weber's notes would be a bootless task, but it may be observed that his medley at i. 427, which includes the Ciceronian fragment from the *pro Scauro* and supplies Müller's text for it, is reduced in the present edition to: Arverne—de his Cicero ait in Seauriana “Inventi sunt, qui etiam fratres populi Romani nominarentur,” with no variants for *Arverni* (*Alverni*, Weber). Whether the scholiast sins against Cicero, in confusing the Arverni with the Aedui, or whether by bona fide citation he believes Lucan of one of his many sins against history, neither Francken nor Haskins takes the trouble to consider. A commentary on the infallibility of the commentator will be his blundering assignment of “*Phaselus ille*,” etc. (Cat. 4.1), to Plautus at v. 518, and a line of his own poet (i. 230) to Vergil at viii. 380.

The notes are brief in form and are concerned with the usual common-places of historical and geographical comment, free illustration from other authors, and the citation of variant readings, in which particular they will doubtless be considered to have most value, though Francken confesses “raro inventi quod ad emendationem posset adhiberi.” The source of these, at least for the recension W U C, the editor refers (p. xi) to the grammarian Vacca, the admiring biographer and expositor of Lucan. In the uncertainty of his date it is clear from the citation (vii. 471) from Livy's narrative of

the Civil War and two other references to it (x. 471; x. 521) that the original commentary antedates, at any rate, the loss of these books.

The volume contains, besides the *scholia*, the *Vita Lucani* professedly drawn from Vacca, an outline, *De bello civili inter Caesarem et Pompeium*, *Argumenta* before books i, v, vi, vii, viii, ix, and *Periochae* before books ii, iii, iv, x.

As *corrigenda* I note *auctorn on* for *auctor non* (i. 24), and in the *lemma* of i. 260, *I*, apparently, for *T*.

The editor has appended serviceable indices and on the whole has contributed with fidelity a text of ancient *scholia* which may in authority rank with the admirable Donatus of Wessner.

JOHN W. BASORE

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY

Textes grecs inédits de la collection papyrologique de Genève. Par JULES NICOLE. Avec VI planches. Mémoire publié à l'occasion du Jubilé de l'Université, 1559-1909. Genève: Georg, 1909. Pp. 49.

Of the eight Greek texts which Professor Nicole publishes, six are from papyri, one from a parchment fragment, and one from a wax tablet. The earliest form a group of three documents relating to the circumcision of priests in Egypt. These date from the reign of Antoninus, and help to augment the papyrus literature on this subject, which already includes documents at Berlin and Strassburg and from Tebtunis. The wax tablet belongs to the sixth century and preserves Ps. 91:1-7, 10-13, in the Septuagint version. But Professor Nicole's most considerable texts are fragments from Aeschines' *Against Timarchus*, from Thucydides, book ii, and from Demosthenes' First Philippic. These papyri range from the second to the fifth centuries and help to carry back the manuscript tradition of these important works into antiquity. To the four columns of the Aeschines, Professor Nicole appends a collation with the text of Blass. The papyrus is in general agreement with the better class of Aeschines manuscripts. A full series of excellent facsimiles adds greatly to the value of Professor Nicole's volume.

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Griechische Papyri im Museum des Oberhessischen Geschichtsvereins zu Giessen. Im Verein mit O. EGER herausgegeben und erklärt von ERNST KORNEMANN und PAUL M. MEYER. Band I, Heft 2, von PAUL M. MEYER. Urkunden No. 36-57, mit 3 Lichtdrucktafeln. Leipzig: B. G. Teubner. Pp. 104. M. 8.

The first part of the Giessen papyri to be published contains twenty-two documents from the Ptolemaic, Roman, and Byzantine periods, edited

with full introductions and commentaries by Paul Meyer. The earliest are Greek translations of demotic contracts from the reigns of Euergetes II and Epiphanes. Of the Roman documents the most considerable are three decrees of Caracalla, the first of which preserves the text of the *Constitutio Antoniniana* by which the rights of Roman citizenship were extended to the *peregrini* of the empire. The limitations under which this was done are at last made clear by this text, which should take an important place among Roman historical documents. The second decree preserves a supplement to the well-known amnesty proclaimed in February, 212. The indices are reserved for the third and concluding part of the volume.

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Natursagen. Eine Sammlung naturdeutender Sagen, Märchen, Fabeln, und Legenden. Herausgegeben von OSKAR DÄHNHARDT. Band II: "Sagen zum Neuen Testament." Leipzig und Berlin: Teubner, 1909. Pp. xvi+316.

Tennyson's

Glastonbury, where the winter thorn
Blossoms at Christmas, mindful of Our Lord,

and his "passion flower at the gate" well illustrate the kind of folk-tales Dähnhardt has collected. That widespread popular tendency, half faith, half fancy, to interpret the everyday phenomena of nature in terms of religion and religious history, as men understood them, has produced an extraordinary mass of legend of curious interest. In many of these, no doubt, ideas really pagan have been given a Christian turn. Others reflect well-known incidents in the narratives of Jesus' infancy, especially those preserved in the apocryphal gospels, e.g., of Thomas and James, to the wide influence of which these legends bear striking testimony. A favorite expression of this religious fancy was the naming of trees and plants, or perhaps only the explanation of an existing name, from an imaginary connection with gospel or apostolic history, real or apocryphal. The Judas tree is a familiar example. Peter is, of course, a leading figure. The fish which was to enable him to pay the temple tax is variously identified in Italy, Sicily, Flanders, and Russia. The keys of heaven once dropped from Peter's hands upon the earth, and where they fell, the primrose (*Schlüsselblume*) sprang up. Cursing plays a larger part than blessing in these stories: children are cursed by Jesus; Jews are turned to swine by St. Hubert; the annoying mule in the inn stable is cursed by Mary. The mediaeval mind, it would seem, found cursing more edifying, or at least more congenial, than blessing. The great majority of the tales have little charm or force, but they are redeemed by a small number in which native wit or real religious feeling finds quaint

expression. The editor and his collaborators have gathered them from a wide range. Not only every part of Europe, but Malta, Palestine, Iceland, and the East Indies have made their contribution. The legends and sayings are compactly presented in German, with variant forms, if such exist, and full references to the sources. There is an extended bibliography, and an index makes the book easy of consultation.

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Zum aegyptischen Grundbuchwesen in römischer Zeit. Untersuchungen auf Grund der griechischen Papyri. Von OTTO EGER, DR. JUR. Leipzig: Teubner, 1909. Pp. viii + 212. \$1.67.

The Greek papyri discovered in such abundance in Egypt in recent years have thrown much light upon many phases of Egyptian life under the Ptolemies and the Roman Empire. A great many of them relate to the somewhat intricate system of land tenure under which the soil of Egypt was tilled so advantageously to the Empire. Eger has examined a wide range of published papyri in the effort to elicit their testimony as to this land system, particularly as reflected in the land registries which played an important part in it under the Romans. In these record offices (*βιβλιοθήκαι*) were preserved documents establishing the legal status of every piece of land within their jurisdiction. The Romans had inherited from the Ptolemaic administration of Egypt an extended classification of lands: *γῆ βασιλική* or *δημοσία*, *γῆ οἰνιακή*, *γῆ ιερά*, *γῆ προσάδον*, *γῆ ιδιωτική*, and *κατοικώς κλῆρος*. Obviously much of this land was hardly subject to sale, but everything relating to the private and catoeic lands—mortgages, purchases, inheritances, or other transfers—had to be reported to the *βιβλιοφύλακες* for record. In the *βιβλιοθήκη* the legal situation of each parcel was thus steadily reflected. The details of these situations are carefully worked out by Eger on the basis of some 600 papyri, mostly of the Roman period. A valuable feature in the Roman land-office was its accessibility to private persons, who might thus satisfy themselves as to the condition of a piece of property before leasing or purchasing it on what might have proved false representations. The land-office was thus quite as truly a benefit to the individual as to the state. Eger has made a thorough and accurate study of his materials, and his work illustrates the way in which the now multiplying papyri illumine ancient life. An index would have added much to the usefulness of the book.

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